Had the the TSR.2 Survived by Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine

[+dtmdragon]

Had TSR2 Survived.

 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine GCB GBE CBIM FRAeS

 

Sir Patrick Hine’s reputation stretches

far beyond the Royal Air Force where he

shone as fighter pilot, commander and

staff officer. His ability to inspire others

by example was unparalleled in his

generation and he is acknowledged as a

military thinker of considerable clarity.

Since his retirement, after command of

all British Forces in the Gulf War, he has

become Military Advisor to British

Aerospace plc and is a much respected

figure in international aviation circles.

He is well suited to consider the likely

effects ‘Had TSR2 Survived’.

 

I was at the Staff College when the cancellation of TSR2 was

announced in 1965, and at the end of that year I was posted as

Personal Air Secretary to the Minister of Defence for the RAF – Lord

Shackleton. As Sir Frank Cooper has told us, the general view in the

MoD at the time, including that of the then CAS, was that cancellation

had been inevitable – on the grounds of unaffordability and with rising

costs that were out of control.

But my remit today is to offer you a view of how things would

look now if TSR2 had survived, then and subsequently. To do so I

must make at least one assumption at the outset. And that is that,

while the TSR2 project proceeded, the earlier cancellation of the

P1154 stood. It is very important that I put that peg in the ground. In

passing, I should say that I believe it was right to cancel the P1154.

The highly effective off-base operating capability developed by the

RAF on the Harrier could not have been achieved on the P1154 with

its plenum-chamber burning reheat system which would have caused

very severe ground erosion problems. In short, we would have been

trying to run before we could walk, and that could have had a most

adverse, if not fatal, impact on VSTOL in the RAF.

Here then is my scenario.

First, the RAF would, I believe, have got about a decade earlier the

kind of capability it eventually enjoyed with the Tornado GR1. The

avionics may not have been quite so well advanced, nor would the

TSR2 have been so manoeuvrable, but it would have had longer legs,

and in this respect have met the range capability called for in the

FOAS Staff Target. But TSR2 would not, of course, have been

stealthy. The bottom line is that TSR2 showed all the signs of being a

better aircraft than its nearest competitor, the F-111, but there remains

a big question mark over cost and therefore ultimate affordability and

cost-effectiveness.

Next, let us have a look at force structure.

The TSR2 would have replaced the Canberra but, because of high

costs, not on a 1 for 1 basis. Probably no more than 100 aircraft would

have been procured. The RAF’s strike/attack/recce force would thus

have become smaller, unless a second aircraft had been procured, for

which money would almost certainly not have been available.

You will recall that by 1965 the days of the V-bomber force were

numbered as a result of the Polaris decision of 1963 and which the

new Labour Government had endorsed. The Air Staff would probably

have argued for more TSR2s to replace some of the V-bombers – but

only once the programme was secure – and they may not have been

successful.

The TSR2 would have been used for nuclear strike/deeper recce,

OCA and interdiction, but not, except in extremes, for OAS

(BAI+CAS). It was not tailored for those missions and it would not

have been cost-effective in the OAS role. Therefore, another aircraft

would have been needed to replace the Hunters in the UK, Germany,

Gulf and Far East.

Would this second aircraft have been the Harrier or Jaguar, or

something else, perhaps a multi-role fighter like the STOL F-16? I

suspect it would have been the Harrier (HSA needed an order), and

that the Jaguar would not have been procured – it was always the

wrong (or certainly over-elaborate) aircraft for an advanced jet trainer

(the original intention) and with its relatively high wing loading, was

not optimised for CAS. In any event, the UK became involved in

Jaguar as part of a collaborative package agreed with the French,

where our real interest lay in the AFVG which was killed of by de

Gaulle in 1967.

The Lightning was planned to be run-on in the AD/Interceptor role

into the late 1970s and, if TSR2 had survived, I very much doubt that

the RAF could have afforded before then a new fighter as well as

TSR2 and Harrier.

By the mid-‘70s the need for a highly agile fighter like the F-15 or

a multi-role FGA aircraft like F-16 or F-18 had been widely

recognised throughout NATO. There was also the requirement to

replace the F-104 and, in France, the Mirage III; thus an opportunity

existed for a collaborative programme in Europe, as an alternative to

procurement of an American fighter. Industry here in the UK would

have pushed hard for a European programme for an agile fighter – as

would the RAF. But that option was effectively ruled out following

the cancellation of TSR2 and AFVG, and with the Tornado

programme launched instead, because industrial, economic and

political arguments de facto forced the RAF down the Tornado ADV

path. In passing, I would comment that the Tornado was never a real

MRCA, and the ADV certainly was not an air superiority fighter. It

was a long endurance interceptor and has given good service in that

role.

So, if TSR2 had survived, it is likely that the UK or Europe would

have developed an EFA-type fighter ten years earlier than was the

case. The lessons learnt on the Jaguar and Tornado collaborative

programmes would then instead have been learnt on the EFA

programme, but nonetheless a good product would probably have

resulted. Moreover, it is less likely perhaps that the French would have

gone their own way on the new agile fighter, as they did in the late

‘80s with Rafale.

Under this plot, there would almost certainly not have been a

Buccaneer in service with the RAF, unless money had been available

to fill out the force structure. I doubt it: I believe the RAF would have

had only TSR2 and Harrier in the offensive roles.

In the longer term, therefore, the RAF’s combat aircraft front line

would have been: TSR2, Harrier and the Lightning replacement.

As it was, in 1982 we had the Lightning, Phantom, Harrier, Jaguar

and Buccaneer in service. We also still had some Canberras operating

in the recce role – and still do. We thus had six types instead of three,

moreover, without TSR2, the V-bombers had to be run on for longer

than necessary – awaiting the entry into service of the Tornado GR1.

Overall, therefore, in logic there should have been considerable

savings in the logistics support area if proper fleet rationalisation

around TSR2 had been effected.

The big unknown, of course, is how costly TSR2 would have been,

both in capital and life-cycle cost terms; and what impact that would

have had on the affordability of Harrier to replace Hunter and a new

fighter to replace the Lightning. Also, of course, on the size of the

RAF’s front line. A TSR2, Hunter, Lightning fleet into the 1980s

would have been feasible but is not one that would have appealed to

me.

Another question that comes to mind is, ‘Who would have

designed and produced the new agile fighter to replace the Lighting?’

With BAC as prime contractor on the TSR2 and HSA on the Harrier,

it could have gone either way, or it could have been an issue that

brought forward the formation of the nationalised BAe. We shall

never know but there are people here today who will have a view. My

own is that the design lead would have gone to Warton given their

experience by then on supersonic aircraft.

For me the seeds of destruction of the TSR2 programme were

sown back in 1959/60 when inadequate attention was paid to

cost/performance trade-offs before endorsement of the operational

requirement on which the contract was finally based. That costs then

rose so dramatically, particularly at a time when industry was being

forced to rationalise across different cultures, is not too surprising, and

by 1964 when the first prototype flew, the die was probably cast and

the balance of arguments that the MoD and HMG had to address at

that time inexorably led to a cancellation decision. In this respect, I

agree with Sir Frank Cooper.

But that was a great shame, for an affordable TSR2 to the right

specification would have given the RAF the world’s most capable

TSR aircraft and one with at least some potential in the export market

(whereas TSR2 had virtually none when it was cancelled).

For the reasons I have given, the RAF’s front-line inventory would

(or should) have been more coherent than it is today and the Service

would probably have had an air superiority fighter at least ten years

earlier.

I doubt that, structurally, industry would have looked much

different than it does today, except perhaps the process of consolidation in Europe might have been accelerated. Frankly, I doubt

it: the real driving force there has been the pace of rationalisation in

the US since the ending of the Cold War and the formation (or

prospective formation) of mega-giants like Lockheed Martin, Boeing

McDonnell Douglas and Raytheon/Hughes.

Edited April 21, 2017 by dtmdragon

[Piglet_7]

 

jump to 35 min for comments about the TSR.2

Edited April 22, 2017 by LeL

[RUSTYMORLEY]

Personally speaking the F-111 is a fine machine or should I say was when it was in regular service. I think it all came down to money and increasing development costs for the TSR.2 at a time when the F-111 was readily available and in current use by the USAF. 

 

Eventually the decision to purchase the F-111 was itself cancelled but you just couldn't keep throwing away tax-payers money on something like the TSR.2 which was subject to ever increasing delays and spiraling costs. TSR.2 may have made a fine strike aircraft but we will never know if could have delivered the goods.!!!