Olham

I could only read from Jannen's book so far, that the Russian population felt very "brotherly" towards the Serbian people, who were also Slavonian. The Tsar did not dare for example to say, that he would not back them up against Austria. He was well aware, that Austria had to punish Serbia to a certain extent, but he had to make sure, it was not too hard. One point of Russian interest must have been, who controlled the Balkans and the Dardanelles. They wanted no Austrian expansion towards that region, but rather see the terrain in the hands of Slav nations.

Okay then - I have checked Wikipedia about him, and here is: Robeeeeeeeeeert Buuuuuuuuuuuurns! And the Haggis poem too. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burns_supper

My Jasta 2 pilot has got his Albatros painting changed a little bit. Returning from a tough mission (his flight attacked 5 French Nieuport 17, when suddenly a flight of 6 Sopwith Pup appeared and joined in; now the Entente fighters outnumbering his flight), he had landed already, when this flight of 4 BE2c came passing his airfield at Bertincourt extremely low, and only 3000 feet away. He went up again and brought one down with his last ammo. He would have prefered the two-seater to land and surrender, but then it suddenly exploded in bright flames, and the crew jumped.

"Brattle" might be "trippeln" in German - a tiny sound made by small feet. Thank you for explaining and translating, Flyby - now I know what the "Burns" is about (I'm a barbarian not to know him, I suppose - sorry).

This is for Cameljockey, but also for everyone interested in old field maps and airfield locations. The field which was used by the German Jasta 6 is still open and without any buildings.

Yes it would - but the French have their pride. They would certainly not want to have red Fokker Triplanes flying over their towns. They would rather re-open an airfield Guynemer or Fonck operated from.

Ah, I see, thank you, Carrick. Still, it would be helpful, if the text of the rhymes was in English.

For Tsar Nicholas, mobilization of Russia was a rather slow event, which did not mean war automatically. For Germany though, the situation was extremely different. Russia and France had an alliance, and Germany lay between them. France felt the need for revenge for the Franco-Prussian wars, were it was beaten. And France urged Russia to mobilize. I'm not sure, if the Tsar or Sazonov really could imagine, what their mobilization would mean for Germany. A fully mobilized Russian or French army would bring those two allies into the position to be able to crush Germany in a two-fronts war. A tempting idea, even if it was not the intention firstly - once the armies stood ready - who knows what would follow? So German military plans all said, that as soon as one of the two countries would mobilize, Germany would have to mobilize as quick as possible too. And even more - Germany would have to attack and beat the French army in a sort of "Blitzkrieg" (lightning-fast war), before Russia's troops could put Germany in serious dangers. Once France would be beaten, they would quickly turn and send most troops to fight Russia. Every high ranking European or Russian military officer knew that. Still though, the Russians did not seem to fully understand this dilemma. Whatever the Kaiser and the Tsar felt and tried to prevent - there were military strategic plans, and a lot of pressure from the military commanders, not to leave their countries unprotected. Tsar Nicholas felt, that his own people would probably turn against him, if he let Serbia alone. Kaiser Wilhelm could not watch Austria-Hungary getting overrun by Russia. And so, both monarchs did not dare to keep stuck to their felt opinions, that the other would not attack them.

Here is one attempt of mine, to translate one telegram by Count Berchtold into English. A difficult task, when you look at the somewhat stiff and circumstancial style. Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff (ambassador) in London Telegram Nr. 170 W i e n , den 26. Juli 1914 Chiffr. 12 Uhr 10 M. a. m. 27./7. Telegram cyphered Herr von Tschirsky (German ambassador to Vienna) has told me today as ordered, that according to a telegram sent by Duke Lichnowsky on 25. 1. M., 3 h PM, Sir E. Grey had sent to him the draft of an answering note of Serbia, and that he had remarked in an attached privat note, that he hoped, - according to the conciliatory tenor of this answer - the Berliner cabinet would advocat for it's acceptance in Vienna. I regard it as appropriate, that Your Excellence come back to this towards the secretary of state, and to advise him of the fact, that almost at the same time, when he sent this note to Duke Lichnowsky, namely yesterday at 3 h PM, Serbia had already ordered the general mobilisation of her army, which proves, that there was never a liking in Belgrade to bring this matter to a peaceful holding. This, as it seems, even earlier telegraphed to London answer was - with a content not according to our demands - only handed over to the k. & k. attaché in Belgrade at 6 h, after the carried out ordering of the mobilization. To me, the tone of the note seems to show, how little Count Berchthold ever thought of the British mediation attempts.

Javito, this is a great link, which I had no knowledge about before! Those telegrams are touching, as they demonstrate the friendship as well as the helplessness of both monarchs, to avoid the catastrophy. I found, that this link contains loads more of documents about that time and the developments. So I post here the basic link, in addition to the above. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/1914_Documents

They created lots of versions over the centuries, Hasse Wind - possibly to make the country appear larger? So, down in London, they spell Birmingham "Burmingham", but in Birmingham, they say "Birmingim". And in Scotland - well, that's a different story again.

Welllll - it was a German field. And I don't think the French would allow that again.

The William Jannen book has the remark "A perfect companion to Barbara Tuchman's THE GUNS OF AUGUST" on the cover. I had already bought Hew Strachan's "The First World War" in German, so I would read that next. Do you know both, perchance? And could you make a comparison?

I don't think so - I just found the wat... - arhem - I just don't think so. (I'm flying from that field in the "Krauts vs Crumpets" Campaign right now.)

So you guys understand that? Is it Sco'ish??? We didn't learn that in school.

??? ??? Burns night???

Good detailed addition, Hasse Wind - maybe human beings are made like that: they have to burn their fingers on the hot oven at least once, until they understand it's hot, and what that does to fingers.

What have you done over Christmas and New Year's eve? Any pics, anyone? Here are some of mine. We first had thick snow (bottom pics - the right one shows our Rescue boat in Norddeich harbour), then after Christmas it got really sunny. The top mills are two of the three Dutch gallery windmills we still have in my hometown Norden; the lower two are in thea fishermen's village Greetsiel 14 km from Norden.

A rather sad Christmas time for you then, TSmoke - I'm sorry for you and your family.

You may find some minor parts thrown behind the shoulders by the mechanics like bolts and stuff. Any larger, recognisable part would almost certainly be collected long ago. So, I would much rather like to know, if there may be parts of aircraft or paperwork or such, in the attics of any of the houses nearby. Apart from that - if you want to find shells, you only need to walk over farmland in the war zones. You will almost certainly find something. They still compile 13 tons of unexploded shells and granades every year! Here is a link of a site showing many such finds - if you watch this slideshow, your neckhair may raise: (you may adjust the speed in the upper right corner) http://www.flickr.com/photos/glosters/sets/72157616167273771/

PS: thanks for that book tip, Lou - I heard the title before and will try to find a German translation.

The ultimatum was not drafted together with Germany, but, as RAF_Louvert says - Germany did not know it any earlier than the other Great Powers. The Kaiser had urged Vienna via diplomats, to punish Serbia, and to be firm this time. He did not like the Serbs at all. The Kaiser did not want war. When his advisors urged him to mobilize, he said he did not believe "Nicky would attack us" (he had a friendly, almost fatherly attitude towards Tsar Nicholas. And the Tsar reacted similarly; he said, that Germany, if it wanted war, could have easily attacked them some years earlier, when they had been weak. He even withdrew the first order for general mobilization according to his feelings about the Kaiser - unfortunately, Sazonov and the Russian Generals convinced him little later to order full mobilization). The thought to fight Russia, before it would grow too strong and before it would finish it's new and important railway system, was rather a military thought. This is not quite true. Once Serbia had assured herself of being backed by Russia, they tried to push it towards a war again. Sir Edward Grey I think was the first who came up with that "Stop-in-Belgrade" and then negotiate scenario for Austria-Hungary. Almost everyone incl. the Kaiser had come to the conclusion, that they should follow that "Stop-in-Belgrade" scenario. It was okay for all, that Austria-Hungary needed to punish the Serbs and get them to accept tighter rules for the future. Austria-Hungary though said, that the Serbian answer to the ultimatum promised almost nothing (which is true - it was very vague and open, and there were points they wouldn't accept at all). Austria-Hungary was determined to hit them hard and teach them their lesson this time; parts of the military staff wanted to crush the Serbian army once and for all. The Kaiser did NOT urge the Austrians to make an ultimatum. The Germans left it in fact rather too much open, which measures Austria-Hungary should take. All the Kaiser said was, they "should be firm". The Kaiser and many other politicians from all nations thought for a too long time, that the conflict could be regarded isolated as a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Only when he understood, that Russia would go as far as mobilizing against his ally Austria-Hungary, he began to understand how far the Russians might go in backing Serbia. This he did neither foresee, nor did he want to fight a bigger war about all this matter. What I do see in the detailed description of those days, is that the Kaiser as well as the Tsar, Sazonov and Bethmann were quite unbalanced and uncertain, how to decide and act - a shakyness which is dangerous in such days. The only one who acted and remained "firm" was Berchtold - unfortunately. He was the one who should have changed his mind. If you like to read it all in very detail, Jannen's book is one I'd really recommend.

That's right, Lou, Jannen's book explains that in detail. What I wrote about was all the time before that Schlieffen plan (which meant to occupy the south of neutral Belgium, to get hold of the necessary railway lines for bringing the troops to northern France). General Moltke held back the troops on request of the chancellor, although the military got very nervous about the Russian movements and those of France, which also ordered troops to the frontier now. And now a very terribly misleading report reached Sazonov, saying, that Germany was mobilizing already - which was at that time not true. From there on, the iron logic of Great Power military madness followed it's own rail like a train with no driver. The only other chance would have been constructive talks that could have brought a change about. But it seemed to need all that bloodshed, crushed men and shell ploughed soil, to chisel it into their and their children's brains - that a war of Great Powers has only losers. No one really wins, and what did we all lose...

Javito, if you read William Jannen's book "The Lions of July", you will find a very detailed reconstruction of the diplomatic attempts to prevent that war. Kaiser Wilhelm did, as well as Tsar Nicholas, not at all want that war. The war was much rather provoked by Serbia, who knew Russias promise to stand by it's ally; by a stubborn Austria-Hungary; by the very dangerous French ambassador in Russia, Maurice Paleologue (who wanted that war; and who lied, cheated, delayed, shortened or disinterpreted important messages); and by rather unbalanced German politicians (here, Gottlieb Jagow made thing rather confusing; and in the last critical days, chancellor Bethmann seemed to have lost most of his nerves). The very critical balance of Great Powers (almost everyone expected a war sooner or later), and the unability of the diplomats to communicate, what most of them prefered - no war - led to this desaster. When Russian minister Sazonov and the generals decided, that they had to fully mobilise to stop Austria-Hungary from going too far against Serbia, the deadly iron dice began to roll. Germany had warned everyone repeatedly, that if Russia would go from a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary in the south-west to a full mobilisation also along the borders of Germany, Germany could do no other but mobilise. It could not risk to get crushed between Russia and France. The Kaiser and the Tsar both knew too well, that their monarchies would probably come to their ends through national uprisings - they both did not want this war. The men who saw all this coming and made the best mediation attempts, were British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey, and German ambassador in London, Prince Max von Lichnowsky, who wanted a better relationship and friendship with Great Britain. Great Britain did not want to get dragged into a European war, only because it had to back France, which would back Russia, which would back the Serbs. Unfortunately, none of the mediation proposals turned into real talks. They were in the end assisted too late strong enough by the German chancellor, and brushed aside by a proud and stubborn Austria-Hungary. With the consequences we all know.

In our "Krauts vs Crumpets" Campaign, Jasta 6 got the Fokker Triplane now. After our first clash, 56 RFC will never try again to turnfight us, surely.