The Victories & Losses of the 15 top-scoring Jastas

[Flyby PC 23]

..... it's enough to explain why the Jastas (well, some of them) were so effective.

 

 

I suspect this is where the subject starts to get immotive. They weren't effective. They lost the air war. The Jastas shot down lots of aircraft and were much feared by RFC pilots, but in the wider picture they never stopped the RFC achieving the objectives which they set out to achieve. The Jastas enjoyed tactical success in winning their battles, but never secured the strategic innitiative necessary to win the war.

 

There was more value to be had from dedicating your airforce to gather your intelligence, rather than dedicating it to prevent your enemy gathering his.

 

The Jastas never stopped the RFC doing what it wanted to do, they just made more costly. Despite suffering tactical difficulties and losses, the strategic innitiative remained with the allied forces throughout the war, through the good times and the bad. In contrast, the big objective of the Jastas was to destroy as many allied aircraft as possible, frustrate their objectives and deny them air intelligence. In these terms, they simply failed to do it. They not only failed to achieve this ultimate objective, you could actually argue that despite the numbers of aircraft shot down, the strategic contribution made by the Jastas was largely irrelevant to the progress of the war.

Edited September 3, 2011 by Flyby PC

[Hasse Wind 46]

You're right, Flyby. Even during Bloody April, when the British squadrons suffered extremely heavy casualties, the recon and bomber aircraft kept flying and doing their duty, supporting the ground troops. The Germans couldn't prevent that. If every month had been like Bloody April, then the RFC would have been devastated sooner or later. But that didn't happen.

 

Actually this reminds me of the submarine warfare of WW2. The German U-Boat fleet was undoubtedly powerful and posed a serious threat to the British war effort. But they weren't powerful enough. A few particularly successful months weren't enough to do the job.

[Olham 164]

Well, if you think about the unbalance of the sheer number of Entente pilots and aircraft

(Britain, France, Canada, Australia and finally America) compared to just German numbers,

it was impossible from the beginning, that German Jastas could have gained air superiority

over enemy terrain. They were in the defensive most of the time.

 

Hasse Wind, do you know how well (or not) the German two-seaters could do their recon

and bombing tasks?

[themightysrc 5]

"I suspect this is where the subject starts to get immotive. They weren't effective. They lost the air war. The Jastas shot down lots of aircraft and were much feared by RFC pilots, but in the wider picture they never stopped the RFC achieving the objectives which they set out to achieve. The Jastas enjoyed tactical success in winning their battles, but never secured the strategic innitiative necessary to win the war."

 

I absolutely concur with this. For all the individual battles that the Jastas won - and they won many - the RFC in particular were never stopped utterly from getting the two seaters where they were needed, more or irregardless of cost. The battles were largely won, but the war still lost.

 

"There was more value to be had from dedicating your airforce to gather your intelligence, rather than dedicating it to prevent your enemy gathering his."

 

My point exactly, but much more cogently put.

 

"The Jastas never stopped the RFC doing what it wanted to do, they just made more costly. Despite suffering tactical difficulties and losses, the strategic innitiative remained with the allied forces throughout the war, through the good times and the bad. In contrast, the big objective of the Jastas was to destroy as many allied aircraft as possible, frustrate their objectives and deny them air intelligence. In these terms, they simply failed to do it. They not only failed to achieve this ultimate objective, you could actually argue that despite the numbers of aircraft shot down, the strategic contribution made by the Jastas was largely irrelevant to the progress of the war. "

 

In terms of destroying aircraft, they were largely successful - but see the rider below - however in terms of stopping the Entente forces from operating over enemy soil, they undoubtedly failed, although lack of numbers exacerbated and influenced a poor strategic decision.

 

One other factor that's not yet been mentioned is the lack of suitable allied aircraft until 1917, compared to the German air service. The Germans were lucky enough and bright enough to develop aircraft that were, in the early years, simply better than their Entente equivalents. It would be a brave man indeed who would argue that Entente pilots had parity of equipment until late 1917, when both scout and two seater development had caught up and led to the later years aircraft that proved so successful. I'm thinking here of the Camel, SE5, DH4 and Brisfit in particular, although taps to N17 and SPAD scouts, as well as Breguet's two seaters. Once equipment parity was established, then it was simply a matter of time before the German air service succumbed.

[Flyby PC 23]

I agree Olham, but that's the point. The German Jastas could not win. However brave, however skillful, however determined, they were never going to achieve their objective.

 

In strategic terms, even if they achieved the objective of preventing the allied aircraft entering their airspace, actually, the strategic value is still nil. The one air force has merely cancelled out the other.

 

In contrast, by continuing to fly every day despite the losses, the allied planes achieved the vast majority of their objectives every day.

[Olham 164]

Perhaps you read the first post again to remember the question.

The question was not, if the German Jastas had any chance to win.

I think it is out of question, that they hadn't.

[themightysrc 5]

"Perhaps you read the first post again to remember the question.

The question was not, if the German Jastas had any chance to win."

 

You're quite correct.

 

I've outlined some of the reasons why I felt they were - individually - successful against Entente forces, but FlybyPC puts the whole thing into a strategic perspective, which I tried and perhaps failed to do clearly.

 

Still, a highly interesting subject, and one that's clearly close to our collective heart.

[Olham 164]

If anyone has reliable numbers / data for the French or the British flyers,

I am more than willing to make a graphic for them, too.

 

Me, I just did this one because I wanted to see the relations in an illustrating way (instead of just numbers).

What got me started was, that I realised, that my Jasta 2 pilot sees far too many falling craft in his fights.

On both sides that is, by the way - I am absolutely certain, that neither the British nor the French lost so

many aircraft in their scraps with the Jastas.

That is, as I said in the beginning, a very difficult problem for each air combat sim - possibly unsolveable.

OFF takes care for that at least so far, that it doesn't count all these fallen craft as losses.

Edited September 3, 2011 by Olham

[Hasse Wind 46]

Hasse Wind, do you know how well (or not) the German two-seaters could do their recon

and bombing tasks?

 

It's surprisingly difficult to find anything on this subject, but my understanding is that they were quite successful at it most of the time. They used a lot of high flying recon aircraft, which were often capable of completely avoiding the Entente fighters and very useful in gathering information from behind the enemy lines. This was particularly true in the final year of the war when Entente air forces became even more powerful and yet it was necessary for the Germans to see behind the lines in preparation of and during the final offensives of the war.

 

One must remember that for the most part, the German army was on the defensive in the West, while the British and the French were constantly planning and executing offensives. The Germans didn't need such massive numbers of artillery direction aircraft to support their defensive positions which were well fortified and where everything was carefully planned ahead. Ground observers and balloons could do excellent work at spotting the advancing Entente troops and directing the fire of the German artillery upon them. It was of course different for the Entente troops, who had to leave their familiar fortified positions and lines of communication behind when they went on the offensive. They needed more support from the air, and when aircraft were found to be extremely useful for directing artillery fire, especially when equipped with wireless sets, it became crucial for the Entente offensives to get that support. That (and the recon and contact patrols) is why the Entente air forces tried to protect their two-seaters so aggressively. I think it isn't totally wrong to say that it was more important for them to guarantee that their own two-seaters got through than to prevent every German two-seater from doing its job.

 

Regarding German bombers, the strategic bombing done by the Gothas and other heavies had an impact in forcing the British to create an air defense system for their homeland. All the guns and aircraft that were needed to fight against the German bombers over Britain could have been used on the Western front for other purposes. In creating this situation the German strategic bombing campaign certainly succeeded to some extent. But of course it wasn't enough to change the course of the war.

 

The close air support role of the German bombers became evident in late 1917 with the introduction of Schlasta tactics. During the battle of Cambrai, the ground attack aircraft used in large formations were very good at harassing the British troops and in supporting German counterattacks. The massive use of such aircraft continued during the big offensives of the next year, but the Entente quickly adapted and thanks to their huge numbers of fighters and anti-aircraft weapons were able to cause heavy casualties to the ground attack aircraft and limit their effectiveness.

 

When the Germans were on the offensive, and in particular during the final months of the war, their two-seaters had to behave more aggressively. Consequently they suffered heavier casualties and they really weren't numerous enough to have a serious impact on the war at any time. It wasn't decisive, but the relative weakness of the Luftstreitkräfte certainly made the job of the powerful German army more difficult during those final months. But I don't think anybody could have done any better under such circumstances, suffering from such serious limitations.

[Olham 164]

Yeah, they made the most of their hopeless case, so to say.

Somewhere I read, that early on in the war, one German General would have had the chance

to get through to Paris - but he stopped.

After that, such a chance never came again.

I'd like to state here, that I am glad it turned out that way. Paris is only Paris, when it is the capital

of France; when it is ruled by the French, and by nobody else. Neither the German nor the British

way is like the French way - and that's good that way.

Vive la diversité!

[Flyby PC 23]

I thought we were 100% on topic Olham.

 

The strategies employed by respective sides meant German aircraft were in the air to hunt and shoot down enemy aircraft. The Entente aircraft, predominantly RFC, were there primarily to look over the side and take pictures. I believe this may account for the disparity between Jasta kills and losses. It is always rare for the prey to defeat the predator.

 

German pilots were more skilled, because they were designated fighter pilots flying in fighter plane rolls. The RFC sent over 'lesser' pilots in inferior aircraft who's best defence, if not only defence, was to rely on not meeting the enemy at all, or trying to run for home if they did. The weren't required to be aerial warriors there to suppress the enemy, (that was to come later), just be able to find their objective, take a picture, and get home with the information. If bounced by enemy patrols they were 'expendible', with their fate in their own hands and skill in defence rather than attack.

 

In this, you can also begin to see another side to RFC not being provided with parachutes. It wasn't only to make a pilot look after his plane, but to make him think twice before engaging in combat rather than running for home.

Edited September 3, 2011 by Flyby PC

[Grinseed 19]

There can be no detracting from the considerable achievements of the German air service at the time, but some consideration has to be given to the general strategy of the RFC, as promoted by Trenchard,

http://en.wikipedia....count_Trenchard, who firmly held to the conviction that 'you cannot defend the sky', which in turn was reflected in the Lanoe Hawker's directive to his squadron, 'Attack everything'and in Albert Ball's tactic of charging headlong into enemy flights.

 

Overall this strategy was in nearly complete contrast to that of the Germans forced to conserve resources where possible, fighting a war on two fronts. There are written accounts of interrogated German pilots expressing consternation that the English pilots appeared to approach the air war as if it were a game, engaging all and sundry, whereas the Germans considered it a job, a duty to be done with the least possible loss.

 

And while the RFC was to benefit from better aircraft arriving at the front in 1917 to reverse the appalling losses exemplified in Bloody April, there were also better trained pilots landing in France in late 1917, graduates of Smith-Barry's Special School of Flying at Upavon, http://www.firstworl.../smithbarry.htm

 

As usual there are always many reasons to explain events and shifts in history. I offer the above only as a small contribution to this particular and interesting part of the first air war.

 

Cheers Grinseed

Edited September 3, 2011 by Grinseed

[themightysrc 5]

"If bounced by enemy patrols they were 'expendible', with their fate in their own hands and skill in defence rather than attack"

 

I'm not sure I can agree. The whole point of the observation planes was to make the observations and get back. Photo plates lying in the mud or inside the German lines helped no one. But, yes, what a way to fight an air war, even though Trenchard was proven right in the end...

[Flyby PC 23]

"If bounced by enemy patrols they were 'expendible', with their fate in their own hands and skill in defence rather than attack"

 

I'm not sure I can agree. The whole point of the observation planes was to make the observations and get back. Photo plates lying in the mud or inside the German lines helped no one. But, yes, what a way to fight an air war, even though Trenchard was proven right in the end...

 

We don't disagree themightysrc. The RFC didn't completely abandon their pilots to their fate, but there was tacit acceptance if they did meet an enemy patrol, it was unlikely to be a fair fight and the RFC pilots were going to be in trouble. Their best chance of survival was to get themselves (and their intelligence) back home and out of harms way as quickly as possible. To turn and engage in combat was not part of their mission, they weren't equipped for it, their aircraft were inferior, and the odds of success stacked against them.

 

It is indeed harsh to send pilots out in such circumstances, but while RFC fighters remained inadequate to perform as escort fighters, the only meaningful defence the RFC could have deployed was to stop sending the patrols. That was the strategic result the Germans were seeking, and the RFC was not going to concede that. They resolved to play the percentage game, and absorb the losses. Many pilots were going to die, but many more were going to survive their patrols and get the job done.

 

This may sound harsh and cold blooded, but it's actually not a million miles away from a foot patrol by ground troops. Reconnaisance patrols seek to avoid contact, where fighting patrols seek it out and carry the necessary equipment and men to win the fight. It's much the same theory, other than there's no place to hide in the sky.

 

Edit- Please be aware I comment on the RFC strategy which ultimately prevailed, but that doesn't mean the German strategy was wrong or even weak in any way. Indeed, what else could the German Jastas have done to be any more successful than they were? Is there some other strategy which would have delivered better results? If there is, I can't think what it is. To attack enemy patrols in small dispersed formations might only have made air combats more evenly contested with greater losses for fewer kills for the Germans.

 

As it is, the German strategy came very close to crushing the morale of the RFC pilots, but the true test of the German strategy requires us to know how close the Entente forces came to abandoning their patrols into enemy skies. That, I believe, was their one and only chance of any meaningful German success. For extended periods throughout the war, they had the edge in the quality of pilots and aircraft to do it, but never once possessed the necessary numbers to dominate their enemy. Even their success denting the morale of the RFC pilots wasn't a concrete success. The British pilots were not dejected and beaten by the enemy so much as frustrated that they hadn't the equipment or strategy to compete on even terms. When such equipment did start to arrive, the British frustration quickly transformed into a heightened desire for pay back.

Edited September 4, 2011 by Flyby PC

[Hasse Wind 46]

This may sound harsh and cold blooded, but it's actually not a million miles away from a foot patrol by ground troops. Reconnaisance patrols seek to avoid contact, where fighting patrols seek it out and carry the necessary equipment and men to win the fight. It's much the same theory, other than there's no place to hide in the sky.

 

In a war that was unprecedentedly bloody and brutal, the lot of the pilots and observers wasn't particularly bad compared to the men in the trenches. At least they had a comfortable place to return to after patrols. The same cannot be said of the poor bloody infantry living in the mud.

 

Edit- Please be aware I comment on the RFC strategy which ultimately prevailed, but that doesn't mean the German strategy was wrong or even weak in any way. Indeed, what else could the German Jastas have done to be any more successful than they were? Is there some other strategy which would have delivered better results? If there is, I can't think what it is. To attack enemy patrols in small dispersed formations might only have made air combats more evenly contested with greater losses for fewer kills for the Germans.

 

The Germans did try both methods during the war, ie. dispersal of fighters along the front to cover every area (the so called barrage patrols) and then later the concentration of fighter units into bigger tactical formations (Gruppen and Geschwhadern). The latter system produced dramatically better results, though at the price of being very weak in certain sectors of the front. There was considerable debate over these tactics between the Jasta commanders, their superiors at Korps and Armee headquarters, and the high command of the Luftstreitkräfte. Richthofen strongly supported the Geschwader tactics, but not everybody was convinced of their effectiveness, until the use of the big formations started to produce excellent results.

 

In the end, the Germans simply had too many enemies to fight against. They didn't have the resources to maintain all the branches of their armed forces so strong as to be able to defeat everybody. The German army (Heer) was arguably the best in the world, but maintaining it was extremely costly, and even its considerable efforts were inadequate to win the war in 1918, when Britain and France were getting more and more support from the United States.

 

I'm getting off-topic now, but the main reason why Germany lost both world wars was the lack of decent strategy. They always excelled at the tactical and operational levels, but were unable to create adequate strategies.

[UK_Widowmaker 571]

Well, if you think about the unbalance of the sheer number of Entente pilots and aircraft

(Britain, France, Canada, Australia and finally America) compared to just German numbers,

it was impossible from the beginning, that German Jastas could have gained air superiority

over enemy terrain. They were in the defensive most of the time.

 

Hasse Wind, do you know how well (or not) the German two-seaters could do their recon

and bombing tasks?

 

The Luftwaffe never managed to do that though did they?... On paper, they would have 100% won the Battle of Britain, for the very reasons you mention Olham...but they lost.

 

British Spunk m8!..WOOF WOOF!

[Olham 164]

... German aircraft were in the air to hunt and shoot down enemy aircraft. The Entente aircraft,

predominantly RFC, were there primarily to look over the side and take pictures. I believe this

may account for the disparity between Jasta kills and losses. It is always rare for the prey to

defeat the predator.

But that would leave all the British and French fighter units out completely?

 

In this, you can also begin to see another side to RFC not being provided with parachutes.

It wasn't only to make a pilot look after his plane, but to make him think twice before engaging in

combat rather than running for home.

I doubt, that the author of "No Parachute", Arthur Gould Lee, would agree with you here.

[Olham 164]

Widowmaker, the "Battle of Britain" was again a fight of only half of the Luftwaffe against the RAF.

The other half (or actually even more than half) was fighting at the Eastern front.

I would like to add a "woof, woof" here, but this is again drifting far off into the emotional areas.

 

Lets not get this into an emotional debate (although I realise for myself, that it is quite impossible

to keep any emotions out of it). It is surely hard to do, to look at just the historical facts, when your

ancestors were involved in a war. I guess that is still making us to sympathize with one or another

side of the trenches. Only natural, but not useful in historical research, I guess.

 

Good points, Grinseed! Are you a new OFF flyer?

In that case I'd like to receive a PM with your town and country, so I could add you to our OFF Pilots Maps.

[Hasse Wind 46]

Olham, the Battle of Britain was fought before Operation Barbarossa.

 

And as always, everything wasn't quite as simple as taking a look at the numbers of both sides.

 

Anyway, now we're getting off-topic.

[33LIMA 972]

Widowmaker, the "Battle of Britain" was again a fight of only half of the Luftwaffe against the RAF.

The other half (or actually even more than half) was fighting at the Eastern front.

I would like to add a "woof, woof" here, but this is again drifting far off into the emotional areas.

 

Lets not get this into an emotional debate (although I realise for myself, that it is quite impossible

to keep any emotions out of it). It is surely hard to do, to look at just the historical facts, when your

ancestors were involved in a war. I guess that is still making us to sympathize with one or another

side of the trenches. Only natural, but not useful in historical research, I guess.

 

Good points, Grinseed! Are you a new OFF flyer?

In that case I'd like to receive a PM with your town and country, so I could add you to our OFF Pilots Maps.

 

A bit OT, but the Luftwaffe only diverted to the East well after the Battle of Britian EFFECTIVELY ended with the indefinite postponement of Operation Sealion on 17 September 1940. The British officially considered the Battle ended in October, but regardless of what date one picks, later Luftwaffe operations against the UK can't by any stretch be considered part of the Summer 1940 operation; the BoB by definition was the Luftwaffe's effort to pave the way for invasion.

 

Curent thinking seems to be that the LW was almost bound to lose; it just didn't have the resources/industrial base necessary to win a short but high-tempo air campaign in the Summer of 1940, against an extremely effective air defence system backed up by higher fighter production and adequate pilot reserves. The decisive point actually came before the Battle started - Churchill's historic decision, arguably against the UK's national interests, to fight on rather than make peace. The RAF made sure that decision stuck, as was always the most likely outcome; and if the RAF somehow hadn't, the Royal Navy (as Admiral Raeder knew would happen) would have destroyed an invasion force and prevented resupply of any forces (eg paras) that did make it over (the LW's anti-warship capability in 1940 was limited - Stukas and KG26 , few AP bombs - and the RN would have accepted whatever losses necessary). It took the Allies years and massive material and manpower resources, air land and sea, to do the reverse. Adler Angriff/Seelowe would only have worked in 1940 if Britain had been on the verge of collapse militarily or politically/morally, and that was far from the case.

Edited September 4, 2011 by 33LIMA

[UK_Widowmaker 571]

It was a little Joke Olham... No Offense meant! (you should know me by now)

[Grinseed 19]

Sorry to say Olham, no. I'm actually a First Eagle spy.

My pedal power puter struggles to run OFF, slideshows etc...maybe if/when I get a more powerful rig...

In the meantime I usually wander over here from the combatace main page following the interesting historical discussions. Great site and forums gentlemen. Keep up the good work.

 

Cheers Grinseed

[Olham 164]

No offense taken, Widow; and yes, I know your "Lord Flashheart" impersonations -

and "ooops!" - I really always thought, half the Luftwaffe was already standing in the East.

You see, I actually know little about WW2 in detail - sorry, my fault.

 

Thank you, Grinseed - I hope you will be able to fly OFF some day - maybe when P4 comes out?

[UK_Widowmaker 571]

Sorry to say Olham, no. I'm actually a First Eagle spy.

My pedal power puter struggles to run OFF, slideshows etc...maybe if/when I get a more powerful rig...

In the meantime I usually wander over here from the combatace main page following the interesting historical discussions. Great site and forums gentlemen. Keep up the good work.

 

Cheers Grinseed

 

A great sim as well..I enjoy flying it

[Stickshaker 0]

Besides the factors mentioned above, I always thought that it was much more German than Entente policy to group the best pilots in special units. Of course the Entente had the Storks and 56 Sqn, but they might be exceptions and a result of ‘evolution’ rather than policy. If this is so, there may have been more elite German than Entente units. So if you compare the best X units you are comparing German elite outfits with a combination of elite and average Entente units.