Bletchley

Hello Test Pilot, Several of the Sopwith and Royal Aircraft Factory machines had a horizontal stabiliser trim (not quite the same as an elevator trim, but effectively the same): Sopwith Strutter, Sopwith Triplane, BE2, RE8, SE5. There was a 'trim wheel' in the pilot's cockpit, and I believe that it is there and can be seen working in at least some of the OFF models. I don't think pilots would have used it in combat, as the effect would not be great or instantaneous, and also mapping it to a lever on the throttle quad would, I think, probably give you too great a range of control - mapping it to key tab, as Olham said, would probably give you a more accurate feel for the historical use :) Bletchley

Hey Rabu :) "I decided to redo the sections, dividing the maps into 12 instead of 16 segments so that each map fits vertically on a letter size sheet better and to cut down the number of maps needed. Each map now covers about 35 miles in width by 45 miles in height" Gordon Taylor beat you to it in 1917:- "For quick and easy reference I had pasted maps of the regions for about 30 miles each side of the lines on pieces of plywood, and had made a holder for these which I fitted beside my seat" (from 'Sopwith Scout 7309'). Bletchley

Weather Forecasting At the outbreak of the war there was no military meteorological service, and weather forecasting as a science was still in its infancy. But as the military situation in France and Flanders settled into its pattern of opposing trench systems, there was a growing need on both sides to predict short-term weather patterns There is little information available in English on either French or German weather forcasting during the war, or on their meteorological service's contribution to the war effort on the Western Front. It is known that the French Meteorological Service already had a well-established network of weather observation stations, and prepared simple daily plotted charts and weather summaries based on daily observations from these stations and on 3-hourly observations at Paris. These French weather charts and summaries are still available today, for the whole of the war period, from the Britsh Met. Office archives in Exeter (England), and presumbly from the French Met. Service archives also. It is very likely that the German Army and Air Service also had access to its own meteriological information, although if there are any surviving records relating to this I am not aware of them. The British Met. Office had access to the French meteorological data, to the data from British weather stations and ships, and from its links to weather organisations in Spain and Scandinavia. This was enough to prepare forcasts based on larger scale weather patterns, such as frontal systems (the term 'weather front' was itself coined at around this time), but was not fine enough to predict local changes in weather along the Western Front. It also provided little information on changes to wind strength and direction above ground level (needed, increasingly, not only by the artillery but also by the Flying Corps and the anti-aircraft units along the Front). Initially, however, the requirement was for accurate and timely predictions of wind strength and direction at ground level, both along the Front as a whole and in specific sectors, to help the Army prepare against the new threat of gas attack from the German lines, and also to support the Engineers by predicting favourable local conditions for British gas attacks against the Germans. In June 1915, therefore, after the first German gas attack at Ypres, two Met. officers went to France to form the Meteorological Field Service, GHQ - 'Meteor' as it was soon to become known. Observers were recruited, mostly from the Artists Rifles. The new service was successful in accurately predicting local wind conditions for Allied gas attacks during the Battle of Loos, and was thereafter established as a section of the Royal Engineers to support RE gas companies. Although observations of surface winds formed the bulk of this early work, both the artillery and the RFC also needed infomation that the Met. observers could provide. The artillery needed information on temperature, wind strength and direction up to 2,000 ft (later to 6,000 ft), to be able to predict the 'drift' caused by wind on artillery shells. The RFC needed information on both wind and cloud formations at altitudes above this - as, at an early meeting with Met. officers at RFC HQ in France, General Henderson remarked that air reconnaisance had to be conducted above 3000 ft because "if they fly lower they are shot down like rabbits". Met. officers were recruited and asigned to Army HQs, establishing a network of weather observation stations along the Front. As the war progressed, the emphasis changed away from gas attacks and towards closer support and integration - first with the artillery, and then increasingly with the RFC and the Independent Air Foce operating from Nancy. Small Met. sections were also sent with RFC detachments to the Dardenelles, Salonika and Italy. The night bombers also required up to date information on the 'sleep winds', the prevailing upper winds that were formed during the hours of darkness. Small weather pilot balloons were used at first, along with sound-ranging and observations of anti-aircraft bursts at different altitudes, and a kite balloon was also obtained for collecting weather observations. But from early 1918 a dedicated meteorological aircraft section was formed to take regular observations of the wind, humidity and temperature in the upper air up to 14,000 ft. These observations are said to have been especially useful before the opening of the final offensive on 8th August. From May 1917 weather observations were also being taken at Calais, initially four times a day, but rising to every two hours by the end of the war. By the end of the war the new Met. Service was producing daily weather reports (these, along with the reports from Calais, are also retained at the Met. Office archives in Exeter) and had expanded from the initial two officers in June 1915 to a final establishment of 28 officers and 187 other ranks. It had become an integral part of the organization of the RAF - subsequently rising to 750 officers and men by 1939, and nearly 6,800 by 1945. Sources Gold, E. Meteorology in the First World War. Weather, vol.5 no.9, 1950. Gold, E. The Meteorological Office and the First World War. Meteorological Magazine, vol.84 pt.996, 1955. Stagg, J.M. The Meteorologic Office and the Second World War. Meteorological Magazine, vol.84 pt.996, 1955. Personal correspondence with Ian MacGregor, Archive Information Manager, Met. Office Archive Bletchley

Hello Catfish I guess stunt-pilots or others may have had specialised carburettors to prevent the engine cutting out when inverted. The problem with the standard float-chamber carburettors (and they were all very similar in this respect, as far as I can tell), has little to do with pressurisation - the main fuel tank was pressurised to deliver fuel either to a smaller gravity tank and/or directly to the float chamber. Then the fuel in the float chamber was "sucked" (technically, pushed) through a tube leaving the bottom of the float chamber to the fuel jet(s) in the carburettor by the difference in air pressure between the venturi and the float chamber (lower at the venturi, higher in the float chamber). When the standard float chamber was in an inverted position the exit tube was on top, and the fuel level was below it, so no fuel would exit from the float chamber. Rotary engines also had pressurised main fuel tanks (pressurised either by the running engine or by a hand pump, or by a small 'windmill' fixed to a strut known as a 'Rotherham pump'). These normally fed a smaller gravity tank, and the fuel would then be gravity fed from this to the fuel jet in the tampier carburettor. I think the only engine that was 'fuel injected' in any way, with pressurised fuel being fed directly to the engine, was the monosoupapes - they delivered a rich mixture to the crankcase under pressure, and from there to the cylinders to be 'leaned' by fresh air entering via the exhaust valve. Because the mixture was so rich at the crankcase, there was no danger of a 'blow-back' from these engines, and so they could be fed by fuel directly from the pressurised main tank (or at least, I think this is the case - I am writing at the moment from memory, so someone else might have to correct me on this. And so I guess that an aircraft with a monosoupape engine might, therefore, have been flown inverted?). Some of the Maybach engines also had a rather complicated system of delivering fuel to the engine, but from memory I think they all relied on a combination of main tank pressure and a gravity-feed, and I know very little about the Argus engines so they may have had a non-standard carburettor. But the Mercedes engines all, to the best of my knowledge, had a standard-type float chamber carburettor. Bletchley

Ther Mercedes D.IIIau and BMW IIIa engines both had float-chamber carburettors that would not feed fuel to the engine when inverted. This is true of nearly all the stationary aero engines of both sides. Bletchley :) http://www.hants.gov.uk/shop/product.php?p...at=0&page=1

The Claims Process British During the early period of the war in the air, from 1914 through to the Spring of 1916, air to air combat was a rare occurence and there appears to have been no official or systematic procedure for recording combat or filing claims. Although the British National Archives (the PRO or Public Record Office as it used to be called) have many, and perhaps most of the combat reports filed during the war (a still unknown number are missing due to theft) those from before April/May of 1916 are rare and far between. During this very early period any air encounter that resulted in an enemy aircraft being forced to apparently break off its mission and dive for home, either 'driven down' or 'forced to land' behind its own lines, was regarded as a 'victory' for the pilot or the aircrew concerned - but not 'awarded' or 'credited' officially to those individuals, as it was seen as bad for the unit's morale if such individuals were singled out for special recognition. Completing the asigned mission was grounds for recognition; fighting the enemy was grounds for unofficial notoriarty; and medals or a mention in despatches would be dependent on the favourable reaction of both the Squadron CO and senior staff at Wing or Brigade HQ. Although combat reports, 'Combats in the Air' as they were officially designated, were prepared by most British squadrons in France and Flanders on a more systematic basis from about April 1916 onwards, using Army Form W 3348, the attitude that individual success was subordinate to the team effort persisted throughout the war, or at least until early 1918 when the authorities reluctantly conceded to pressure from the press to release the names of British and Dominion 'Aces' alongside those of the French and German air services. There was never, however, any systematic or centralised recording or awarding of 'victory' credits to individual pilots, aircrew or units. The different Squadrons, Brigades and Wings had their own ways of dealing with or responding to individual successes of this kind. There was, importantly, no direct link between awards and medals and an individual's 'score' (as this invariably discriminated against two-seater crews, and those condemned to fly the outdated machines), and even the keeping of individual or unit scores at a Squadron level was sometimes discouraged as 'bad for morale'. Pilots who were later singled out for press attention were also often unhappy, as it did indeed seem, in some cases at least, to lead to division or discomfort within the mess. Until June of 1917 the Army form W 3348 did not even have a section for the 'Results' where a claim could be made. From June 1917 onwards the form was belatedly changed to add a 'Results' section, where a number could be placed for Destroyed, Driven down out of control, or Driven down. Pilots would fill in the form after returning from a mission, and then if approved by the Squadron CO this would be forwarded to Wing or Brigade HQ. Some but not all reports had short notes added at this stage, such as 'Decisive' or 'Indecisive', 'Approved' or 'Not Appoved', and typically a short description of the combat from these reports would appear in the next RFC Communique if the enemy aircraft had been destroyed, or was merely listed there if the enemy aircraft had been driven down 'Out of control'. Claims did not necessarily require 'confirmation' from witnesses or the evidence of a crash site - this would have been difficult, anyway, as many of these combats were over the enemy side of the lines - as it was regarded as enough in many cases that the pilot was, generally, both an officer and a gentleman (and 'shooting a line' was regarded as 'bad form' within the mess anyway). During the course of the war the early 'Driven down' and 'Forced to land' claims disappeared from these combat reports, but were replaced by an ever increasing number of claims for driven down 'Out of control' and not seen to crash, about 40% of all claims by the end of the war, and multiple claims were also allowed for cases where an enemy aircraft was shot down by several pilots. Bill Lambert, in his memoirs of serving with 24 Squadron (Combat Report), comments that by mid 1918 "Although the official policy did not countenance the keeping of either unit or individuals 'scores' squadrons and pilots, in some instances, did maintain their own totals...The circumstances surrounding airfighting were such that the exact number of E.A. destroyed or damaged by a unit or pilot could not be precisely determined except in very rare instances and a difference in totals was inevitable. The fact is that while the H.Q. figure was undoubtedly appropriate to the official requirements, that at squadron level probably did fuller justice to the unit or individual". French Although the French Service Aeronautique officially credited their pilots only for enemy aircraft destroyed or captured (no 'Out of control' or 'Driven down' claims), in the early period of the war at least some of the early 'aces' were credited with victories that were never confirmed as crashed. In addition, the French press were the first to coin the term 'ace' and, particularly after Verdun in 1916, there was also a clear desire to publicly promote these 'Knights of the air' to boost morale on the home front. So the top-scoring French pilots, unlike the British and Dominion pilots, received substantial early press exposure - and it is possible that, under these circumstances, the claims of some pilots might not always have been given the same thorough scrutiny that the system required. And although the French system allowed for multiple claims on a single enemy aircraft, as the British did, a large proportion of the victories were credited to these aces with very few of their claims being listed as collaborative. The French pilots were required to make an immediate claim on landing, or risk loosing the credit. The claim was then passed up to the HQ of the operational Zone where it was evaluated. Each operational Zone HQ then published the successful claims in a daily Compte Rendu or Resumee, and the credits published here were regarded as the official confirmation of a victory. United States Those American units under British control (17 and 148 Aero Squadrons) followed British procedures and practice, whilst those under French control followed French procedure and practice. Victories by US pilots under British control were published in the Communiques, and those under French control in the Resumees. After being brought under US control and organised into Groups, victories were then published in the General Orders of the relevant Army, although the claims process continued to reflect predominant French procedures and practice. Multiple claiming appears to have been common in this period. German On paper at least, and probably in practice for most of the war, the German system of claim and credit for air to air victories appears to have been the most organised and thorough of all the combatants. Combat reports were required by each pilot for every victory claim, and were claimed as 'ds' or 'diesseit' (our side); 'js' or 'jenseit' (their side); or as 'zLg' or 'zur Landung gezwungen' (seen to land). the 'zLg' claims, although they could be a part of the pilot's personal score, were not officially acknowledged as a 'victory' unless the enemy aircraft landed behind German lines, and as the war progressed these appear to have been largely phased out. All 'js' or 'ds' claims required witnesses, although as most 'ds' claims fell behind the German lines the wreckage of the aircraft or captured aircrew were usually there to support the claim. The 'js' claims were more problematic, as there was no evidence on the ground to support the claim - in practice, very similar to the British 'Out of control' type of claim. After claiming a victory the Jasta pilot would prepare a combat report, which would go to the CO for approval. This would then be passed to the HQ of the relevant Army for approval, and from there to the Kommandierende General der Luftstreikrafte (Kogenluft) for final approval and confirmation. If it was then approved at this level a document, with a victory number asigned, would go back down the chain of command to unit level. The victory was then published in Kogenluft's Nachrichtenblatt der Luftstreikrafte (the Intelligence Report of the Air Service) and in the weekly 'Wochenbericht' reports of the relevant Army. It was a strict system of one credit to one 'victory', without allowance for multiple claims (except for the multi-seat aircraft, where each crew member received one credit). Disputed claims often went to 'the biggest Kannone', but if such a dispute could not be resolved the credit was awarded to the unit rather than an individual. This system was not in place immediately the war broke out, and it is likely that the early victories of 1914 and early 1915 would have been evaluated less thoroughly. By early 1917 there is also some evidence that the system may have started to 'loosen up' as the war dragged on into its third year and more 'aces' were required by the press to bolster morale on the home front. From January 1917 onwards the precise location for each victory was no longer required for publication, and further details were dropped from May 1917. Although some aces (Manfred von Richtoften amongst them) maintained scrupilous details for all claims submitted, others did not (Goering, for example, apparently stopped supplying serial numbers for aircraft claimed after the end of 1916). The system might then have gone into something of a 'melt-down' in the final months of the war, the last official victory credits, up to August 1918, being published at the end of October 1918, and an apparent increase in the more nebulous 'js' claims (up to about 40% of the total, perhaps the same proportion as the 'Out of Control' claims being made by British and Dominion pilots). There is also a suspicion that at least some of the later German aces, who went on to add a significant number of victories in a very short period of time in the final months, were by then overclaiming at a similar rate to that of some pilots on the Allied side. Sources PROCAT (British National Archives catalogue) Lambert, Bill. Combat Mission. Corgi, 1975. Olynyk, Frank. Claims documentation (The Aerodrome Forum) Barrett, Tilman. Victory claims (The Aerodrome Forum) The information for an apparent 'melt-down' in the German system in the final months of 1918 is taken from a recent discussion of German claims on The Aerodrome Forum, from information supplied by Russ Gannon and others, although responsibility for this interpretation is mine. Bletchley

It would be nice to have the accuracy/effectiveness of the AA separated out from the AI pilots again. Although I know that the increases in AA quantity is taken care of by date-based changes in the game, the accuracy and effectiveness of the AA on both sides increased by leaps and bounds as the war went on, and in previous patches to OFF this could be reflected by manually changing the AA setting from "Easy" in 1915 through to "Realistic" in 1918 without also changing the effective range of AI pilots' machine guns (which remained fairly static, I think). Or has this also been taken care of within the changes made? Bletchley

I do that allways Moritz :) On the first mission you get, just ignore the mission objectives and fly around the airfield making a note of important landmarks and compass bearings from them back to your field. I never use the M key in game, unless my aircraft is on the ground, so I do rely upon Rabu's map and my memory to fix the location of my airfield in relation to the local topography, so I find a first flight of this type essential. Historically, new pilots often spent a whole week or more, sometimes even longer in a quiet period, putting in extra flying hours on the squadron type (they were often woefully short of hours on the type used by the squadron, having been sent over with only experience of older types in training) and finding their way around the local sector. But I like the idea of a specific mission of this type to kick off the campaign - I guess this could be added to the campaign as a feature by making the first mission in any campaign a 'lone wolf' type mission - if you had to follow a leader, I think you would spend too much time keeping the leader in sight and not enough time looking at the ground. You could do the same in Quick Flight, but then there would be danger of running into an enemy... Bletchley

If you wan to escape (I usually do), I find it helps to hit the deck and jink from side to side. The AI have a hard job to hit you then, and will often just follow you without even shooting. Doesn't allways work, but 'hedge hopping' has got me back safely many times now :) Bletchley

I made a test flight in the Albatros D.III, and I am very pleased with the changes to engine performance at changing altitude. I can now fly this aircraft up to 15,000 + ft. without having to touch the mixture control, which is just as it should be, I think (it had no manual mixture control). The D.III powered up nicely to 5000-6000 ft without any apparent loss of power, and I could see that best rpm was obtained at around 3000-4000 ft (indicating that the carburettor has now been leaned slightly for take-off, as I believe it actually was). After 6000 ft there is a noticeably loss of power and fall in rpm, but the D.III can still get up to 10,000-12,000 ft fairly comfortably, more slowly up to 15,000 ft, and then much more slowly thereafter which fits the historical data very well. I havn't tried any other aircraft yet, but I am hoping similar adjustments will have been made. Hats off, and a big thank you, to the developer chaps - I notice other players are also finding these and similar adjustments to be an improvement. I am looking forward to trying out the rest of the aircraft :) To those that are experiencing problems with the Sopwith Triplane, note that this aircraft (like other Sopwith aircraft: Strutter and Pup, although I am not sure if the one on the Pup was needed or was even functional) had a horizontal stabiliser trim wheel within the cockpit - so you could legitimately use the CFS3 trim controls to make the Tripe a little less tail heavy in flight. Bletchley

Hello All, Claims Currently flying a very early RFC campaign in Bristol Scout (February 1915, 20+ missions 10+ hours, 1 claim) and having great fun - but I got to thinking about the claims process, and how this changed (at least for the RFC) over the course of the war. In the early part of the war, if I remember correctly, the whole claims process was a lot more relaxed than later - the RFC was never that keen on acknowledging individual pilot 'scores', and in the early years at least if a pilot said that he had shot down an enemy a/c or even sent it down 'out of control' this was enough, at the squadron level, to validate a claim (after all, they were all officers and gentlemen, and a gentleman's word is his bond...) even to the point of allowing several pilots to share a claim for one enemy a/c. I think the claims process was tightened up as the war went on (I am currently re-reading Bill Lambert's memoir, and by 1918 this process certainly seems to have been tighter) but over-claiming is now accepted as being rife in the RFC up to 1917 at least. To get a 'realistic' score as an RFC pilot, therefore, I think it is probably acceptable to adopt the more relaxed claims option in the workshop settings: 1915 : Easiest 1916/17: Easy 1918: Normal Flight Altttudes Flying altitudes increased as the war progressed, so, in the workshop settings: 1915: 3000 ft 1916: 10,000 ft 1917/18: 18,000 ft Bletchey (aka Bletchley, but a slip of the finger in registering...)

Thanks for the name change! Bletchley again :) MK2, here is Lambert's log book entry for that engagement (p.154 of my copy): "4/7/18; 8.00 a.m. to 10.00 a.m.; 1084 [serial no. of SE5A]; 120-min.; 1000 feet; trench strafing; one OK on 100 Fan. (one bomb on 100 ground troops.); put one A.A. crew out of commission with guns; attacked by three E.A.; crashed first one with 100 rounds of Vickers; fired one round at second and got stoppage. Hung on his tail until he crashed; one down damaged and foced to land." And his recollections: "Slightly to the west lots of Archie bursts showed Hazell and Selwyn were busy over Hamel. Daley and I joined thm as they climbed for altitude. At 2000 feet Archie was busy and accurate. I heard a deep grunt close behind and below; 1084 bounced like a cork on rough water but had not been hit or I would have felt it. I took a quick look into the sun and saw three bright flashes of light. Enemy aircraft with the rays of the sun reflected by their wings. I closed up to Hazell and pointed towards the flashes which seemed to be at about 6000 to 8000 feet and two or three miles east of us. Within seconds a large formation of black dots started down out of the sun. Hazell rocked his wings and climbed followed by the rest of us. As we reached 3500 feet we saw Fokker D.VIIs, Albatros D.Vs and Pfalz D.IIIs in a large formation of 20 or 25. They were all colours and included a couple with all-white wings. The formation was led by five Fokkers flying abreast and 50 yards apart, the others spread out fan-wise behind them. This was the first attack of its type I had witnessed. Since I had re-rigged the 1084 she outclimbed the other S.E.5s and was posibly 200 feet above the nearest which was Hazell. The formation closed the gap at about 100 miles per hour, the Germans nose down, ours pointed up. Within seconds we were together. Those leading D.VIIs with ten Spandaus spouting flames and lead seemed intent on crashing into anything in front of them. Being slightly higher I aim into the others behind. The five Fokkers pull into a tight climb, turn and come in behind our crown. A clever trick. Two D.IIIs and a D.V pass 300 or 400 feet below me. A fast half-roll and 1084 has her nose aimed at the D.V. Full throttle and close to about 100 yards behind. I press the Vickers button. Too much of a hurry; his nose goes straight down and he escapes. I spot a Fokker in a favourable position 100 feet below and half a mile west of me. With the sun behind, 1084, at full throttle, swings down and closes on that D.VII. Evidently he has not seen me as I dive in directly behind him. I aim a few yards ahead of his nose. About 50 yards serarate us as I fire both guns. He hears them, turns in his seat, and with one look slams his machine straight into a spin almost to the ground where he levels out and heads south. My lead was off. I was almost vertical while the German was horizontal and was leading him by a couple of yards which proved too much. Two other D.VIIs are bearing down on me so I head towards some S.E.5s nearby. I was in no mood to tackle them by myself. An Albatros D.V appears riding hard on the tail of an S.E. which is diving and twisting, trying to escape those bullets. Time to do something; 1084 leaps forward under full throttle and comes in for a fair deflection shot from my Vickers at about 50 yards. The German leaves the S.E.5 below him and turns to give full attention to me. We have our own private war for a few minutes but neither gets into position for effectiv shooting. I manage to fire about ten rounds of Vickers and my tracers seem to enter his cockpit. In haste, that German noses straight down and is gone. I watch him dive towards the ground, a couple of thousand fet below. I am thinking of nothing but that D.V, my mind a complete blank to anything else. Suddenly bullets are flying all over us; poor old 1084 stops some of them. I fee them hit her and see tears appear in the wings. I look back and see a light blue and silver Pfalz 75 yards behind and above with flashes of flame coming from her nose. At the same instant I pick up two Fokkers above and to my right who are also sending out plenty of lead. I not only see all this but I can hear those guns firing. For a second fear and panic hit me. How did I let myself in for this? We are at about 1500 feet. I glimpse another S.E.5 hanging on its propeller ten yards below the Pfalz and firing both guns. Then the German falls into a spin. The two D.VIIs are still on my tail which was well up in the air. 1084 must be doing close to 200 m.p.h. as I dive. I feel her quiver and pull the stck gently back into my belly. The next thing I know is I have one of the D.VIIs just right in my sights and 20 yards away. All I have to do is press the button and my Vickers fires about 100 rounds, the pilot receiving at least half of them. He does not come out of that dive until he hits the ground. How did 1084 get into position for such a perfect shot? I do not know. I must have blacked out for an instant. The other D.VII is possibly 150 yards in front of and below me. Full throttle and nose down and the distance is just 40 yards. Back on the stick a bit, slight pressure with my right foot and my target is just right. From no more than 20 yards I fire my Vickers. Only one shot leaves that gun. A fine time for a stoppage! I try to clear it but no luck. That German is almost within touching distance. His nose is well down and 1084 still on him with the ground 800 feet below us. We hang on to that Fokker and literally drive it into the ground near what had been Warfusee where it crashes and burns. My one bullet may have done the job, but I doubt it. That would have been a rare shot. More likely the pilot was paralysed with fear and could not move. By now I am below 500 feet. In the distance are several S.E.s, D.VIIs and D.Vs, down low in a general mix-up. I see the remains of four planes burning on the ground. Are any of he ours? I clear the stoppage and get my Vickers firing again. We engage a yellow D.III and try to close the gap from about 100 yards behind. From out of the blue sky an S.E.5 with a streamer on his tail appears. Must be Selwyn. He is 20 to 30 yards behind the Pfalz when he fires. I see the pilot jerk back, almost upright, then slump forward in his cockpit. The plane falls and spins into the ground in a burst of flame and smoke. Up at 1500 feet are six S.E. and eight or ten D.VIIs and D.Vs. I climb and swing around in a wide circle to come in from the east. A Fokker is about 100 yards behind an S.E. which seems to be in trouble. Soon 1084 is on the tail of the D.VII. Short bursts from my Vickers and Lewis at about 100 yards and he starts down in a jerky manner. Maybe his controls are cut. I watch him land and roll into a shell hole. Another Fokker comes at me broadside from the right and, at about 150 yards, tries a hard deflection shot. But he fires too soon and 1084 is not touched. However, his is a determined cuss and gives me a rough time for a few seconds. Neither of us can position for a shot and he finally pulls out. Below, two S.E.s chase an Albatros D.V. From the streamer on his tail one is either Hzell or Selwyn so the German is in trouble. Within seconds, his nose goes down and a small trail of smoke starts. I do not watch the end as another Albatros going east catches my eye. I follow and give him a couple of bursts with no luck. At that instant a highly decorated Fokker flashes past only 20 feet from me. An S.E. is close behind the D.VII. I hear his Vickers and Lewis crackling as he roars by me. I last see them diving in about the same relative position. The fight has really developed into something vicious; the Germans do not want to quit and it feels as if we have been at it for an hour. I check the time. Holy smoke! This affair has lasted only fifteen minutes. How could all that action take place in such a short time? Our S.E.s reassembled. All present..." Interestingly, Henshaw's record for that day shows only one Fokker D.VII, claimed Out-of-Control by Hazell, for that date, and the Jasta War Chronology lists no losses that would fit this engagement. ? Bletchley

Thank you Galand! That is the sort of fascinating detail that only a family source can provide. Photo-recon photographs would often be taken in the early morning or late evening, as the shadows cast by objects would reveal details for analysis that would otherwise be missed. Possibly a practice shot of their own field by a recon pilot based there? Thank you for sharing this, and the history of the field. Bletchley

It is by W.C. 'Bill' Lambert DFC, "Combat Report". My copy is a paperback published by Corgi, 1978, but there was an earlier hardback publication by William Kimber, 1973. My pbk copy has photos, but no sketches. I have not seen the hbk publication. Captain Bill Lambert was an American, he joined the RFC and trained in Canada, and flew with No.24 Squadron RFC 'C' Flight from March-August 1918 (approx. 20 claims). He had a bad crash, but survived the war to be demobbed in 1919. I think he later served as a Colonel in the US Air Service. Thanks for posting that sketch - very interesting. The date fits, and the Allied a/c look like the SE5A, which he flew with No.24 Squadron :) Bletchley