Map 36: The Schlieffen Plan

[Hauksbee 103]

The German and French war plans emphasized attacks

German and French war planners both believed the war was going to be an offensive one. The German plan, conceived by strategist Alfred von Schlieffen, envisioned a rapid German march primarily through Belgium into French territory. The French strategy, Plan XVII, sent French troops directly across Franco-German border, as well as through Luxemburg and Belgium. This partially explains where the main battle lines were during the war, but according to some historians it means much more than that. A very contentious line of scholarship holds that World War I was caused by these plans, because every state believed that the key to victory was a quick offensive strike and that a war, under those terms, could be won quickly and comparatively cheaply.

 

As in so many cases, the best minds of the day had it all figured out; it was going to be easy. A quick knock-out blow. A cake walk. One of the truest maxims of war is that "No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy". (Hauksbee)

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Edited October 5, 2014 by Hauksbee

[Olham 164]

It often seems to me, that military strategians rely too much on their own plans, and overlook possible enemy strategies.

A good strategian should put the same effort, as he puts into his own plan, into the detailed working-out of

"what would I do, if I was on the other side?" plans.

[+Gepard 11,244]

It the german command would had followed the Schlieffenplan by all means the history could have been a different.

But they made a version of this plan, a "Schlieffen light" with much to few troops on the right flank, so that an encircling of Paris was impossible from beginning.

 

The main idea of Schlieffenplan was the encircling of the french capital and finaly the encirling of the advancing french troops in south Germany. Schlieffens idea to scrifice Bavaria if neccessary  was not loved by the south german Kings and so the plan was changed after Schlieffens dead in that kind, that the defensive flank in the Vogesen mountains was made stronger. This was successfull. The french were unable to reach the Rhine valley. The german forces were able to stop them on the last hills, like Hartmannsweilerkopf.

But the troops which now fought in the Vogesen were missed on the offensive right flank. More bad was, that troops were removed from the offensive flank of the Westfront to stop the unexpected early russian offensive operation against Ostpreussen (East Prussia). But finaly this troops came to late to take part to fight the russian invasion in the battle of Tannenberg and in the west they were also not available. Bad missmanagement caused by panic in HQ. This was deciding of the war.

[Olham 164]

Well, if you have to fight at three hotspots, it must be extremely difficult to get all the movements right, I suppose.

Transport capacities were far from todays - the railways were the best transport lines, but it takes a certain time

to move thousands of troops plus all their equipment, from A to B, and maybe back again.

It seems to me that the possible Russian front was underestimated for too long.

[Hauksbee 103]

The Schlieffen Plan required a huge number of troops. To make this happen, the Germans cleverly counted their Reserve Units in with their Front Line Divisions. The Front Line units were young: 18-25. The Reserve Units were late-20's to mid 30's. Reserves were considered inferior by most of the armies of the world, and considered fit only for garrison duties and rear echelon support. Germany realized this was false and threw them into the front line. But Schlieffen had cautioned "Let the sleeve of the last man on the right brush the English Channel". With a mass of men this large, it was tempting to filch some here, some there for other duties, such as holding back the Russians in the east. And the Kaiser's young Crown Prince, who was in command of the left flank chafed at fighting a defensive war. He wanted to attack, and garner some military glory of his own. He demanded extra troops. As Barbara Tuchman put  it, "the spectre of a double-envelopment constantly danced before their eyes" The Schlieffen Plan got watered down. By early September the Germans were exhausted and  had out-run their supply lines. They paid for it on the Marne.