I just found this out - James McCudden didn't ...

[gaw 5]

many great ones are recommended in the WW 1 books download over at OFF.....one of the best from that good source is "A World Undone" by G.J. Meyer. The numbers and the blind futility of the whole mess was appalling. Verdun, Gallipoli, Ypres, Marne.......a lot of fascinating detail on what led up to each and a great deal about the Eastern front about which I knew practically nothing.....great context

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

...echo, echo, echo, echo, echo...

 

 

.

[Hauksbee 103]

WOW! All this detailed discussion...and not a single mention of "The Guns Of August" by Barbara Tuchman. Is Tuchman not read anymore?

[Olham 164]

The William Jannen book has the remark "A perfect companion to Barbara Tuchman's THE GUNS OF AUGUST" on the cover.

I had already bought Hew Strachan's "The First World War" in German, so I would read that next.

Do you know both, perchance? And could you make a comparison?

[Javito1986 14]

To what extent do you guys think the Germans in particular tended to underestimate Russia due to her performance in the Russo-Japanese War? Is it similar to the way the Winter War in Finland caused everyone to underestimate them in 1914?

 

 

EDIT: Typo, meant 1941 but that's the first time I've ever noticed that cool coincidence of the numbers being switched around for both years Russia was attacked that I just left it

 

 

EDIT 2: I found this on the internet and just read through it, as I'm sure most of you already have years ago: Willy-Nicky Telegrams. Fascinating! Did they stop such correspondence at the outbreak of war? I suspect so, but I hope not as I'd love to know their reactions to events as the war progressed, particularly as the revolution in Russia began simmering as the military situation on the Eastern Front turned against them.

Edited January 7, 2011 by Javito1986

[Olham 164]

Javito, this is a great link, which I had no knowledge about before!

Those telegrams are touching, as they demonstrate the friendship as well as the helplessness of both monarchs,

to avoid the catastrophy.

 

I found, that this link contains loads more of documents about that time and the developments.

So I post here the basic link, in addition to the above.

 

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/1914_Documents

[Olham 164]

Here is one attempt of mine, to translate one telegram by Count Berchtold into English.

A difficult task, when you look at the somewhat stiff and circumstancial style.

 

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff (ambassador) in London

 

Telegram Nr. 170 W i e n , den 26. Juli 1914

Chiffr. 12 Uhr 10 M. a. m. 27./7.

 

 

Telegram cyphered

 

Herr von Tschirsky (German ambassador to Vienna) has told me today as ordered,

that according to a telegram sent by Duke Lichnowsky on 25. 1. M., 3 h PM,

Sir E. Grey had sent to him the draft of an answering note of Serbia,

and that he had remarked in an attached privat note, that he hoped, -

according to the conciliatory tenor of this answer - the Berliner cabinet

would advocat for it's acceptance in Vienna.

 

I regard it as appropriate, that Your Excellence come back to this towards

the secretary of state, and to advise him of the fact, that almost at the

same time, when he sent this note to Duke Lichnowsky, namely yesterday at

3 h PM, Serbia had already ordered the general mobilisation of her army,

which proves, that there was never a liking in Belgrade to bring this matter

to a peaceful holding.

 

This, as it seems, even earlier telegraphed to London answer was - with a

content not according to our demands - only handed over to the k. & k. attaché

in Belgrade at 6 h, after the carried out ordering of the mobilization.

 

To me, the tone of the note seems to show, how little Count Berchthold ever

thought of the British mediation attempts.

Edited January 7, 2011 by Olham

[Javito1986 14]

Oh that's really neat. There's a load of fascinating documents on that website then! I skimmed through them all, the British documents related to the Somme seem of particular interest. I'll go through that website in more detail when I get home later!

 

One thing I don't understand, and maybe because I approach things from a 'modern' perspective: why did Wilhelm and Nicholas consider military mobilization synonymous with war? Time and time again in the telegrams it's "Do not mobilize, do not mobilize, I implore you do not mobilize, if you mobilize I will have no choice but to mobilize and then there'll be no stopping the thing". Was the military of both countries such that once they let it off the leash they can't control it anymore?

[Olham 164]

For Tsar Nicholas, mobilization of Russia was a rather slow event, which did not mean war automatically.

For Germany though, the situation was extremely different.

Russia and France had an alliance, and Germany lay between them.

France felt the need for revenge for the Franco-Prussian wars, were it was beaten.

And France urged Russia to mobilize.

I'm not sure, if the Tsar or Sazonov really could imagine, what their mobilization would mean for Germany.

 

A fully mobilized Russian or French army would bring those two allies into the position to be able to crush

Germany in a two-fronts war. A tempting idea, even if it was not the intention firstly - once the armies stood

ready - who knows what would follow?

So German military plans all said, that as soon as one of the two countries would mobilize, Germany would

have to mobilize as quick as possible too. And even more - Germany would have to attack and beat

the French army in a sort of "Blitzkrieg" (lightning-fast war), before Russia's troops could put Germany

in serious dangers. Once France would be beaten, they would quickly turn and send most troops to

fight Russia. Every high ranking European or Russian military officer knew that. Still though, the Russians

did not seem to fully understand this dilemma.

 

Whatever the Kaiser and the Tsar felt and tried to prevent - there were military strategic plans, and a lot

of pressure from the military commanders, not to leave their countries unprotected.

 

Tsar Nicholas felt, that his own people would probably turn against him, if he let Serbia alone.

Kaiser Wilhelm could not watch Austria-Hungary getting overrun by Russia.

And so, both monarchs did not dare to keep stuck to their felt opinions, that the other would not attack them.

Edited January 7, 2011 by Olham

[Hasse Wind 46]

To what extent do you guys think the Germans in particular tended to underestimate Russia due to her performance in the Russo-Japanese War? Is it similar to the way the Winter War in Finland caused everyone to underestimate them in 1914?

 

It certainly played a part in the calculations of the general staffs. But they were well aware of the fact that Russia had started major reforms after the war against Japan, and they also understood that the circumstances in the Far East were very different from the European theatre of war. Russia was in a very difficult situation in the war against Japan, trying to support large-scale operations with very limited railroads of their Asian territories. It really was a logistical nightmare made worse by some thoroughly incompetent commanders. (One of them, General Kuropatkin, was even allowed to continue his failures in WW1.) But it was the Austro-Hungarian army which more seriously underestimated the Russian military might during the first weeks of the war. They paid the price in extremely heavy casualties and some loss of territory, which would have been even worse without German successes in East Prussia. If the Austrians didn't have German support, they would have lost the war against Russia.

 

Regarding mobilization, Olham already described the situation. I'll only add the fact that mobilizing the mass armies of the early 20th century took time (our modern armies are quite small by comparison), and everything depended on the railroads. General staffs had prepared extremely detailed plans and timetables for mobilization, and there was very little room for delays and changes of any kind. So if there was a decision to mobilize fully, the plans had to be followed to the letter in order to prevent the system from collapsing into a complete chaos. Time was of the essence, especially for Germany 'sandwiched' between France and Russia. The Austro-Hungarian army actually suffered from such a chaos when their commanders couldn't decide where they should concentrate some of their troops. They didn't fully follow the plans they had made in pre-war days, and ended up moving whole divisions around the country uselessly before finally getting them to the front. A decision to mobilize couldn't be made lightly, but when it was made, it had to be executed quickly in order to guarantee success. For Germany it was absolutely necessary to quickly mobilize and start attacking, otherwise they would lose all their advantages. And if one of the powers mobilized, the others couldn't stand around waiting for diplomacy to work, because if it didn't, they would have lost too much precious time for successful operations.

 

France and Germany had the best systems of mobilization and were able to concentrate their armies to their assigned sectors quickly and efficiently.

[Dej 17]

What has begun to interest me about the whole 'spark and powder keg' situation is the 'greater Slavonic nation' aspect of Russia's leap into the Serbian created abyss. Empire-expanding desires aside, none of the diplomatic particpants (if worth the pay cheque) could fail to extrapolate any of their actions. But why did Russia leap to Serbia's defence... no offence meant but she was ever a troublesome nation for any empire to govern, proud and fiercely independent... what did Russia stand to gain?

[Olham 164]

I could only read from Jannen's book so far, that the Russian population felt very "brotherly" towards the Serbian people,

who were also Slavonian. The Tsar did not dare for example to say, that he would not back them up against Austria.

He was well aware, that Austria had to punish Serbia to a certain extent, but he had to make sure, it was not too hard.

 

One point of Russian interest must have been, who controlled the Balkans and the Dardanelles.

They wanted no Austrian expansion towards that region, but rather see the terrain in the hands of Slav nations.

[Creaghorn 10]

As long as i know tsar nikolaus, wilhelm II. and george V. were even cousins. and the british royal family had the surname Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, which they changed into windsor in 1917 due to political pressure of the british people and their antigerman attitude.

don't know if true, but i heard that officially russia and japan are still in war because there was never a peace treaty since then to this day.

 

 

[Javito1986 14]

That's true actually. They never signed a peace treaty after WW2 and still dispute some island chain or another. I remember there was a cool mod for Operation Flashpoint that depicted a modern war between Russia and Japan. Someone made a giant robot for the Japanese side, I used to have fun taking on Russian armies single handed in that thing.

[Hasse Wind 46]

What has begun to interest me about the whole 'spark and powder keg' situation is the 'greater Slavonic nation' aspect of Russia's leap into the Serbian created abyss. Empire-expanding desires aside, none of the diplomatic particpants (if worth the pay cheque) could fail to extrapolate any of their actions. But why did Russia leap to Serbia's defence... no offence meant but she was ever a troublesome nation for any empire to govern, proud and fiercely independent... what did Russia stand to gain?

 

Olham already explained the Slavonic aspect of Russia's attitude, and the fact that Russia didn't want the Austrians to keep expanding their empire in the Balkans. But there was also the aspect of religion. Serbia was and still is mostly an Orthodox Christian country, and Russia was traditionally the protector of the Orthodox Christian church, having inherited this role from the fallen Byzantine Empire. So the Russians felt very strongly for the Serbs, who were not only Slavs like them but also had the same religion. But Russia didn't really have anything material to gain from supporting Serbia. It was mostly a question of international prestige, Pan-Slavism and religion.

[Olham 164]

I remember there was a cool mod for Operation Flashpoint that depicted a modern war between Russia and Japan.

Someone made a giant robot for the Japanese side, I used to have fun taking on Russian armies single handed in that thing.

 

So much for history - tch!

 

Good knowledge again; thank you, Hasse Wind.

[gaw 5]

Echo......comes from not reading the entire post.....saw RAF had already barked up the same tree.......never mind...great book!

[Olham 164]

Better twice than never, gaw - the good intention counts.

[Javito1986 14]

I let my library card expire, woops. Apparently I haven't been there since August 2009! Didn't realize it'd been so long! They require two pieces of proof of residence which I didn't have, hence -today- I shall go acquire the books mentioned here.