I just found this out - James McCudden didn't ...

[Guest British_eh]

die as I thought. Perhaps this is common knowledge but I had always believed that he died turning back to the airfield after a stall.

 

The new book I am reading , Peter Hart's - "ACES FALLING" is a reasonable reference book, and has a lot of quotes from the pilot's of the day, to add a little extra flavour. On page 199 was this. A Captain Hubert Charles was the senior accident Investigator assigned to the crash. McCudden had landed just 5 miles short of his final destination, to ensure that the British positions hadn't changed since his orders. Once ascertaining his destination, he jumped in his new SE5a, and took off. An eyewitness statement “he did a vertical turn only 100 feet up" (which flooded the carburettor of this non modified unit) and presented him with an immediate loss of power. When he banked of course he needed extra power and so opened the throttle, which then would choke the engine. "The machine went on its back and nose down from 200 feet. It appears he switched off the engine to reduce the likely hood of fire, and UNDID his safety belt, as he was thrown out and "found unconscious on the wing". Two hours later, at the age of 23, he was dead.

 

Cheers,

 

British_eh

 

 

[Rugbyfan1972 1]

die as I thought. Perhaps this is common knowledge but I had always believed that he died turning back to the airfield after a stall.

 

The new book I am reading , Peter Hart's - "ACES FALLING" is a reasonable reference book, and has a lot of quotes from the pilot's of the day, to add a little extra flavour. On page 199 was this. A Captain Hubert Charles was the senior accident Investigator assigned to the crash. McCudden had landed just 5 miles short of his final destination, to ensure that the British positions hadn't changed since his orders. Once ascertaining his destination, he jumped in his new SE5a, and took off. An eyewitness statement “he did a vertical turn only 100 feet up" (which flooded the carburettor of this non modified unit) and presented him with an immediate loss of power. When he banked of course he needed extra power and so opened the throttle, which then would choke the engine. "The machine went on its back and nose down from 200 feet. It appears he switched off the engine to reduce the likely hood of fire, and UNDID his safety belt, as he was thrown out and "found unconscious on the wing". Two hours later, at the age of 23, he was dead.

 

Cheers,

 

British_eh

 

 

 

British_eh,

 

If you want the definitive account of why he died read "High in the empty blue" by Alex Revell, Alex actually interviewed Hubert Charles who was 56 squadron engineering officer during 1917, was now an accident investigation officer, and he was amazed to find that the air filter which, he Hubert Charles had modified in 1917 to prevent the engine flooding and cutting out. Also JTBM was known for taking off in steeply banked turns, I have just re-read the reference in HITEB to the crash and it is stated that once the SE5A passed 60 degrees angle of bank the speed needed to keep it airborne rose from 48 MPH to 110 MPH.

 

Apologies if I sound bitter, but the incompetence of the Royal Aircraft Factory also caused the death of another pilot of 56 squadron on the 7th May 1917, namely Albert Ball. I just find it incredible that a problem that had been identified over 12 months earlier in the field had not been rectified in the production run at home. Thus Britain lost 2 of her best aces through the incompetence of the home estabishment.

 

Incidentally the combined scores of Albert Ball and James McCudden was 100 eenemy aircraft and 1 balloon shot down.

 

Also the accident report book for the Auxi-le-chateau for the 9th July 1918, has various references to accidents sustained around the airfield, people removing their toes while digging latrines etc, but no mention of one of britain's top aces being killed in a crash. Do you not find that odd, because I certainly do?

 

Thanks

Rugbyfan1972

Edited January 3, 2011 by Rugbyfan1972

[Guest British_eh]

Ah, so of course there is more to the story. Thanks for the further update. It would appear then that there could be several reasons why the stall happened. Certainly the notion that two mechanical issues that were known, and not sorted out, resulting in how many deaths, is appalling. Having read probably 4-5 reference type books on the WWI air conflict their certainly was a disconnect between manufacturer's like the Royal Aircraft Factory, and what was actually needed by the pilots on the Front. Also the General's insisted on using 19th century tactics, in the 20th century, which of course resulted in thousands of casualties, on all sides.

 

Cheers,

 

British_eh

 

[UK_Widowmaker 571]

Rugbyfan......You can almost be certain, that brown envelopes full of cash were being slipped under tables even then!...It will almost certainly have been in someones financial benefit not to make changes to any design!...they're only Human Beings those Pilot Chappies!...if the powers that be were happy to see millions slaughtered in the Trenches..a few poncy, posh Flyboys are neither here nor there!

(God I'm feeling Cynical these days!)

Edited January 3, 2011 by UK_Widowmaker

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

WM, I'm afraid you are likely quite right about the money under the table. Unlike technology, human greed has changed very little over the centuries.

 

.

[Dej 17]

Mervyn O'Gorman had 'blood on his hands' I'll warrant. As Superindent at Farnborough and coincidentally (hah!) Head of the Supply Directorate he actively stifled the availability of designs othe than the out-dated death traps the R.A.F. were producing. How many pilots and observrs died in machines whose 'inherehnt stability' meant they were outclassed by their German counterparts (if they even stood comparison)? Does the SE5 redeem the Harry Tate? You be the judge.

Edited January 3, 2011 by Dej

[Rugbyfan1972 1]

Wm & Dej,

 

You both make excellent points, in fact if you read "No Parachute" by Arthur Lee-Gould, he devotes 2 appendices to both the BE2 series and the reason it was in service so long, and to the reason that parachutes were not issued to the pilots in the RFC/RNAS or RAF.

 

Thanks

Rugbyfan1972

[Dej 17]

Indeed he does RF, and names O'Gorman among others he holds responsible. In AGL's own experience with No. 46 squadron, his was one of those RFC units who only acquired a decent scout when the RNAS had tired of it and moved onto better. I think the scale of the 'betrayal' (for want of a better word) in the provision of a decent fighting machine can be judged by the anger clearly evident in Gould Lee's writing, 20 years after the event. On the matter of parachutes, the title Gould Lee chose for his autobiography (the best in WW1 aviation, IMO) says it all.

[Wodin 0]

High in the empty blue by Revell is one book I really want to read and own...trouble is at £75 I will have to keep my fingers crossed for a re print.

[Javito1986 14]

Darn right there was money under the table back then. That whole war was just one huge mess. I was reading a book the other day on the summer of 1914, and how the Central Powers were intentionally provoking a war so Franz Joseph could eliminate Serbia and the Kaiser could defeat his own enemies, and I became so irritated. The fellows literally threw the world into chaos and horrific suffering for their own benefit. I for one am quite content their actions led to the demise of both their monarchies, but they damn near took the whole world with them!

 

Odd thing is, Kaiser Wilhelm in later years became a right decent chap. I suppose World War 1 had a nice humbling effect on him.

[Hasse Wind 46]

I've often wondered about the decision-making processes of the British military aviation bosses of WW1 regarding their bombing and observation/recon aircraft. The BE.2's were good at first, but they were kept in front service for far too long. By 1917, they were flying coffins. And the aircraft intended as the Quirk's replacement, the RE.8, was simply horrible. It's not like there weren't better B/R aircraft available for the British, but the Royal Aircraft Factory seems to have dominated the business with their less than stellar designs. Yes, the SE.5 was brilliant - one of the best fighters of the war - but I imagine that wasn't much of a comfort to the two-seater men in their awfully obsolete or otherwise poor RAF planes. When one compares the RAF-made two-seaters to similar German designs, the difference in quality is stunning.

[Javito1986 14]

Dare I say, perhaps it was because nice planes are expensive and airmen's lives are cheap? During the Fokker Scourge the chap in charge of the RFC specifically stated he knew his boys had no chance in hell against the Eindeckers, but he'd keep sending them up because their sacrifice was necessary for King and Country and all that.

[Hasse Wind 46]

It's quite possible that the BE.2's and RE.8's were less expensive to manufacture than many of the better British two-seaters, like the excellent Airco DH.4. Plywood and canvas isn't that expensive, but engines are, and the better models usually had better and thus more expensive engines. As far as I know, the RAF also manufactured engines for their two-seaters. It's ridiculous that the BE.2 had a 90 hp engine while German two-seaters regularly had twice as much power, or even more in many cases.

 

I wonder if the SE.5a would have been such a success with a 90 hp RAF engine?

[Olham 164]

Javito, if you read William Jannen's book "The Lions of July", you will find a very detailed

reconstruction of the diplomatic attempts to prevent that war. Kaiser Wilhelm did, as well

as Tsar Nicholas, not at all want that war.

The war was much rather provoked by Serbia, who knew Russias promise to stand by

it's ally; by a stubborn Austria-Hungary; by the very dangerous French ambassador in

Russia, Maurice Paleologue (who wanted that war; and who lied, cheated, delayed,

shortened or disinterpreted important messages); and by rather unbalanced German

politicians (here, Gottlieb Jagow made thing rather confusing; and in the last critical days,

chancellor Bethmann seemed to have lost most of his nerves).

 

The very critical balance of Great Powers (almost everyone expected a war sooner or later),

and the unability of the diplomats to communicate, what most of them prefered - no war -

led to this desaster. When Russian minister Sazonov and the generals decided, that they

had to fully mobilise to stop Austria-Hungary from going too far against Serbia, the deadly

iron dice began to roll. Germany had warned everyone repeatedly, that if Russia would go

from a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary in the south-west to a full mobilisation

also along the borders of Germany, Germany could do no other but mobilise. It could not

risk to get crushed between Russia and France.

 

The Kaiser and the Tsar both knew too well, that their monarchies would probably come

to their ends through national uprisings - they both did not want this war.

 

The men who saw all this coming and made the best mediation attempts, were British

foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey, and German ambassador in London, Prince Max von

Lichnowsky, who wanted a better relationship and friendship with Great Britain.

Great Britain did not want to get dragged into a European war, only because it had to back

France, which would back Russia, which would back the Serbs.

Unfortunately, none of the mediation proposals turned into real talks. They were in the end

assisted too late strong enough by the German chancellor, and brushed aside by a proud

and stubborn Austria-Hungary. With the consequences we all know.

Edited January 6, 2011 by Olham

[Hasse Wind 46]

Good post, Olham. I've for a long time believed that a great war among the European powers was inevitable, if not in 1914 then certainly soon after that. The whole cultural and political atmosphere of the era somehow seems so twisted and so filled with militarism and national fanaticism that the powder keg would have caught fire sooner or later. Even the most democratic powers of the West were full of themselves and rattling their sabres everywhere. Add to that the apparently quite common idea among ordinary people that maybe war is not such a bad thing after all, and it certainly won't last long or cause that much suffering, just a few heroic deaths like one can see in old paintings or read about in adventure novels, and it's not really surprising that the world was plunged into a terrible industrial war.

 

There were some farsighted and intelligent people, drawing from the experience of the wars of the late 19th century, who realized already in 1914 that the great war would be neither short nor easy, but they were definitely in the minority.

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

Olham, you are quite right that Germany did not want to go to war unless it was absolutely necessary. They had agreed to stand by Austria-Hungary in the event of hostilities against that country, and Austria-Hungary used that agreement in an extremely underhanded way. But then, as you've mentioned as well, there was a lot of underhandedness by all parties that ultimately led to the Great War. Another factor that directly resulted in the War was Germany's Schlieffen Plan, which had been drafted years earlier to deal with the event that Germany might have to fight a war on two fronts. Because of this plan, how Germany and the rest of the world viewed the act of "mobilization" was completely different, (and in fact "mobilization" and "going to war" meant pretty much one and the same thing to Germany at the time). Other countries could ready their troops for the possibility of a war and it required nothing further than calling up extra men and reserves and preparing them and their equipment to move out. But the Schlieffen Plan made the act of mobilization something much more serious for Germany as it meant you not only called up the troops, but also put them on the trains and moved them to the Western front, along with their supplies and equipment, and then prepared to strike hard and win quickly there so that those same troops and supplies and equipment could be quickly moved to the Eastern Front before Russia and her allies had a chance to get their own troops in position to strike. It must be remembered that Germany was literally surrounded by potential enemies in 1914, and if they absolutely had to go to war at that time their only chance of preserving themselves was to strike first and strike hard. The disparity in what "mobilization" meant to Germany and what it meant to everyone else was one of the very real factors that brought about the War.

 

As to the question: Had WWI not happened when it did, would there still have been a war soon thereafter? Very, very likely.

 

.

[Olham 164]

Other countries could ready their troops for the possibility of a war and it required nothing further than calling up extra men and reserves

and preparing them and their equipment to move out. But the Schlieffen Plan made the act of mobilization something much more serious

for Germany as it meant you not only called up the troops, but also put them on the trains and moved them to the Western front, along with

their supplies and equipment, and then prepared to strike hard and win quickly there so that those same troops and supplies and equipment

could be quickly moved to the Eastern Front before Russia and her allies had a chance to get their own troops in position to strike.

 

That's right, Lou, Jannen's book explains that in detail. What I wrote about was all the time before that Schlieffen plan (which meant to occupy

the south of neutral Belgium, to get hold of the necessary railway lines for bringing the troops to northern France). General Moltke held back

the troops on request of the chancellor, although the military got very nervous about the Russian movements and those of France, which also

ordered troops to the frontier now. And now a very terribly misleading report reached Sazonov, saying, that Germany was mobilizing already -

which was at that time not true. From there on, the iron logic of Great Power military madness followed it's own rail like a train with no driver.

 

It must be remembered that Germany was literally surrounded by potential enemies in 1914, and if they absolutely had to go to war at that time

their only chance of preserving themselves was to strike first and strike hard. The disparity in what "mobilization" meant to Germany and what it

meant to everyone else was one of the very real factors that brought about the War.

As to the question: Had WWI not happened when it did, would there still have been a war soon thereafter? Very, very likely.

 

The only other chance would have been constructive talks that could have brought a change about.

But it seemed to need all that bloodshed, crushed men and shell ploughed soil, to chisel it into their and their children's brains - that a war

of Great Powers has only losers. No one really wins, and what did we all lose...

Edited January 6, 2011 by Olham

[Javito1986 14]

My understanding of the July Crisis is mostly based off reading Europe's Last Summer. Goes like this: The Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated by members of the Black Hand, Serbian nationalist/terrorist organization led by Dragutin Dimitrijevic, who was also a member of the Serbian general staff. One of Princip's fellow conspirators implicated Dimitrijevic and several other members of the Serbian government in the Archduke's assassination and Franz Joseph seized on the opportunity, having wanted to get rid of Serbia for a while now and called on his alliance with Germany to help him crank up the pressure. They drafted the infamous ultimatum knowing that Serbia would not accept it and give them the impetus for war. The Kaiser wasn't overly interested in Serbia, but he wanted a war because he felt that Germany was ready for it and Russia was not, and if he waited then Russia would eventually grow too strong and overwhelm Germany in the inevitable "Teutonic-Slavic apocalyptic war".

 

Serbia replied to the ultimatum in a relatively humiliating fashion, surprising the Central Powers at just how much it conceded. The Kaiser then withdrew his support for the war since he felt the few things the Serbs hadn't agreed to could be negotiated upon. So the Kaiser did an about face, which angered other high ranking Prussian diplomatic and military officers (Hollweg and Moltke in particular), who sabotaged the Kaiser and prevented his more "dovish" overtures from being made known to the Entente. The deadline passed, Austrian troops marched towards Belgrade, Russia joined in, Schiefflen plan is executed, German troops in Belgium = British declaration of war, world implodes, etc.

 

Critique at will please! I may have been a bit too harsh on the Kaiser in my original post since he did change his mind and all, but I've never been much of a fan of the way he prodded on Franz Joseph into delivering the ultimatum intended to cause a war. It's always seemed to me that Wilhelm only really changed his mind because he was surprised the Serbians accepted as much of the ultimatum as they did.

Edited January 6, 2011 by Javito1986

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

Javito, it should be noted that neither the Kasier nor anyone else outside of council in Vienna and Leopold Berchtold even knew what was in the ultimatum as Berchtold pushed hard to keep as much as he could secret, in his efforts to deceive enemies and potential friends alike. Germany learned of what was actually in the ultimatum at the same time all the other major players on boths sides did, which is really quite startling when you consider how the Kaiser had written a blank check of support to Austria just a few short weeks before. Berchtold did an excellent job of keeping the Kaiser out of the loop, but then Wilhelm really had no great interest in Austria's affairs with Serbia shortly after the whole thing began. He was much more intersted in racing about in his newest yacht.

 

.

[Javito1986 14]

P.S. I'm actually on my way out to Madison's great central research library downtown tomorrow for work purposes. I already wrote down the text Olham mentioned, if anyone else would like to recommend a book on the July Crisis or causes of WW1 I'd be thrilled to check it out too while I'm there!

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

"A World Undone: The Story of the Great War", by G.J. Meyer. Amazingly concise, outstandingly well-written, it offers superb perspectives of the inner workings of all the major personalities involved. You will not be disappointed Javito.

 

.

[Olham 164]

They drafted the infamous ultimatum knowing that Serbia would not accept it and give them the impetus for war.

The Kaiser wasn't overly interested in Serbia, but he wanted a war because he felt that Germany was ready for it and Russia was not,

and if he waited then Russia would eventually grow too strong and overwhelm Germany in the inevitable "Teutonic-Slavic apocalyptic war".

 

The ultimatum was not drafted together with Germany, but, as RAF_Louvert says - Germany did not know it any earlier than the other Great Powers.

The Kaiser had urged Vienna via diplomats, to punish Serbia, and to be firm this time. He did not like the Serbs at all.

The Kaiser did not want war. When his advisors urged him to mobilize, he said he did not believe "Nicky would attack us" (he had a friendly, almost

fatherly attitude towards Tsar Nicholas. And the Tsar reacted similarly; he said, that Germany, if it wanted war, could have easily attacked them some

years earlier, when they had been weak. He even withdrew the first order for general mobilization according to his feelings about the Kaiser - unfortunately,

Sazonov and the Russian Generals convinced him little later to order full mobilization).

The thought to fight Russia, before it would grow too strong and before it would finish it's new and important railway system, was rather a military thought.

 

Serbia replied to the ultimatum in a relatively humiliating fashion, surprising the Central Powers at just how much it conceded.

 

This is not quite true. Once Serbia had assured herself of being backed by Russia, they tried to push it towards a war again.

Sir Edward Grey I think was the first who came up with that "Stop-in-Belgrade" and then negotiate scenario for Austria-Hungary. Almost everyone incl. the

Kaiser had come to the conclusion, that they should follow that "Stop-in-Belgrade" scenario. It was okay for all, that Austria-Hungary needed to punish the

Serbs and get them to accept tighter rules for the future. Austria-Hungary though said, that the Serbian answer to the ultimatum promised almost nothing

(which is true - it was very vague and open, and there were points they wouldn't accept at all). Austria-Hungary was determined to hit them hard and

teach them their lesson this time; parts of the military staff wanted to crush the Serbian army once and for all.

 

I may have been a bit too harsh on the Kaiser in my original post since he did change his mind and all, but I've never been much of a fan of the way

he prodded on Franz Joseph into delivering the ultimatum intended to cause a war.

 

The Kaiser did NOT urge the Austrians to make an ultimatum. The Germans left it in fact rather too much open, which measures Austria-Hungary should

take. All the Kaiser said was, they "should be firm". The Kaiser and many other politicians from all nations thought for a too long time, that the conflict

could be regarded isolated as a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Only when he understood, that Russia would go as far as mobilizing against

his ally Austria-Hungary, he began to understand how far the Russians might go in backing Serbia. This he did neither foresee, nor did he want to fight

a bigger war about all this matter.

What I do see in the detailed description of those days, is that the Kaiser as well as the Tsar, Sazonov and Bethmann were quite unbalanced and uncertain,

how to decide and act - a shakyness which is dangerous in such days. The only one who acted and remained "firm" was Berchtold - unfortunately.

He was the one who should have changed his mind.

If you like to read it all in very detail, Jannen's book is one I'd really recommend.

[Olham 164]

PS: thanks for that book tip, Lou - I heard the title before and will try to find a German translation.

[Hasse Wind 46]

One thing that made a great European war practically inevitable was the fact that, as has been mentioned in this thread, Germany was surrounded by enemies. France desperately wanted revenge for her humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, Britain saw Germany as her worst competitor in naval affairs and was very concerned about the fact that German industrial production was growing faster than their own, and that Germany was able to devote huge resources into building a new powerful high seas fleet (which was very precious to Kaiser Wilhelm) in addition to maintaining a huge army on the continent. But what caused Germany the most concern was Imperial Russia. That country had for a long time been very poorly developed and lacking in modern industrial might, so even though their army had a huge amount of men, they were not seen to pose too much of a threat to the great industrial might of Germany. But all this was rapidly changing in the 1910's. Russia was the most quickly developing country in Europe at that time: every year they built more and more factories, new railroads and other improved infrastructure, and their armed forces benefited greatly from this development. The German General Staff estimated in the early 1910's that within a few years, and certainly by the 1920's, Russia would be able to field an army as powerful as Germany. So if there was going to be a European war, Germany had a better chance of winning it in 1914 than in 1920 or later.

 

The German and Austrian general staffs actually underestimated the Russian threat. In August 1914, they were counting on a very slow Russian mobilization, when in fact the Russian army was able to concentrate its divisions to the border regions much more quickly than anybody believed - they probably surprised even themselves. If the majority of the highest-ranking generals commanding their principal armies in the west hadn't been rather incompetent, Russia would have been able to threaten Berlin in a serious way. They failed against the leadership of Hindenburg and Ludendorff (particularly the latter, who was indeed the top brain of the German army), but were repeatedly able to devastate the Austrian troops, who had even worse generals than the Russians, and whose men weren't really interested in defending the old Dual Monarchy anymore, especially when they realized just how bad their commanders were.

 

So it can be argued that the situation in Europe in the early 1910's was so impossible that no matter the amount of diplomatic maneuvers (and these failed miserably in July 1914), there would have been a war sooner or later. Probably sooner. This is what naturally happens when countries see their neighbours more as enemies than friends. Many European nations were guilty of this in the early 20th century.

[Olham 164]

Good detailed addition, Hasse Wind - maybe human beings are made like that: they have to burn

their fingers on the hot oven at least once, until they understand it's hot, and what that does to fingers.

Edited January 7, 2011 by Olham