Fubar512

Or sink Japanese destroyers, submarines, and armored Daihatsu barges in the Pacific Theater, not to mention one Nazi Corvette, numerous F-lighters, and at least two Schnell boats in the Med. Oh, and a brace of PT boats held off a wave of Japanese strike aircraft near the Solomon Islands, in broad daylight, downing at least three of them.

"Motor Mac's" (engineer's) station on an Elco 80 footer. Talk about being in the hot seat! The 658's web page: http://www.savetheptboatinc.com/new_page_9.htm

Radars today display the set range somewhere on the screen. For example, the image that I posted earlier shows the radar is at a 12-mile setting, so each ring corresponds to 2 nm out from the center. Most of the equipment today is pretty idiot-proof. However, it all means nothing unless one is paying attention.

What we need is a good PT-sim that covers the Pacific, Med, and North Sea theaters. Taking on the Tokyo Express in the slot (off the Solomon Islands), barge-busting along the New Guinea coast, interdicting Axis convoys off Sicily, and fighting Schnell boats in the North Sea. Vosper, Elco and Higgens boats for the Allied side, versus Italian MAS boats, the aforementioned Schnell boats, flak lighters, Daihatsu barges, etc. Killerfish Games, take note!

If you are referring to the sort of water effect that SF2NA has, the simple answer is no. SF2NA uses a LOD-based terrain with more advanced terrain shaders, the older titles use a TOD-based one, with fairly simple shaders, that do not take full advantage of the DirectX shader libraries.

Commercial radar sets often integrate AIS onto the display, along with target data tags. For example, this is a Furuno FAR series display. Note the AIS target data on the right side.

In my experience, not very messy. While one often does see a series of "pacmen" (small dots) appear to randomly propagate across the display from a radar-equipped target, I've never seen it interfere with determining the range or the relative bearing of said target. And, from what I've seen, the Crystal's AIS set was functioning at the time of the collision, so the Fitzgerald would have known its heading, speed, and vessel name, and that it was a "dangerous target" (meaning that it was on a collision course), from the AIS tag that would have appeared on their navigation radar. For those of you who do not know what AIS is, here's a wiki page on it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_identification_system

It's in the "Rules of the Road" module of the CG Master's exam. The minimum passing grade for that module is a 90, for obvious reasons. The other modules (the minimum passing grade for them is 70) are deck general, navigation general, and what they now refer to as "plotting". When I took a prep course for my master's ticket back in the dark old days of the 1980s, one of my fellow students, a middle-aged lady who was an attorney by trade, commented that it seemed every bit as hard as passing a bar exam...LOL

Typhoid, there are few circumstances where a warship does have the right of way over another (non-constrained) vessel in open waters. A carrier during aircraft launch or recovery maneuvers is just one example. 38 CAUTION WITH REGARD TO SHIPS APPROACHING FORMATIONS, CONVOYS, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND OTHER WARSHIPS AT SEA AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AT ANCHOR Formations and Convoys 1 The attention of shipowners and mariners is called to the danger to all concerned which is caused by single vessels approaching a formation of warships or merchant vessels in convoy, so closely as to involve risk of collision, attempting to pass ahead of, or through such a formation or convoy. 2 Mariners are therefore warned that single vessels should adopt early measures to keep out of the way of a formation or convoy. 3 Although a single vessel is advised to keep out of the way of a formation or convoy, this does not entitle vessels sailing in company to proceed without regard to the movements of the single vessel. Vessels sailing in a formation or convoy should accordingly keep a careful watch on the movements of any single vessel approaching the formation or convoy and should be ready, in case the single vessel does not keep out of the way, to take such action as will best aid to avert collision. Aircraft carriers 4 Attention is drawn to the uncertainty of the movements of aircraft carriers, which must usually turn into the wind when aircraft are taking off or landing. While operating aircraft, aircraft carriers will show the lights or shapes as prescribed by Rule 27(b) of Schedule I of the Collision Regulations. Aircraft carriers may display red or white flight deck lighting during night flying operations. 5 Mariners are warned that by night, aircraft carriers have: (a) their steaming lights placed permanently off the centre line of the ship and at considerably reduced horizontal separation. (b) Alternative positions for their side lights: (i) on either side of the hull, (ii) on either side of the island structure, in which case the port bow light may be as much as 30.5 m (100 ft.) from the port side of the ship. 6 Certain aircraft carriers exhibit anchor lights as follows: Four white lights located in the following manner: - In the forward part of the vessel at a distance of not more than 1.5 m (5 ft.) below the flight deck, two lights in the same horizontal plane, one on the port side and one on the starboard side. In the after part of the vessel at a height of not less than 4.6 m (15 ft.) lower than the forward lights, two lights in the same horizontal plane, one on the port side and one on the starboard side. Each light is visible over an arc of at least 180°. The forward lights visible over a minimum arc from one point on the opposite bow to one point from right astern on their own side, and the after lights from one point on the opposite quarter to one point from right ahead on their own side. Ships which operate helicopters 7 Mariners are warned that certain ships of the Maritime Command operate helicopters and cannot manoeuvre freely when helicopters are taking off or landing. Such ships are fitted with hangars and landing platforms, and when operating at night use red or white flood lighting. 8 By night, such ships in addition to the lights prescribed in Rule 27(b) of Schedule I of the Collision Regulations may exhibit the following lights: (a) Red aircraft warning lights on the foremast, visible 360°. The lights will be on continuously when a helicopter is in the vicinity of the ship. (b) A cluster of six red, green, or yellow lights, mounted on the after side of the helicopter hangar, visible from red 090° to green 090° through the stern. These lights will be used intermittently as required when helicopters are landing. © Subdued white flight-deck illumination lights. These lights will present a general white glow to other ships. (d) White, high intensity, flight deck flood lights, fitted on the after side of the hangar, visible from red 090° to green 090° through the stern may be used after the helicopter has landed. (Red deck lights and flood lights may be used instead of white.) (e) Lighting associated with Helicopter Operation may be shown in addition to masthead lights, side lights and overtaking light, at the discretion of the officer in tactical command (OTC). Replenishment-at-Sea 9 Canadian and Allied Warships in conjunction with auxiliaries frequently exercise Replenishment-at-Sea. While doing so the two or more ships taking part are connected by jack-stays and hoses. They display the signals prescribed by Rule 27(b) of Schedule I of the Collision Regulations. 10 Mariners are warned that while carrying out these exercises the ships are restricted both in manoeuvrability and speed. Other vessels are to keep well clear in accordance with Rules 2 and 18 of the above Regulations. 11 Lights and shapes carried by North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mine Countermeasures Vehicles. Mariners are warned that Canadian, Allied Warships and Helicopters engaged in mine countermeasure activities, cannot manoeuvre freely whilst so engaged. These ships/aircraft may be encountered singly or in formation. Attention is directed to the lights and shapes displayed during these operations: a. Minehunters Ships engaged in minehunting will show the lights or shapes prescribed in Rule 27(f) of Schedule I of theCollision Regulations. Minehunters normally work in conjunction with small boats and inflatable rubber dinghies from which diving or mine disposal operations are conducted. These may be up to 1,000 metres from the minehunter. When showing the lights or shapes prescribed in Rule 27 (f) of Schedule I of the Collision Regulations, other vessels should not approach closer than 1,000 metres of the minehunter. When a dinghy is being used to operate divers or conduct mine disposal operations, the minehunters in addition to the lights and shapes prescribed above will: (1) By Day: Display Flag 'A' or Flag 'B' of the International Code of Signals as appropriate. (2) By night: (a) Signal the letter 'U' by flashing light when approached by other vessels. (b) Make a warning signal in accordance with Rule 36 of Schedule I of the Collision Regulations if approaching vessels do not take avoiding action. b. Diving Dinghies (1) When operating divers or conducting mine disposal operations, the dinghy will be required to: By day: Display/be prepared to display Flag 'A' or Flag 'B' of the International Code of Signals as appropriate when approached by other vessels. (2) By night: (a) Display/be prepared to display an all-round white light in accordance with Rule 23© of Schedule I of the Collision Regulations. (b) Be prepared to show a signal to attract attention in accordance with Rule 36 of Schedule I of theCollision Regulations. c. Minesweepers (1) Ships engaged in minesweeping will show the lights or shapes prescribed in Rule 27(f) of Schedule I of the Collision Regulations. Other vessels should not approach closer than 1,000 metres from the minesweeper. (2) In addition, the minesweepers may carry the following Station-Keeping Lights: Two vertical white lights, dimmer controlled, visible from 020° before the beam on either side to right astern. In smaller minesweepers, where the lower light may not be visible through the whole area, it may be necessary to carry two lower lights, one on each side, visible from 020° before the beam to right astern. d. Helicopters The helicopter shall be equipped with a quick flashing amber light to indicate that gear is being towed.

Judging by that image, I'd say that it was the other way around. I'd wager that the Crystal's damage points to the 'Fitz having been picked up by the former's bulbous bow, at the time of impact. If that is the case, it was fortunate that the Fitz's keel didn't buckle right then and there.

If one looks at the damage to both vessels, it is evident that it wasn't a simple crossing scenario. The damage to the Fitzgerald from the ACX Crystal is more in line with a vessel that was approaching from abaft the starboard side, perhaps at a relative bearing of port 060 or less. And, the real question is who was overtaking whom? A bunch of maritime lawyers are going to be arguing this one for a while. Do you believe that maritime incidents involving crossing scenarios are simple, and that the they always rule in favor of the stand-on vessel? Read the court of inquiry decision on the Andrea Doria versus the Stockholm. And 1977 Frenchie, Rule 5 will be the key here, as it appears that both crews failed to comply with it. Rule 5 -- Lookout INTERNATIONAL INLAND Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Rule 5 is a short rule that places a large responsibility on the mariner. Rather than specific duties, equipment, places, times, and number of persons, Rule 5 requires the master to decide how best to maintain a proper lookout. Instead of giving us precise guidance on the adequacy of the lookout, the Rule uses vague terms such as "proper" and "appropriate." Only in this way could the Rule reasonably provide for all vessels at all times. Requirements covering even the most common situations would have been intolerably detailed and complex. The lookout requirement of Rule 5 relies heavily on common sense and good seamanship. If you are able to comply with the Steering and Sailing Rules (Part B of the Rules) and with Rule 34--all of which depend on lookout information--you will no doubt have met the demands of Rule 5. A proper lookout, therefore, provides all the information needed to comply with those Rules. If the information collected by the lookout is insufficient, then the master must intensify his or her lookout efforts (for example, by turning on the radar) or reduce the need for information (for example, by slowing a fogbound vessel). The "information gap" that sometimes opens between the amount of information collected and the amount needed to comply with the other Rules is a leading cause of most collisions. Too often vessels collide because they their masters have either ignored the gap or have filled it with assumptions. An appreciation of the lookout requirement will take the mariner halfway toward avoiding collisions. Definition and Purpose of the Lookout What is a "lookout"? Perhaps the most common image that leaps to mind is that of a lone seaman wearing yellow foul-weather gear and a navy watch cap, stationed at the very bow of the ship and peering out into the gloom to catch a flicker of light or the moan of a foghorn. This perception is misleading. The term, as used by the Rules, denotes not a person but rather the systematic collection of information. Responsibility for maintaining a proper lookout lies with the vessel's operator, not with a subordinate designated as "lookout." The vessel's operator--that is, master, watch officer, or person in charge--is the lookout manager. If the operator can keep a lookout personally, then coordinating the collection and analysis of information is relatively straightforward. But if the operator, that is, the decision-maker, must rely on others to gather the information, then management of a proper lookout becomes more complicated. The operator must ensure that information on the vessel's surroundings is detected in a timely manner and promptly communicated, so that he or she can correctly analyze the situation. The purpose of the lookout is simple, so simple that it can easily be overlooked. As the purpose of the navigation rules is to prevent collisions, it follows that the purpose of the lookout is to collect the information needed to avoid collisions. This fundamental reason for maintaining a proper lookout is something to keep in mind. Duty of the Lookout Traditionally, the duty of the lookout was to watch out for vessels, lights, and other objects (such as reefs, shoals, and icebergs) by sight and hearing alone and to report their presence to the vessel's operator promptly. The lookout was allowed some discretion on what to report in crowded waters and would be assigned no other duties that would interfere with this important function. Although the traditional principles of the lookout are still pertinent, today's mariner has tools available that greatly extend the distance over which information can be detected. Today, a proper lookout is a team effort. Yet the master of the vessel is the one held accountable. For this reason, the master must see to it that each member of the lookout team is competent in the use of equipment and diligent in the performance of that duty. The master, who knows the vessel's needs for information and who has the authority and the Rule 5 responsibility, should determine the duties of each member of the lookout team. It is the master's duty to ensure that a proper lookout is maintained at all times. That duty cannot be delegated. Tools of the Lookout Sight, hearing, and "all available means" are tools of the lookout. While not too long ago "all available means" was limited to the spyglass, modern mariners have a wealth of tools with which to extend the human senses. Human sight and hearing have, of course, their limitations. Near sightedness may be uncorrected or poorly corrected. Even good eyesight is affected by environmental factors such as ambient light, weather conditions, water spray, or wind. Fatigue can also affect vision, as can moving between extremes of light. Similarly, hearing my be impaired. The noise of wind and wave and ship's machinery may mask the sound you want to hear. The blast from a ship's own whistle blocks out other noises and will temporarily, perhaps permanently, reduce the hearing of the lookout. Hearing testing would be advised. Fortunately, mechanical means for maintaining a lookout are available. "Available" to Rule 5 means "shall be used" in appropriate circumstances. Some of these "other means" are listed below: Binoculars Radar VHF bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone Automated radar plotting aids (sometimes called collision avoidance radar) Differential GPS (DGPS) satellite navigation equipment Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) radio transponders Vessel traffic services Navigation and piloting instruments Radar has assumed such importance on modern vessels that Rule 6 (Safe Speed) and Rule 7 (Risk of Collision) discuss it specifically. Most commercial vessels are now fitted with radar, and probably anyone who has seriously ventured out on the water has some concept of what radar is and what it does. Why then are there so many radar-assisted collisions--collisions that occur even though the other vessel was observed on the radar screen? And why are there still night-time collisions when the radar was either not turned on or not observed? As with most tools, radar will not provide any benefit unless used, and used correctly. A lookout may check an empty radar screen and believe nothing is there because he or she can't see anything. What may have happened, though, is that a weak contact with a small nearby vessel is lost when the radar operator twisted the sensitivity knob to reduce sea-surface clutter. Collisions occur because radar observers rely on capabilities the radar does not have. A lookout may observe a contact on radar, begin to form a mental pisture of the other vessel, an possibly make a course change. A few minutes later, upon checking the screen, the oberver "confirms" the other vessel's imagined course and speed a not leading to a collision. In making this "confirmation," the radar observer has incorporated a string of assumptions into the process. If the oberver had taken the time to plot the tracks, rether than rely on assumptions, he or she would have seen that the vessels were in fact on a collision course. We cannot emphasize enough how important it is to distinguish between assumption and fact in your decision making. Consciously seek out, do not unconsciously suppress, conflicting evidence. It is very difficult to calculate mentally another vessel's relative course and speed after observing a radar blip two or three times--difficult to the point of impossibility. Assumption making is not one of the "other means" referenced in Rule 5. If you are fortunate enough to have more advanced (computer-enhanced) radar equipment, your job will be easier; just keep in mind that all aids have their limitations. Do not assume a machine will do your job for you. Some mariners believe that radar is not necessary on clear nights, yet collisions continue to happen in those conditions. In one such instance, a ship not using its radar ran into a large, newly constructed oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The platform was inadequately lighted, but so are many other vessels and objects. Just because you can't see something at night in good visibility doesn't mean it isn't there. Rule 5 does not require the installation of radar, but if radar is installed it must be used whenever it would contribute to the quality of the lookout. What are your obligations if radar is installed on your vessel but is not working properly? Rule 5 does not require that mafunctioning radar be used. If the problem is temporary, such as signal blockage caused by a heavy rainstorm, the use of radar can be suspended but not abandoned. Radar can be carried one step further by incorporating a computer to calculate the courses and speeds of other vessels the radar detects. The computer than relates that information to the vessel's own course and speed. The automated radar plotting aid (ARPA) displays position, course, and speed for each target and signals when it detects risk of collision. Some ARPAs will also display the projected future track of each vessel, all against the background of an electronic chart of the area. Because all of the information on the vessels comes from radar, ARPA's technical limitations are the same as radar's. However easy it is to become overdependent on radar, it is much easier to relinquish the lookout function, including decision-making, to the magic-box ARPA. A poor understanding of this very useful tool may lead the unwary mariner into extremis. Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) have been implemented in some areas to advance the state of the art even further. AIS uses radio transponders in much the same way as the mandatory aircraft T-CAS collision avoidance system uses Mode-S radar transponders to transmit encoded information from each aircraft to other aircraft in the area and to air traffic controllers. In the case of the shipborne AIS, this information can include vessel identification, GPS/DGPS position, course, speed, navigation status, dimensions, or cargo. Combined with a display capability, AIS presents critical navigation and vessel traffic information to the bridge team. AIS systems at present are limited and have not been standardized, although an international standard is being actively pursued, and it seems likely that carriage requirements for such equipment will follow adoption of an international standard. In many situations the best way to find out if other vessels are in the area is to ask. A blind call on the radiotelephone may elicit an answer from an undetected vessel, or a call about traffic to a known vessel may produce useful information, such as any planned course changes. In a number of heavily trafficked areas the mariner can call a vessel traffic service (VTS) for advisory information. The VTS operators keep track of all major vessels' positions, course, and speeds, as well as accumulate information on navigation hazards. This service will be discussed in more detail with Rule 10. The tools available to aid the mariner in maintaining a lookout will continue to develop. The use of shipboard radar transponders in conjunction with ARPAs and radiotelephones, for example, is being explored. The continued exploitation of microprocessor technology will make available new means for maintaining a proper lookout. Whatever changes the future will bring, Rule 5 will continue to require that the person directing the movement of the vessel know the benefits and limitations of any new devices and be able to use them. Continuing education is part of the navigation rules. Prevailing Circumstances and Conditions A proper lookout is that which is sufficient to prevent a collision, without any allowance for good luck, in the prevailing circumstances and conditions. Tp give substance to this definition, we offer more specific observations: A lookout in the open ocean can be less intense than one in coastal or inland waters. It cannot, however, be abandoned--midocean collisions do occur. A lookout on a vessel at anchor is required, with the level of effort depending upon the location of the anchorage, depth of water, type of ground tackle, wind, currents, waves, and so forth. The lookout should determine whether the anchor is dragging and should warn other vessels of the anchored vessel's presence. The means and methods for maintaining a lookout vary with night and day. At night, lookouts should make greater use of binoculars and radar. Masters should post observers away from the vessel's own lights so as not to impair the night vision of the lookout. During the day and in good visibility, a vessel can be seen at a much greater distance , as indicated by the fact that a masthead light for the largest vessel need be visible for only six miles and for the smallest vessel, only two miles. During daylight, and under the most favorable conditions, the watch officer on a large vessel may perform the lookout alone. The size and arrangement of a vessel have a direct bearing on the effort required to maintain a proper lookout. On small vessels where there is an unobstructed all-around view and where there is no impairment of night vision, the craft's operator may both steer and keep the lookout. Unobstructed view, simple controls, no distractions, and high maneuverability are important here. Visibility is generally the key factor in maintaining a proper lookout. As the visibility decreases, the level of effort to maintain a proper lookout increases tremendously. Sight needs to be augmented by hearing, radar, and radiotelephone. Unless you are in the open ocean, you should seek precise navigational information. In the case of low-lying fog, at least one person should be positioned high enough to see over the fog. Full Appraisal of the Situation and Risk of Collision These last words restate the purpose of Rule 5. It is this broad objective that you should keep in mind when managing the lookout. If there is not enough information to assess the situation, you should tap all your resources to gather more. If you are still unable to acquire the information you need, then you should take steps immediately to reduce your requirement for information--for example, by slowing or stopping. Otherwise, you are violating Rule 5. This is not one of those circumstances where doing more with less is a virtue. Although it is true that the determination of a proper lookout is left to the mariner, it is also true that courts of law assign as a contributory fault the lack of a proper lookout in a very large proportion of collision cases.

Charlielima, that wasn't always the case. I was part of the USS Ling's volunteer crew during the early 1980s. We kept her well-maintained back then, and I experienced a bit of what life must have been like on a fleet boat during her heyday. Two of my fellow volunteers, Frank McGill and Herb Georges, were also coworkers of mine and had served on Fleet and GUPPY boats during the late 1940s and early 1950s (one was an NCO, the other, a Commissioned Officer, who was also a Ling plank-owner). Another volunteer (Dean Smith) was just out of the USN, having served on a Sturgeon-class SSN. I recall them complaining to the staff at the Naval Museum that the boat was irretrievably stuck in the mud, back in 1981, after we performed an impromptu waterline inspection prior to a chip 'n paint session. The inside of that boat gleamed as if it were awaiting inspection. We even had the radar and radio working at one point. It was cool listening to HAM operators around the world tapping out conversations in Morse code, and seeing the Court Street bridge's bright return on the SJ radar's Phosphor display. From what I've heard, even if they were to dredge a channel through the mud and into deeper water, she would probably not survive being towed to a proper dry dock facility. I am truly saddened to see her in that state. If I can dig up any of the snap shots I took of the Ling (in her better days), I will scan and post them.

Heck, I've been aboard the old "Mame" in Fall River (35 years ago!), the USS New Jersey in Camden, and the USS Texas in LaPorte. I want to visit the USS North Carolina, as a late co-worker of mine served on her from mid-'42 - early 1945.

Heck, have you ever visited the USS Texas? It's an experience. It was a ship designed back in the day when the average sailor was less than five foot eight in height. I found myself having to walk around slouched over below decks.

When one takes into consideration that dreadnoughts were for the most part, practically obsolete by 1914 (replaced by the "super dreadnoughts"), so Michael is correct. The Helgoland class, the majority of US battleships, and many of the Royal Navy's BBs, were "old" ships by the beginning of WW1. Technology was advancing by leaps and bounds back then. When the USS New York and Texas entered service in 1914, they were allegedly the most powerful battleships afloat. Three years later, they were considered just so-so.

Major Correction. At the time of her sinking, she was the USS Ostfriesland: http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?137746 Here's a recent sonar image, along with coordinates. The wreck lies in 400 feet of water, so I doubt that I'll be checking it out any time soon. If I am not mistaken, the original USS New Jersey, and the USS Virginia, are resting a short distance away (as is the USS Monitor). http://atlanticwreckdivers.net/Mitchell/Mitchell.html

http://www.app.com/story/news/new-jersey/2017/04/11/perfect-storm-ship-sunk-off-nj-next-week/100344998/ After several months' delay, the ship that helped rescue seven people during "the Perfect Storm" is scheduled to be sunk off the New Jersey and Delaware coast next week, state officials said Tuesday evening. The Coast Guard cutter Tamaroa will join other ships forming an artificial reef about 26 miles off Cape May at ceremony next Tuesday, barring bad weather, said Larry Hajna, a spokesman for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. The 73-year-old ship, which also had a distinguished career in World War II, had been scheduled to be sunk late last year. It was delayed when lab tests confirming the ship was free from cancer-causing PCBs — a prerequisite before sinking — came in later than expected. The sinking comes a few months after the 25th anniversary of "the Perfect Storm," a confluence of three weather systems off the New England Coast in October 1991 that generated 40-foot waves and wind gusts over 70 mph. The Tamaroa’s crew helped save three people on a sailboat before rescuing four of five crewmen of an Air National Guard helicopter that had to be ditched in the ocean when it ran out of fuel during a similar rescue mission. The ship gained fame when its exploits were documented in Sebastian Junger's 1997 book, "The Perfect Storm," and three years later in a film starring George Clooney. News of the sinking had generated significant interest among former crew members ever since word of the Tamaroa's fate broke in October. Many would rather see the ship used as a reef than demolished for scrap metal. The ship already had a decorated history as the Navy's USS Zuni, towing crippled U.S. warships across the war-torn Pacific in World War II and aiding in the invasion of Iwo Jima. It was transferred to the Coast Guard shortly after the war and spent almost a half-century conducting search-and-rescue operations along the East Coast. The Tamaroa was decommissioned in 1994. A decade-long effort by a group of veterans to restore the ship ended when its hull sprang a significant leak in 2012, causing hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage. The Tamaroa will join the Navy destroyer USS Arthur W. Radford 120 feet below the ocean's surface on the Del-Jersey-Land Reef, which is managed by Delaware, New Jersey and Maryland.

Indeed, M$ must be quite upset that their "new" OS (it's coming up on its second anniversary), is not sparking anywhere near the amount of interest that they had envisioned. http://www.zdnet.com/article/windows-10-versus-windows-7-whose-numbers-do-you-trust/

This is all that I could find at Wine HQ regarding Strike Fighters. https://appdb.winehq.org/objectManager.php?sClass=version&iId=13349 https://appdb.winehq.org/objectManager.php?sClass=version&iId=22396

I haven't seen a 'Union 76" logo since that chain left my area in the early 1980s, or about the same time that Phillips 66 pulled out out of the Northeast.

Check out the name of this boat design. Those of you that are familiar with the H.G. Wells novel "The War of the Worlds" will get it immediately. https://www.safehavenmarine.com/the-boat

Raven, I am glad that you're back and doing better.

All one needs is an accurate 3-view of the desired "subject", the appropriate software, and a 3D printer.

One of my favorite actors, who was in many of the James Cameron's hit movies, from The Terminator , to Aliens, to Titanic, and recently starred in the television series "Training Day". Dead at 61, from complications due to heart surgery. RIP, Bill Paxton. http://people.com/movies/bill-paxton-dead-complications-surgery-age-61/

WWII destroyers still providing action off of the lower Keys. As artificial reefs, that is! This video is interesting, as this gent fishes some 12-16 nm offshore of the Keys.....in a 14 foot kayak! A kayak made of roto-molded plastic, essentially the same material that plastic drums, kid's toys, and garbage cans are made of. His approach to this, if anything, is bold. Anyway, enjoy!