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I'm trying to get my hands on a jane's subscription but it's a little too expensive to stealth card ;) I don't think 'if you love me you'll get me a jane's subscription' will work. IF I can get it you can send me a list of stuff you need data for and i'll try digging it up.

here's some stuff dug up from janes and other places Sir Bedivere class (LANDING SHIP LOGISTIC) (LSLH) IN SERVICE: 1 Name No Builders Laid down Launched Commissioned SIR BEDIVERE L 3004 Hawthorn Leslie, Hebburn-on-Tyne Oct 1965 20 July 1966 18 May 1967 Displacement, tons: 3,270 light; 6,700 full load Dimensions, feet (metres): 441.1 × 59.8 × 13 (134.4 × 18.2 × 4) Main machinery: 2 Mirrlees 10-ALSSDM diesels; 9,400 hp (7.01 MW) or 2 Wärtsilä 280 V12 diesels; 9,928 hp(m) (7.3 MW) sustained (SLEP); 2 shafts; bow thruster; 980 hp(m) (720 kW) (SLEP) Speed, knots: 17 Range, n miles: 8,000 at 15 kt Complement: 51 (18 officers); 49 (15 officers) (SLEP) Military lift: 340 troops (534 hard lying); 18 MBTs; 34 mixed vehicles; 120 tons POL; 30 tons ammunition; 1-25 ton crane; 2-4.5 ton cranes. Capacity for 20 helicopters (11 tank deck and 9 vehicle deck) Guns: 2 or 4 Oerlikon 20 mm. 4-7.62 mm MGs. Countermeasures: Decoys: 2 Plessey Shield chaff launchers. Radars: Navigation: Kelvin Hughes Type 1006 or Racal Decca 2690; I-band. Aircraft control: Kelvin Hughes Type 1007; I-band (SLEP). Helicopters: Platform to operate Lynx, Chinook or Sea King. Comment: Fitted for bow and stern loading with drive-through facilities and deck-to-deck ramps. Facilities provided for onboard maintenance of vehicles and for laying out pontoon equipment. Mexeflote self-propelled floating platforms can be strapped one on each side. Sir Bedivere had a SLEP in Rosyth from December 1994 to January 1998. This included lengthening by 29 ft an enlarged flight deck, new main engines and a new bridge. The helicopter platform was lowered by one deck, which has reduced the size of the stern ramp. Due to be decommissioned in 2011. Based at Southampton. SIR BEDIVERE (R G Sharpe) 1153934 APPROACH TO and BATTLE FOR STANLEY (Parts 41-49) Part 43. "SIR GALAHAD" & "SIR TRISTRAM" BOMBED WEEK ELEVEN, Falkland Area Operations, 7th-13th June 1982 on to 44. 3 Para Battle for Mt Longdon Summary of Main Events ARRIVING AIRCRAFT: HMS HERMES - Last 2 of 4 Harrier GR.3's of 1(F) Sqdn RAF 4 Wessex HU.5's of No.847 NAS TASK FORCE SHIPS IN AND AROUND TEZ (at time of surrender on 14th) CV Hermes, Invincible; DD Bristol, Glamorgan (Exocet damaged), Cardiff, Exeter; FR Brilliant, Broadsword, Active, Ambuscade, Arrow, Avenger, Andromeda, Minerva, Penelope, Plymouth (bomb damage); Assault ships Fearless, Intrepid; RFA's Blue Rover, Engadine, Fort Austin, Fort Grange, Olna, Resource, Stromness, Tidepool, Tidespring; LSL's Sir Bedivere, Sir Geraint, Sir Lancelot, Sir Percivale, Sir Tristram (bomb damaged); RMAS Typhoon and minesweepers Cordella, Farnella, Junella, Northella, Pict; Transports Atlantic Causeway, Baltic Ferry, Canberra, Elk, Europic Ferry, Lycaon, Nordic Ferry, Norland plus submarine force, hospital ships in RCB, repair ship in TRALA, and some tankers (Sheffield, Ardent, Antelope, Coventry, Atlantic Conveyor and Sir Galahad lost) AIRCRAFT AND SHIP LOSSES 1. Plymouth damaged in Falkland Sound off San Carlos Water (8th) 2. SIR GALAHAD mortally hit and Sir Tristram damaged off Fitzroy (8th) 3. Fearless LCU F4 sunk in Choiseul Sound; 3. Argentine aircraft lost - [a67,a68,a69] Skyhawks (8th) 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE LOCATIONS 4. 3 Para on Mount Longdon (12th) 5. 45 Cdo on Two Sisters (12th) 6. 42 Cdo on Mount Harriet (12th) SHIP DAMAGED (continued) 7. Glamorgan damaged and helicopter [b34] Wessex destroyed 17 miles south west of Stanley (12th) 5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE LOCATIONS 8. 2 Para on Wireless Ridge (14th) 9. 2nd Scots on Tumbledown Mountain (14th) 10. 1/7 Gurkhas behind Tumbledown Mountain 11. C Coy 1/7 Gurkhas at Goose Green 12. 1st Welsh Guards and A & C Coys 40 Cdo to the south west of Mount Harriet 13. B Coy 40 Cdo in defence of San Carlos Water OTHER AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND OPERATIONS 14. Argentine aircraft lost over Pebble Island - [a66] Learjet (7th) 15. British aircraft lost at Port San Carlos - [b33] Harrier GR.3 (8th) 16. 'Black Buck 7' - Vulcan raid on Stanley (12th) 17. Argentine aircraft lost in Mount Kent area? - [a70] Canberra (13th) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The decision was now taken to use the LSL's to continue 5th Infantry's move forward. "Sir Tristram" reached Fitzroy on Monday 7th to start unloading ammo, and in San Carlos Water, "Sir Galahad" took on board the rest of the 1st Welsh from "Fearless" before sailing around Lafonia to arrive on Tuesday morning (8th). By now, only one LCU and a Mexeflote were left to complete offloading "Sir Tristram", and although by early afternoon, Rapier SAM's and 16 Field Ambulance had gone ashore from "Sir Galahad", plans to move the Guards to Bluff Cove to join the rest of the battalion had come to nothing. Worse still, the LSL's had been reported by enemy observers, and around 2.00 pm, five Skyhawk's of Grupo 5 and five Daggers of Grupo 6 were coming in over the Falklands. First to be attacked by the Daggers, but in Falkland Sound was frigate "Plymouth" on her way to bombard an Argentine position on West Falkland. Hit by cannon fire and four UXB's, one of which detonated a depth charge, she was only slightly damaged. Shortly after, the Skyhawks reached Fitzroy. Three of them put two or more bombs into the crowded "SIR GALAHAD", and the other two hit "Sir Tristram" with two UXB's killing two crewmen. The ships caught fire and were soon abandoned, but by then the results for "Sir Galahad" were catastrophic with a total of 48 killed - five RFA crewmen, 32 Welsh Guards and eleven other Army personnel, with many more badly burned and wounded. "Sir Tristram" was later returned to the UK for repairs, but the burnt-out "Sir Galahad" was scuttled at sea as a war grave on the 25th June. As the FAA's last major effort continued, four Grupo 4 Skyhawks attacked troops in the Fitzroy area later that afternoon, and minutes after, four Skyhawks of Grupo 5 arrived over Choiseul Sound to catch LCU F4 (belonging to "Fearless") sailing from Goose Green to Fitzroy with 5th Infantry HQ vehicles. Hit by one bomb, which killed the coxswain, Colour Sgt Johnston (post QGM) and five of the crew, she shortly sank. Two No.800 Sea Harriers over head on CAP immediately dived to the attack and brought down three of the Skyhawks with Sidewinders [a67, a68, a69]. During the week, both Land Forces and 5th Inf HQ's moved to Fitzroy and 3 Cdo Bde's to Mount Kent, and although the "Sir Galahad" disaster caused delays, planning continued for the attack towards Stanley. In the first phase, 3 Cdo Bde would take Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet, and if possible Tumbledown Mountain and Wireless Ridge. Otherwise these two plus Mount William would be assaulted in phase two, and Sapper Hill and the ground south of Stanley in phase three. As part of the build-up, 3 Cdo continued its reconnaissance patrols, and the special forces their covert operations, but with casualties. Only the previous week, an SBS sergeant was killed in an accidental clash with the SAS, and over on West Falkland, as the SAS kept a careful watch on the two large Argentine garrisons there, an observation post near Port Howard was surrounded on Thursday 10th and Capt Hamilton killed as he tried to fight his way out. With seven of the eight infantry battalions and all five 105mm batteries forward, the first phase started on the night of Friday 11th, and by next morning 3 Cdo Bde was on Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet, but during the night there were other losses. The supporting warships shelled Argentine positions in the mountains, and near Stanley, a house in the capital was hit killing two women and mortally wounding a third in the first and last civilian deaths of the war. Then as destroyer "Glamorgan" (pictured above) retired out to sea after 45 Cdo's attack, a land-launched Exocet fired from Stanley hit her in the hangar area, badly damaging that part of the ship, killing thirteen men and destroying her Wessex [b34]. The second phase was delayed until Sunday night (13th), but by the morning, 2 Para had taken Wireless Ridge and 2nd Scots were on Tumbledown, but too late for the Gurkhas to assault Mount William in the dark. The movements during the week of the attacking battalions, including the Gurkhas (less C Coy at Goose Green) are covered by Parts 44-48. As for 40 Cdo and the 1st Welsh, the badly depleted Guards stayed at Bluff Cove until Friday 11th when they were reinforced by A and C Coys 40 Cdo released from San Carlos defence (B Coy remained), and marched that day to the south west of Mount Harriet to stay in reserve for the next two days. During this time, a battalion dispatch rider was mortally wounded by Argentine shellfire. Even aside from the Tuesday strikes, there was little let-up in the air-war during the week. On Monday morning (7th), a reconnaissance Learjet of FAA Grupo 1 was shot down over Pebble Island by one of "Exeter's" Sea Darts [a66]. Next day, the last two RAF Harrier GR.3's from Ascension arrived on "Hermes", and earlier, the fourth and last GR.3 lost was damaged beyond repair landing heavily at the Port San Carlos FOB with a partial engine failure [b33]. On Wednesday, RFA "Engadine" flew off her four Wessex HU.5's of No.847 NAS to San Carlos Water to add to the helicopter lift, and early Saturday morning, in "Black Buck 7", Stanley airfield was bombed by a Vulcan for the final time. Sunday 13th saw the last Argentine air raids. Late that morning, Skyhawks of FAA Grupo 5 concluded their successful war with an attack on 3 Cdo Bde HQ on Mount Kent and 2 Para on Mount Longdon, but without causing casualties, and that evening, two Grupo 2 Canberras bombed Mount Kent, and as they turned away, one was brought down by a Sea Dart from "Exeter" (or possibly "Cardiff") [a70]. All this time, RAF GR.3's were hitting Argentine positions around Stanley, and still on Sunday, made their first successful laser-guided bomb attacks. British Gallantry Awards included: LSL Sir Galahad - rescue work: On board Second Eng Offr P A Henry (post GM) RFA Third Offr A Gudgeon (QGM) RFA Gdsm S M Chapman (MM) 1WG L/Cpl D J Loveridge (MM) 1WG Sgt P H R Naya (MM) RAMC WO2 B T Neck (MM) 1WG By Sea King helicopters of No.825 NAS Lt Cmdr H S Clark (DSC) RN Lt J K Boughton (QGM) RN Lt P J Sheldon (QGM) RN Alongside Colour Sgt M J Francis (DSM) RM, coxswain LCU F1, HMS Fearless Sgt D S Boultby (MM) 17 Port Regt RCT NCO i/c, Mexeflote unit Additional SAS awards Capt G J Hamilton (post MC) Green Howards, including South Georgia, Pebble Island and Darwin diversion raids, Mount Kent Capt T W Burls (MC) Para Regt, South Georgia and Pebble Island HMS Glamorgan (Courtesy - MOD, Navy) FAA Skyhawk A-4 attack bombers of the type which mortally damaged RFA Sir Galahad, badly damaged Sir Tristram and sank LCU F4 on the 8th June. In return they lost three of their number. Past and present: could UK Royal Navy replicate previous battle performance? It is a quarter of a century since a UK naval task force led the campaign to recapture the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Denise Hammick examines whether the modern Royal Navy could respond to a similar contingency The UK Royal Navy (RN) has seen a seismic shift in both roles and capabilities since it spearheaded the operation to capture the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) from the Argentine armed forces 25 years ago. In that intervening period, the strategic context has been transformed. While the government in Buenos -Aires maintains its claim to the -islands, the UK and Argentina today enjoy a cordial relationship. In terms of size, shape and cap­ability, the RN has also witnessed huge change. In 1982, the size of the fleet was larger, but less capable, and less well prepared than the navy of today, according to Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward, commander of the Battle Group dispatched to the South Atlantic in April 1982 to retake the Falklands. He had just six weeks - the time taken to transit to the theatre of operations - to assemble and work-up the group - TF.317 - to operational readiness. "The whole operation was ad hoc, off the cuff, last minute", he says. "We hadn't trained for that kind of thing for at least 10 years. The front-line commanders barely knew each other. "The Staff process [was] put tog­ether by a Joint Headquarters brought together at Northwood at last minute. This hadn't been done before. [The Joint Headquarters in the UK] was a completely new organisation, bits -and pieces [had to be] put together from what had previously been on a naval headquarters." Limited intelligence Also, there was little military intelligence of the islands, or of the Argen­tinian Navy. In fact, for the latter Adm Woodward says he relied almost -entirely on Jane's Fighting Ships. It was also the case that there were very few RN assets within 6,000 n miles of the Falklands, namely the Ice Patrol Ship HMS Endurance and two Royal Marine detachments - comp­rising some 79 men in all - on the isl­ands. Other than this, the closest units were in fact at Gibraltar, having been participating in Exercise 'Springtrain'. The sheer distance reflected how the RN of the era was very firmly tied to a Cold War mission in support of the NATO alliance. Conducting a nat­ional joint expeditionary operation at long range was simply not on the -defence agenda. This was equally apparent in the way crews were trained, the sort of threats they rehearsed against, and in the platforms and systems employed. All were focused on the Soviet maritime threat in the open seas of the North Atlantic, one that was far removed from the type of conflict the RN was asked to fight in the South Atlantic. "We were going to war equipped to fight the next war, to find we were fighting the last," says Adm Woodward. He cites the Seawolf point defence missile system employed on the Type 22 frigates as a case in point, noting that this was "programmed to deal with the Soviet missile threat", typically streams of large, high-diving missiles. However, the Argentinian threat came from aircraft that flew -in a formation of either two or four. "The computer said, this is a pair, it can't be missiles, and switched off," says Adm Woodward. "We had to change this on the front line, in situ." Much tactical development was undertaken in a very short space of time, allowing tactics, techniques and key equipments to be evolved and honed during the transit to -the South Atlantic. This was of course achieved by experiment, and while such creativity did much to protect the fleet, it could never be a proper substitute for a structured programme of trials, qualification and operational development. Lessons learnt Of course, the contemporary RN is not immune to the unexpected. But the Falklands was undoubtedly a wake-up call for the service - and one which taught it the virtues of flexibility and preparedness. There is now a standing naval commitment to the South Atlantic, which serves to maintain a UK maritime presence in the region and uphold British sovereignty. It also ensures that the intelligence picture is kept up to date. Power-projection capabilities have also been greatly enhanced. Rear Admiral Philip Wilcocks, currently Chief of Staff (Capability) in Fleet Command and a veteran of the conflict, points out that in 1982 one of the major weapon systems of the submarine were "World War Two torpedoes". Contrast that to today, with the 1,000 km-range Tomahawk cruise missile and Spearfish heavyweight torpedoes being fitted throughout the nuclear -attack sub­marine (SSN) fleet. "Their fighting capability has been hugely improved," he argues. But while this is true, it is also a fact that surface combatant numbers have been significantly reduced since 1982. From a force of around 50 frigates and destroyers in 1982, the RN now has just 25. During the Falklands conflict, 23 RN frigates and destroyers were dep­loyed to the area of operations, and of those, four ships were sunk and eight seriously damaged. Given current surface fleet levels, a similar contingency would require more or less the entire fleet to be deployed. Moreover, in proportionate terms, the impact of any attrition would be much higher and a long campaign not possible. Rear Adm Wilcocks insists that numbers are not everything. "You can't compare the Type 42 of today with that of 1982. Other than hullform they are significantly different. What we now have to do is make sure we get the Type 45 [destroyer], into service as quick as possible while ensuring the Type 42 remains fit for purpose." He adds: "There will always be tension between an enemy's capability and the ability to project power and defend ourselves. The challenge for us is to keep abreast of where the enemy's potential capability is going with right level of investment." Fine balance But as Adm Woodward points out, the balance is a fine one. Budget pressure in 1982 meant the Type 42 destroyers had only manually opera­ted small-calibre weapons for close-in defence. This meant they were dangerously exposed to attacks outside the envelope of their Sea Dart medium-range missile system. "That's not to say [the ship] was useless", he says. "It caused the Arg­entinians to fly less optimally as they were frightened the Sea Dart [missile] would knock them down... "So they flew low to attack ships [which meant their] bombs didn't work. If they had [worked] we'd have lost twice as many ships and probably the war as well." Another major shortcoming in 1982 was the lack of organic airborne early warning in the Task Force. This was rapidly rectified by the introduction to service of the Sea King AEW.2 helicopter, itself now replaced by the Sea King ASaC.7 airborne surveillance and control helicopter. But the fleet today no longer has an outer layer of air defence, the Sea Harrier carrier-borne fighter, with its Blue Vixen multimode radar and armed with the AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missile, having been retired from service in 2006. Back in 1982, the first-generation Sea Harrier FRS.1, armed with the AIM-9L Sidewinder missile and the original version of the Blue Vixen radar, the Blue Fox, was pivotal to the outcome of the conflict. "Without the Sea Harrier then, we wouldn't have won", says Adm Woodward. "I don't think people realise even yet just how much hinged on 24 aircraft and about 30 pilots." The decision to retire the Sea Har­rier early was controversial, and rem­ains so because of the capability gaps it leaves. The Harrier GR.7/GR.9 carries the AIM-9L/M Sidewinder to confer on it a limited air-combat capability for self-defence, but it lacks both a -radar and beyond-visual-range weapon. Therefore at present, for an air--defence capability against a well-equipped force, such as that of the Argentine's in 1982, the RN would need to rely upon coalition forces. Rear Adm Wilcocks maintains however, that the "reality of the Sea Harrier was that it was an ageing aircraft. It didn't make financial or opera­tional sense to try - in an engineering context - to keep it going". It was retired because the proposed engine upgrade of the helicopter, and the UK's focus on offensive air power, meant the decision was taken to focus investment on the upgrade of the Harrier GR.7 fleet to an improved GR.9 standard. The Naval Strike Wing the maritime-oriented component of Joint Force Harrier now operates this Harrier ground attack variant, which Rear Adm Wilcocks says offers an enhanced offensive air capability with a range of precision-guided munitions. Plus, he adds that it is anticipated a decision will be made "in the next few months, [to build] two new aircraft carriers... [which] is recognition that to carry out expeditionary operations you need to take mobile airfields with you". Capability gains It will take at least ten years for these to come online. However, the UK's amphibious force has already been the beneficiary of a major recapitalisation programme. Rear Adm Wilcocks obser­ves that "you cannot compare the -capability offered [in 1982] by the [amphibious assault ships] HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid to the capability we now have from HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark. Also, we did not have a helicopter carrier then, [but] we now have HMS Ocean". Further gains in amphibious lift are being achieved with the rep­lacement of the old landing ship logistic vessels with the four new Bay-class landing ships that he says - with a larger capacity to transport troops, boats and vehicles along with a command-and-control ability - offers "a huge increase in capability". Joint operations are now ingrained in the UK military psyche, with the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood very much at the hub. And the field of long-haul strategic communications has also witnessed a step change. In 1982, one US -satellite was available for the Southern Hemisphere, through which all messages were channelled, and most signals were read off paper. Beginning with the introduction of the Type 45, all RN ships will have access to Skynet 5 satellite com­munications, which provides a strategic level joint picture to give "a much better situational awareness and ability to communicate it at -all levels than in 1982", says Rear Adm Wilcocks. Marines also have a much imp­roved expeditionary capability. "They had to yomp [run across country] in 1982, partly because we lost many of their helicopters when the Atlantic Conveyer was sunk, but partially because we didn't have the equipment to give them mobility on battlefield," according to Rear Adm Wilcocks. "Now the marines have the Viking high-mobility vehicle, which has performed with great distinction in Afghan­istan." Body armour for troops and Bowman radio communications are also increasing effectiveness on the battlefield. There is no doubt that the battle for the Falklands in 1982 was a very close run thing. Twenty-five years on, it is clear that while the RN is in many areas a more capable force, its smaller size would leave it enormously stretched if it were to attempt a similar operation. Furthermore, the lack of carrier-based outer air cover would incur significant risk against a well-equipped adversary. Perhaps more intriguing is the question as to whether politicians in the modern era would be prepared to run the same risks as the government of Margaret Thatcher. She was convinced by the then First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Henry Leach that the Falklands could be recovered, albeit not without losses. Would today's naval hierarchy be willing to make the same judgement call to their political masters? The Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield after it was hit by an Exocet missile in May 1982. (UK MoD) 1184409 The flight deck of the Centaur-class aircraft carrier HMS Hermes during the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict in 1982. (Royal Naval Museum) 1190608 Castle-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Dumbarton in the Falklands in January 2007. (UK MoD) 1191453 ********* http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/europe/uk.htm Sir Galahad large landing ship Displacement: 8,750 tons full load Dimensions: 140.47 x 20 x 4.57 meters (461 x 65.5 x 15 feet) Propulsion: 2 diesels, 2 shafts, 13,100 bhp, 18 knots Crew: 49 civilian Aviation: aft helicopter deck Troops: up to 537 Cargo: unknown EW: intercept, 4 decoy, Type 182 towed Armament: 2 20 mm, provision for 2 20 mm CIWS Greatly improved version of previous class. Number Name Year Homeport Notes L3005 Sir Galahad 1987 Marchwood Modified Sir Lancelot class large landing ships Displacement: 6,700 (L3505: 6,407 tons full load Dimensions: 139 x 17.94 x ?? meters Propulsion: 2 diesels, 2 shafts, 9,400 bhp, 17.25 knots Crew: 54 civilian Aviation: aft helicopter deck Troops: 402 Cargo: 340 tons vehicles & supplies (16 tanks, 34 vehicles) EW: intercept, 2 chaff Armament: 2 or 4 20 mm Landing ships built for Army/civilian service, but taken over for the Navy. This pair has been modernized for further service; unmodernized sisters are listed separately. Number Name Year Homeport Notes L3004 Sir Bedivere 1967 Marchwood L3505 Sir Tristram 1967 Marchwood Sir Lancelot class large landing ships Displacement: 5,774 (L3036: 5,674) tons full load Dimensions: 126 x 17.94 x 3.98 meters (413 x 59 x 13 feet) Propulsion: 2 diesels, 2 shafts, 9,400 bhp, 17.25 knots Crew: 65 civilian Aviation: aft helicopter deck Troops: 402 Cargo: 340 tons vehicles & supplies (16 tanks, 34 vehicles) EW: intercept, 2 chaff Armament: 2 20 mm Landing ships built for Army/civilian service, but taken over for the Navy. This unmodernized pair will soon be retired. Number Name Year Homeport Notes L3027 Sir Geraint 1967 Marchwood L3036 Sir Percivale 1968 Marchwood ****** http://www.merchantnavyofficers.com/LSLclass.html The LSL Class CAMELOT Built: 1946 by Vickers Armstrong Ltd;, Newcastle. Tonnage: 7, 795g, 4, 511n, 9, 750 dwt. Engines: Single Screw, 2 Stage Turbine by Metropolitan-Vickers, 6, 800 SHP, 15 Knots. Heavy lift ship with 2x 120 ton derricks. Completed June 1946 for Ministry of Transport with Alfred Holts a manager, Yard No. 94, Launch as Empire Athelstan. Sold to Ben Line in May 1947 and renamed Benalbanach in 1963 laid up at Hartlepool. In November she is taken out of mothballs by the Ministry of Transport with British India as managers and is renamed Camelot. In February 1968 she is placed in reserve on the River Fal and reverts back to the Ministry of Transport. Mercur Shipping Enterprises SA become the new owners in 1969 and rename her Dragon Castle, briefly she is owned by Cuatebol Shipping in 1975 before arriving in Split for breaking on the 5th December 1975 by Brodospas. I have been reliably informed that this photograph was taken after the ship had been taken over by British India, note if you can read it, her name is on a piece of board. As my informant states the photograph was taken on the River Fal but Laxon & Perry state that she was taken over in Hartlepool, could this possibly be Hartlepool in the background? SIR LANCELOT Built: 1964 Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd, Govan Tonnage: 6,390g, 3,315n, 2, 180 dwt Engines: Twin Screw 2x12 Cylinder 2S.C.S.A. Sulzers, 9,520 BHP, 17 knots. Built for the Ministry of Transport with British India appointed as Managers. 340 Troops, 18 Officers and 50 Ratings. Launched 25th June 1963, completed 16th January 1964. Yard No: 818 The first ship of her type and class she differed slightly from her sisters but the main difference was in the Engine Room, the Lancelot having Sulzers, the remaining ships Mirrlees Monarch Propulsion Units. If my memory serves me correctly the Lancelot along with Bedivere, Galahad and numerous LST's were present in Aden for our withdrawal before all the facilities were handed over to the Southern Yemeni Authorities, at the time I was Fourth Engineer on the Bedivere. The ships not only had the ability to beach but were able to carry Mexi-floats secured port/starboard and when fitted with engines could land personnel/ equipment in some of the more remote places that the ships visited. The helicopter pad was above the Military Officers' accommodation and if required the helicopters could refuel. Vehicles were not only carried on the top deck but on the tank deck below, other Military Ranks were accommodated either side on the tank deck. On the 3rd January she was handed over to the Royal Fleet Auxillary. On the 24th May 1982 two Argentinian bombs struck the ship which fortunately failed to explode during the Falklands War. The Lancelot paid off on the 31st March 1989 at Southampton, she was sold to Lowline (Rambler) Ltd and renamed Lowland Lancer. In 1992 she was sold to the Ministry of Defense (Singapore) and renamed Perseverance as far as I know she is still in service. SIR GALAHAD Built: 1966 Alexander Stephen & Sons Ltd, Govan Tonnage: 4,473g, 2,179n, 2, 404 dwt Engines: Twin Screw 2x10 Cylinder 2S.C.S.A. Mirrlees Monarchs, 9,400 BHP, 17 knots. Built for the Ministry of Transport with British India appointed as Managers. Launched 19th April 1966, completed 17th December 1966. Yard No: 690 On the 7th March the Galahad was transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxillary. On the 24th of may 1982 during the Falklands War she was struck by a bomb whilst off the Falklands which failed to explode, nevertheless she caught fire and had to be beached, she was later refloated. Two weeks later on the 8th June she was hit by an Argentinian bomb whilst at Bluff Cove catching fire again. But this time she had to be abandoned which led to the ship being scuttled off Port Stanley on the 24th June. SIR BEDIVERE Built: 1967 by Hawthorn Leslie (Shipbuilders) Ltd, Hebburn. Tonnage: 4,474g, 3,489n, 2, 404 dwt Engines: Twin Screw 2x10 Cylinder 2S.C.S.A. Mirrlees Monarchs, 9,400 BHP, 17 knots. Built for the Ministry of Transport with British India appointed as Managers. Launched 20th July 1966, completed 18th May 1967. Yard No: 760 The first of the three Hawthorn Leslie ships arrived in Marchwood, Hampshire at Husband's Shipyard for exercises with the Royal Corps of Transport whose camp was adjacent to the yard. I joined the ship as Fourth Engineer on the 22nd June just before she sailed for Aden calling at Gibraltar for minor repairs before continuing the long way round via the Cape. The Bedivere along with half the Fleet anchored in the inner harbour with the remaining support vessels anchored outside, after approximately five weeks the Governor General attended a fly past and the largest British Fleet assembled since the Spithead Review dispersed, the Bedivere made her way to Singapore, the Far East being her allocated station. Whilst British India managed the ships it was usual for two ships to be stationed in Singapore, two in the Persian Gulf and the remaining two in the UK. On the 14th January 1970 she was transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxillary and is still in service. Control Room, Main Switchboard Control Room. Engine Consul to Left, Switchboard Centre, Data Logger to Right Air Conditioning Plant Port Main Engine Cylinder Heads SIR GERAINT Built: 1967 by Alexander Stephen & Sons Ltd, Govan Tonnage: 4,473g, 2,179n, 2, 404 dwt Engines: Twin Screw 2x10 Cylinder 2S.C.S.A. Mirrlees Monarchs, 9,400 BHP, 17 knots. Built for the Ministry of Transport with British India appointed as Managers. Launched 26th January 1967, completed 12th July 1967. Yard No: 691 All this class of ship were fitted with spray curtain systems which enveloped the whole of the accommodation in a fine mist, thus we were assured in the event of nuclear fall out it would simply wash off the ship, also port and starboard entrances below the upper vehicle deck were fitted with decontamination showers. In the Control Room it was possible not only to steer, navigate and communicate but through the use of remote cameras actually see what was going on in the event of vacating the Bridge, quite innovative fro ships built over thirty years ago. I joined this particular ship as Third Engineer on the 14th August 1968 and left two days short of a year on the 12th August, on the 5th March 1970 the Geraint transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxillary and is still in service. SIR TRISTRAM Built: 1967 by Hawthorn Leslie (Shipbuilders) Ltd, Hebburn. Tonnage: 4,473g, 2,179n, 2, 404 dwt Engines: Twin Screw 2x10 Cylinder 2S.C.S.A. Mirrlees Monarchs, 9,400 BHP, 17 knots. Built for the Ministry of Transport with British India appointed as Managers. Launched 12th December 1966, completed 14th September 1967. Yard No: 761 This ship transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxillary on the 30th January 1970. During the Falklands War she was bombed by Argentinian aircraft at Bluff Cove had severely damaged, nevertheless she returned to the UK for repairs aboard the special purpose ship Dan Lifter in June of 1983. Between August of 1984 and October of 1985 she was rebuilt which included a new 29ft long midship section the cost being £13 million and work was carried out at Tyne Shiprepairers Ltd, the Tristram is still in service. SIR PERCIVALE Built: 1968 by Hawthorn Leslie (Shipbuilders) Ltd, Hebburn. Tonnage: 4,473g, 2,179n, 2, 404 dwt Engines: Twin Screw 2x10 Cylinder 2S.C.S.A. Mirrlees Monarchs, 9,400 BHP, 17 knots. Built for the Ministry of Transport with British India appointed as Managers. Launched 4th October 1967, completed 23rd March 1968. Yard No: 762 The final of the six-build programme, the Percivale transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxillary on the 6th March 1970 and is still in service. I believe a new ship was built to replace the Galahad which took the number of this particular class of ships back to six. ***** The Loss of Sir Galahad RFA Sir Galahad on fire On 3 June Fitzroy on the south side of East Falkland was occupied. The campaign on land had been going reasonably well with troops crossing the main part of the island from San Carlos but it was decided to open up a further line of advance from Fitzroy. In doing this two of the landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were sent carrying equipment, ammunition and several military units including part of the Welsh Guards. On 8 June they were at anchor there in daylight. Before unloading could be completed the ships were attacked by five Argentine air Force A-4 Skyhawks. Bomb and cannon hits were taken on both causing fires, worst in Sir Galahad, leading to her being abandoned. Unfortunately there was heavy loss of life, especially on board Sir Galahad, a total of 50 men killed or missing with more wounded. It might have been worse without timely rescue efforts by helicopter and boat and rapid medical assistance. Subsequently Sir Tristram returned to the UK, was repaired and returned to service. Sir Galahad, more seriously damaged, was taken out to sea and sunk. ******* Not sure about the pics - some might be from the newer class.

Enquiring with some people in the Canadian navy.

can you make sure that contrails are visible from LONG distances - too frequently in sims contrails are only visible when you're also able to see the aircraft where you should be able to see the contrails from huge distances away.

no amount of eye candy can compensate for poor stability, poor networking code, poor missions or a poor interface. prime priority should always be the content, not the decoration - the decoration might help it to sell but without the rest it ends up placed on a shelf and does not generate a 'community' with which to expand upon with future products. creating 'dumpware' might be a good short term strategy, so long as it's intended to be the last product before getting out of sim development.

you can never have enough time to polish. that's what makes a good product a great product.

well you know where to find me dante ;)

good stuff :) i sure hope you can do a better interface though :)

that's the way i see it too. multiplayer can not afford to be tacked on as it's simply integral to the whole design. a well designed, well executed sim - even if it's a bit thin on actual 'content' creates a life of it's own through community effort. In addition it's the basis of further work later. The design and the implementation are the hard work, once you've done that expanding content is relatively painless.

resist the temptation to not plan ;) PLEASE :D

not to give you grief but tacking on multiplayer at the end is the WRONG way to do it. LOMAC 1.0 is a classic example of this being done and the multiplayer code was horrible. both single player and multiplayer will have shared requirements, and to cater to one first without catering to the second at the same time often leads to wasted effort and developmental issues. much better to get this sorted out on paper then leap into the coding.

If you haven't gotten it yet, Shaw's Fighter Combat tactics and manoeuvering should provide you with all the theory necessary.

the only game for combat is the il2 series. get pacific fighters and ace expansion pack and get onto hyperlobby.

that flexibility sounds excellent. one thing though - will you guys be implementing some sort of rudimentary anticheat (checksumming the scripts and validation with the host) to prevent the kind of cheating we saw when LOMAC first came out? it's starting to look like this sim is going to be a modder's dream. thanks.

i really like your approach for using a seperate server application, should give quite a bit of flexibility down the road. can you make the single player engine default to localhost, but give the user the option to throw the host onto another box and define the ip address of that unit - great for those people with spare boxes ;) one thing that could be REALLY handy for online play would be to allow peer to peer communication between multiple servers who then service the local clients. Useful for bandwidth management and latency management, and possibly if you guys follow up later with a larger theatre (say.. vietnam.. *hint hint*) you'll have a way of clustering for future growth.