Semi OT : New WW1 Book

[Bullethead 12]

I'm currently reading a new book called Home Before the Leaves Fall, by Ian Senior, ISBN 978-1-84908-843-5. Despite being published by Osprey, it's a big hardcover running about 400 pages.

 

Anyway, as you can probable guess from the title, this is another look at the events of August-September 1914. You could see it as a replacement for the venerable The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman, with more recent research and improvements, plus finer detail. And it's a very good read.

 

The book begins with a description of the evolution of the opposing war plans. In this discussion, Senior gives passing notices to the now-discredited revisionist work of Terence Zuber, who in 1999 said there'd never been a "Schlieffen Plan". After this, the primary focus is on the events of the German right and French left wings once the Germans had gotten through Belgium. The narrative thus really picks up in the 3rd week of August, from which it becomes a day-by-day account through mid-September in the immediate aftermath of the Marne.

 

The battles of Charleroi and Guise are covered in good detail with lots of maps. The last 3rd of the book is a thorough tactical treatment of the Battle of the Marne, which was actually 2 separate battles (the Ourcq and the Petit Morin) fought about 50 miles apart, something I hadn't known until now. The narratives, besides the big-picture decision-making and movements of units, are liberally interspersed with many extracts from the memoirs of participants in the front lines, which are quite informative.

 

All in all, I think this is a very good book. Check it out.

[Hasse Wind 46]

Sounds interesting. I'll have to add it to my list of WW1 books.

 

The Marne battles have received attention in recent years. There's a relatively new book by Holger Herwig (a well-known WW1 historian) called The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World. I haven't read it yet, but Herwig is a respected author.

 

Unfortunately I don't speak much French, so I don't know how much their historians have paid attention to the events of 1914 in recent years.

[Panama Red 22]

_{Thank you, just ordered it per your recomendation. :sohappy:}

Edited August 8, 2012 by Panama Red

[Dej 17]

Your recommendation and summary are good enough for me, BH. Ordered,

[Bullethead 12]

Damn, I wonder if I can ask the author for a cut of these sales ;).

 

BTW, to keep this more on topic, I should have mentioned that aerial recon is mentioned many times in this book. No details about it (no units, plane types, etc.), but what is clear is that a great many key decisions on both sides were taken as a result of it. So air power definitely had a big effect on this campaign. I'm sure most folks here know that already, but I like to point it out for the benefit of those who think WW1 airpower had little effect on the outcome.

[HumanDrone 4]

But can they add this aspect into WOFF? Can you imagine "flying" as we do, and having to make reports only as to what we see on the ground?

 

Still, since we're only two weeks away, I don't want to suggest anything that would jeopardize the release!

 

I'd order the thing if I didn't already have a drawer full of half-read books. Life...

[Bullethead 12]

Well, I finally finished this book. I hope those whom I inspired to get it have enjoyed it as much as I have. I had all sorts of things delay me in finishing it, but none of them were the fault of the book. And in fact I'm rather glad these delays happened because, by coincidence, they eventually got me in synch with the calendar, so that often I read of events on the same calendar day of 2012 that they happened in 1914. Thus, I kept thinking, "Damn, 98 years ago this very day, this stuff was happening!" and this, in turn, made me relucant to read more than that single day's chapter even when I had the rare opportunity. Despite my 4+ decades of what passes for literacy in this degenerate day and age, I had never before had this experience with a history book. It gave it a sort of RPG flavor.

 

Anyway, my opinion of the book has only improved during the relatively long period (compared with most of my brainfodder) I've had to digest it. It's both a ripping yarn in its daily narrative parts and an intelligent, logical, and convincing argument in its analytical parts. Personally, I have never been satisfied with any explanation previously available in the US of the German failure in 1914 because all this side of the Pond have smacked of propaganda for 1 nation or even 1 faction within 1 nation. This book seems, OTOH and from my American POV, to be a fair treatment of the real whos, whats and whys of the matter.

 

Given that I'm resurrecting a long-dead thread here, I figure it's now safe to discuss the particulars of the book's thesis without spoiling it for anybody. But just to make sure the range is clear, I'm asking here and now if there's anybody who'd rather not discuss this just yet. Speak now or forever hold your peace.

[Olham 164]

Thanks for this pronounced book tip - I will get it some day (maybe for Xmas).

You could make a big red mark-up text line saying

"Don't pass this line, if you don't want to spoil the book for yourself."

 

I won't participate here any further, cause I want to read it first.

But this is a forum for discussing such stuff, so carry on, Bullet.

 

.

Edited October 1, 2012 by Olham

[Bullethead 12]

OK, Olham, from now on, consider this thread a

 

SPOILER ALERT!!!!

 

 

 

 

 

Essentially, Senior says that the version of the Schlieffen plan championed as infallable by the post-war "woulda-coulda-shoulda" crowd, who crucified Moltke the Younger, wasn't a complete plan. This was the 1910 (IIRC) version, the last for which Schlieffen was responsible and what Moltke the Younger inherited. First off, this version of the plan contemplated only a 1-front war against France alone. Second, it had essentially zero thought put into the logistical problems imposed by a very strong German right wing moving at the highest possible speed at the greatest possible distance from sources of supply. Senior makes a very good argument that this version of the plan was completely unworkable and that, had the war not started when it did, with crops either still in the field or just harvested but not yet moved to market, the right wing would have starved to death.

 

So, Moltke based his strategy on the the last 2-front war plan, which IIRC was 1906. This meant fewer Germans on the Western Front to start with. Also, Moltke was much more concerned with the right wing's logistics than Schlieffen had been, and decided not to put more troops there than he thought he could supply, which as it turned out was still too many. Finally, the Germans had great difficulties with their chosen method of communications, which was voice telephone. This made them fall back on radio, which they weren't equipped to do. The bottom line was that German HQ lost touch with what was happening at the front. Part of this could be blamed on Moltke not moving the operational HQ ahead of the Imperial HQ, but a lot was due to the reliance on telephone instead of the long-established and easier-to-maintain telegraph, and the insufficient means of radio to fill the gap.

 

The bottom line is, Senior says the Schlieffen Plan was unworkable due to 1) a 2-front war, 2) the logistics of the right wing, and 3) the inadequacy of German communications between armies and HQ, and between adjacent armies. Combine these failings with the normal amount of Clauswitzian frictions, plus the expected amount of army commanders with troublesome personallities and rivalries, and you have the recipe for defeat, given an enemy with resolve in the face of intial disaster. And that's what Joffre turned out to be, although nobody on either side expected much out of him beforehand.