Biggest Mistakes of WW2

[Sheriff001 397]

Gepard has pointed to one of the most important factors in the British victory in the Battle of Britain. The Americans have a simpler version of the phrase "Train like you fight, fight like you train". I don't believe that giving the Luftwaffe more of a focus on how to fight a strategic battle would necessarily have helped them. Their training addresses one of their tactical weaknesses, but not their strategic weaknesses.

 

More airfield attacks would not have turned the battle. They achieved a lot of short term chaos, but putting a grass airfield out of action is incredibly difficult. Putting it out of action permanently is virtually impossible. The only exception is when such attacks destroy a major proportion of the target's air force on the ground. The Germans managed to achieve this in Poland. In Britain, radar denied the Germans the element of surprise.

 

In regard to the "man in the cockpit" factor, there were advantages and disadvantages on both sides. The Germans seemed to suffer from short-sightedness in regard to their pilots. There was no system by which German pilots could be rotated out of the front line for rest, while RAF Squadrons could be moved out of 11 Group to 13 Group for rest and recuperation. The Luftwaffe had pilots who had been in action almost continuously since the Spanish Civil War. The Luftwaffe also kept its best pilots in combat, rather than transferring them to training schools. This concentrated the lessons generated by experience, rather than turning these lessons in to wisdom for the younger pilots.

 

The Bf-109 escort fighters were tied to the bombers by their commmanders. Rather than being given leave to roam, they were ordered to stick close to the bombers. Having "Nulls" would not have changed this order, therefore the close escorts could have moved further in to Britain, but having surrendered their advantages in speed and agility to remain close to the bombers, the Nulls start at a great disadvantage.

 

One of the most important things to stress is that the Battle of Britain was a highly complex affair. Anyone suggesting that they found the cause of German defeat is oversimplifying the case. German defeat had several causes. This is true of most historical phenomenon. The single-cause fallacy is one of the most pernicious logical fallacies in existence.

[Snailman 517]

In regard to the "man in the cockpit" factor, there were advantages and disadvantages on both sides. The Germans seemed to suffer from short-sightedness in regard to their pilots. There was no system by which German pilots could be rotated out of the front line for rest, while RAF Squadrons could be moved out of 11 Group to 13 Group for rest and recuperation. The Luftwaffe had pilots who had been in action almost continuously since the Spanish Civil War. The Luftwaffe also kept its best pilots in combat, rather than transferring them to training schools. This concentrated the lessons generated by experience, rather than turning these lessons in to wisdom for the younger pilots.

 

Japanese have done exactly the same, maybe even more seriously due to traditions. Their superb crews were fighting until death, and they considered dishonorable to go back to train recruits. Producing average or above average recruits are more profitable than keeping a few super aces and a lot of green recruits.

[Sheriff001 397]

 

Japanese have done exactly the same, maybe even more seriously due to traditions. Their superb crews were fighting until death, and they considered dishonorable to go back to train recruits. Producing average or above average recruits are more profitable than keeping a few super aces and a lot of green recruits.

 

Indeed. I think the Japanese case was definitely due largely to traditions. In the case of the Germans, short-sightedness appears to be the main cause. They simply didn't plan for a long war. In the short wars they had planned for, there would need for rotating crews out of combat, nor of increasing the training program. They would get "rotated out" after they had won their short war, and they believed that the training program would provide enough pilots for a short war.

[+CrazyhorseB34 937]

Yes, especially if you have a whole lot of planes to put the new but fairly adequately trained pilots in and those squadrons being led by experienced or at least semi experienced veterans. The Germans and the Japanese had neither. The British did not do that during the BOB. They may have rotated squadrons for "rest" but the end result was nothing like the system that later developed in the Allied camp. The Germans did not have a clue, as Gepard pointed out, on how they where going to invade England. Hitler (drug addict) listened to Goring's (drug addict) promises of an air victory. Big lesson kids, don't do drugs. If the Germans would have had the "Null" ( I kind of like that term!), they would have had an aircraft that was able to do more hunting. They obviously would have realized this and used them to their advantage. I can say that the biggest factor was RADAR. Without that the Luftwaffe might have been able to remove the RAF from the Earth. But the British did have RADAR. The irony is that Germany was defeated by the very means they failed to master. Strategic air warfare.

[Sheriff001 397]

The capacity to do more hunting is useless when the boss insists you stick to the bombers, no matter what. It is not obvious that they would have realised the "Null's" capacity for free pursuit and used it, given the caliber of their higher commanders

 

Radar was definitely one of the biggest factors. However, it couldn't produce or repair aircraft, nor could it generate pilots. Radar did, however, contribute to RAF aircraft serviceability and help to reduce pilot fatigue by removing the need for standing patrols. This, combined with the Dowding-Parks policy to meet each attack with only the forces necessary to repel it, saved Fighter Command from incredible wastage.

[Snailman 517]

And one thing, I remember someone wrote before, the close escort problem. Ace pilots and expert commanders begged to the high command to authorize forward escort and free hunt (sorry if that not the correct term in english) but they were - old guards. And Goring. But the allies did not learn from the same lesson and they did the very same when they went over Germany...

[+Brain32 265]

One thing the British aircraft had going for them was fuel, the RAF used 100 Octane fuel, while the Germans had 87 Octane fuel.

That was a non issue, Germans used B4 fuel all the way until the end of the war using C3 only on certain examples like the brutal ME-109K4 with C3 fuel...

Infact RAF didn't start out with widespread 100 octane use and very early Hurris and Spits ran at very low pressure having significant performance(speed) disadvantage however with the 100 it about equaled out...

[Toryu 156]

BoB is blown way out of proportion. It does have some historical significance (first major defeat of the Wehrmacht).

However, Germany never planned to attack Britain, hence the more than poor equipment and training-syllabus (they only started their war-program for pilot-training after BoB was over). Operation Seelöwe was nothing but a poor joke. It sprung out of the necessity to shut the UK up, as it wouldn't proceed with appeasement anymore, as it conveniently did in the months and years leading up to WW2. Bloody bastards, just effing changed their minds! 

 

Had Germany actually planned to not only attack, but also defeat Britain, the LW would have looked entirely different. Even though the LW was an "independent" branch of forces, it actually really wasn't. As Gepard already stated, there was nothing going on in the generals' minds than Close Air Support and Blitzkrieg. Those types of warfare typically don't include blue-water naval operations or strategic air-campaigns. NONE of the german attempts at strategic air-campaigns actually worked. Ever.

They didn't have the capability, because they never anticipated to do what they later had to. Thus, they lacked hardware, air-crew and procedures. What they lacked most, however, was leadership. 

 

The german generals were somewhat a mixed bag of brilliance, snobbistic wieners and unimaginative careerists that would do anything to please their superiours and get a promotion in time. You really can't win a war with that kind of people - "leading" the troops from 9 to 5 and then spraying some Cologne in their face to party with the local Nazi-officials.

 

 

 

That, and the preoccupation of killing masses of civillians because they just didn't look right to them. 

Edited December 4, 2013 by Toryu

[Capitaine Vengeur 263]

The lack of preparedness in strategic air warfare was only a part of the German underestimation of what would be needed to knock down Britain. In diplomacy, British resolution was underestimated, as the Germans thought that Britain would not keep on fighting alone if not having any more Continental allies to sacrify (the Germans had thought the same when launching their offensives in 1918). More dramatically, the Germans had underestimated the impact of the strategic submarine warfare when the War broke, probably disillusionned after the heavy losses in subs and failure of the sub warfare in 1917-18. Yet, during the second half of 1940, the available three or four dozens of German oceanic subs almost strangled the overpopulated Kingdom heavily relying on its importations, to very slight own losses due to inefficient escort system. With 200 subs instead, the British merchant Navy may have been durably bled, and the Islands starved and put on their knees. By the time the Germans produced several hundreds of subs per year, this weapon had become inefficient and strategically anecdotical.

[Capitaine Vengeur 263]

Japanese have done exactly the same, maybe even more seriously due to traditions. Their superb crews were fighting until death, and they considered dishonorable to go back to train recruits. Producing average or above average recruits are more profitable than keeping a few super aces and a lot of green recruits.

Another factor that had the Japs lose many excellent pilots that may have survived longer otherwise, was the place where they had to fight. Malaria and other tropical diseases ravaged the Jap ranks in Burma and New Guinea, and the pilots were too proud to only "fly when fit". Several aces may have been lost in circumstances when they were too weakened to evaluate the danger. The Allied pilots suffered as well from tropical diseases; but they had quinine, and were ordered to rest. The Japanese only had Bushido readings, and were ordered to fly to their death.

[Peugeot205 2,745]

The biggest mistake was the war itself.

[MigBuster 2,884]

The biggest mistake was the war itself.

 

You can speculate on alternatives - however a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany may not have been the best thing - especially if you are not a member of the master race and didnt subscribe to Hitlers Ideology. How far would they have expanded? - its a possibility they would be the only power with an Atom bomb as well by 1946 if everyone did nothing. Would France even exist - even if France didn't declare war why would Hitler not just take it anyway?  

 

Japans Empire would also include China and SEA - again how far would they go - the US and UK just sit there while the Axis powers take over important economic interests - was never going to happen - conflict was inevitable.

 

 

I found this speech interesting - Hitler basing his decisions on Nazi ideology:

 

Edited December 9, 2013 by MigBuster