The Victories & Losses of the 15 top-scoring Jastas

[Olham 164]

Correct, Stickshaker.

The Germans didn't have such high resources of aircraft and pilots as the Entente had.

That's why von Richthofen's "Circus", and also many other Jastas, travelled quite a lot

during the war - the best were always needed at the hot spots.

 

But again: this graphic was not made as a competition between Jastas and Entente fighter

squads - it was made solely to demonstrate, that the fifteen top-ranking Jastas had only

about 12 % losses compared to their victories.

Not more - without any valuation.

I had always guessed they should have had much higher losses.

[Creaghorn 10]

The Luftwaffe never managed to do that though did they?... On paper, they would have 100% won the Battle of Britain, for the very reasons you mention Olham...but they lost.

 

British Spunk m8!..WOOF WOOF!

 

hi wid,

 

as long as i know the main reason the germans (fortunately) did not win was the decoding of the crypted german messages (ULTRA). so the brits almost always knew the german next moves. at least enough to know where to concentrate their forces.

 

the other reason is "herr meier" göring, who shortly before beating the brits completely by destroying all airfields etc. decided to appeal to hitler by attacking london, so the brits had enough time again to repair their airfields and their recources.

 

 

sorry for beeing off topic. the main topic should still be why the germans had so few losses, not why did they not win or why they had so many victories.

 

 

 

cheers

[Hasse Wind 46]

I had always guessed they should have had much higher losses.

 

Yeah, that's the impression one gets from playing flight sims. Air combat is almost always much deadlier in the virtual skies. In OFF and other sims every battle causes much heavier casualties than in reality. It's a combination of Terminator AI and similar Terminator human player behaviour.

 

Man, it's easy to go off-topic.

[33LIMA 972]

Just before we get back on topic, I for one tend to go with the view expressed by some historians, that the significance of 'Ultra' decoding, and code-breaking generally, is often over-stated. Of course there are some exceptions (like maybe the mortain counterattack in Normandy, and more importantly Midway, where the US ambushed and destroyed the Japanese carrier force largely on the basis of USN code breaking, and to a lesser extent, re U-Boat message traffic). The thing is, important and detailed orders were transmitted, not via Enigma, but by teleprinter/land line or courrier. In general, Enigma was used for relatively short-term, tactical traffic. Decoding this was certainly helpful but it gave Allied commanders another piece in the jigsaw and not some kind of magical view of 'the other side of the hill'.

 

Also, whether the switch to London reprieved the RAF is often debated these days. Some LW commanders (Jeschonnek IIRC was one), not just Goering, thought it necessary, not as a reprisal for RAF Berlin night raids, but to force the RAF to commit its fighter reserves - 'the last fifty Spitfires' - so they could be worn down in air combat. The USAAF had much the same motive for mounting daylight attacks Berlin in early 1944, and few people criticise that move. In both cases, attacking the capital had a certain logic. Going for London took some pressure off the RAF airfields and made life even harder for the short-legged 109s but I'm not sure it was a decisive factor. The Luftwaffe would have had to have been extraordinarily fortunate and/or effective, and the RAF extraordinarly unfortunate and/or ineffective, for the Battle to have ended in anything other than a strategic defeat for the Luftwaffe. I think it was Keitel or von Rundstedt who, when asked by the Soviets at the end what he considered to be the war's turning point, disappointed them by answering, not as they'd expected, 'Stalingrad', but 'the Battle of Britain'. He had a point.

Edited September 4, 2011 by 33LIMA

[Olham 164]

... as long as i know the main reason the germans (fortunately) did not win was the decoding of the crypted german messages (ULTRA).

so the brits almost always knew the german next moves. at least enough to know where to concentrate their forces.

Well, that's what they call intelligence, I guess - you don't only fight with guns in a war,

and the British radar system plus the decoding may be two good examples for that.

 

...the other reason is "herr meier" göring, who shortly before beating the brits completely by destroying all airfields etc.

decided to appeal to hitler by attacking london, so the brits had enough time again to repair their airfields and their recources.

Whatever wrong tactical decisions "Herr Meier" made - it is again part of a war, to make better or bad decisions.

Let's not make "Herr Meier" the secret winner of the Battle of Britain - for the British.

[themightysrc 5]

"I had always guessed they should have had much higher losses."

 

Why?

 

Surely, grouping together experienced scout pilots with a well developed tactical methodology into squadron (or larger) sized bodies would produce the exact opposite?

[UK_Widowmaker 571]

+ Sheer Morale as much as anything I would think?... I mean, it must have been low in 1917-18 for a German Pilot... The American's had joined the War, it must have been obvious that the game was up to many of them

[Hasse Wind 46]

+ Sheer Morale as much as anything I would think?... I mean, it must have been low in 1917-18 for a German Pilot... The American's had joined the War, it must have been obvious that the game was up to many of them

 

That is something that is not easy to admit to yourself. No matter how bad the situation, you don't want to give up hope.

 

But the situation for Germany at the end of 1917 didn't actually look bad. They were on the brink of kicking Russia out of the war - the Czar had lost power and Lenin's Bolsheviks were doing their best to destroy the old system in Russia. The Germans knew that they could move a huge number of divisions from the Eastern front to the West and use them in a final attempt to win the war, before the American contribution to the Entente war effort became too decisive.

 

Desperation came only in the late summer of 1918, when it became obvious that the big offensives had failed and German armies were on the retreat. But still they kept fighting, because it's so hard to admit that there's no hope. It's human nature.

[Olham 164]

"I had always guessed they should have had much higher losses."

 

Why?

 

Surely, grouping together experienced scout pilots with a well developed tactical methodology into squadron (or larger) sized bodies would produce the exact opposite?

For various reasons I thought that.

Firstly from my experiences in various sims (so much for the historian in me!).

Then because of their technical situation - sitting in open cockpits, no radios,

flying kites no insurance would easily insure anymore, and then flying against

so overwhelming superior forces.

I had just thought that all would take a bigger toll, actually.

 

But you are surely right - the way they organised their operations, was keeping them relatively safe.

There were often wide spaces with no Jasta pilots seen anywhere - but where they appeared, they

did in strong enough formations to defend each other.

And their tactical cooperation was well thought out and trained surely.

[Flyby PC 23]

I don't have any answers, but try to make sense of the bits I do know, and remain very suspicious of the bits which seem bizarre or which don't make sense. In my experience, nonsense is only nonsense until it's explained and understood.

 

I also have massive gaps in my knowledge, but which I would like to fill.

 

For example, on a typical day, how many aircraft sorties were flown? How many aircraft were in the sky at the same time, and of these, what proportion would realistically become casualties? Did they all fly in the morning, or disperse their sorties throughout the day? What proportion flew in squadrons, what proportion flew alone? How many fighters were there compared to other aircraft? How did these 'patterns' evolve as the war developed? Did the Germans fear the French more than the British or vice versa?

 

All I can add to the issue of British fighters was that early on in 1915/16, the British fighters were still Armstrong Whitworths, Bristol Scouts, and BE2's with limited capacity to take the fight to the enemy. The gap between their performance as fighters and genernal purpose aircraft was marginal.

 

Contrary to a large number of books and reports, I struggle to accept the British commanders were arrogant buffoons content to see their pilots entering combat at such a seriously disadvantaged position. To me, it would make sense to encourage them to flee from encounters with the enemy which held little promise of a victory. He who fights then runs away, survives to fight another day...

[Hauksbee 103]

Has any our vacant-eyed, over-immersed pilots ever said "To Hell with this! I can't take it any more." and tried to fly to virtual Switzerland? (which begs the question: Where does the OFF terrain end?)

[themightysrc 5]

"Contrary to a large number of books and reports, I struggle to accept the British commanders were arrogant buffoons content to see their pilots entering combat at such a seriously disadvantaged position. To me, it would make sense to encourage them to flee from encounters with the enemy which held little promise of a victory."

 

Well, yeah but no but....

 

Trenchard and his people knew exactly what they were about, and they simply instilled a similar ethos (or at least encouraged it) in the RFC. They knew the planes were rubbish, the training inadequate and the German scouts formidable, but, as you've already pointed out, they had their eyes on a much bigger target, one that required that perhaps dozens of RFC flyers died, but which then saved the lives of hundreds - perhaps thousands - of allied ground troops. That was the trade off. You might lose a squadron's worth of spotters, but those that got through provided the intelligence to enable you to plaster a German battery or trench system, thereby enabling the great advance.

 

Of course, that's where the thinking - apart from the early part of the battle of Arras, and then into 1918 - fell apart. The spotters went out; men died; some returned; the intelligence was gathered; plans were laid; attacks took place; more casualties, for insignificant material gain. That's not to say that the psychological toll on the German army wasn't considerable. It's been remarked by better historians than me that the Somme was the graveyard of the elite of the pre-war German army, and Passchendaele the graveyard of its hopes for victory. No matter how appalling the slaughter was on the allied side of the fight, it's often forgotten that German troops in those - and other - battles generally suffered comparable casualties to the Entente forces.

 

So as not to divert, I'll get back to the point. The RFC planning was sound, but the delivery of the end product - the successful breaching of the lines and a march on Berlin - were chimaeras in the imaginations of the planners. Were the British commanders heartless? No. Were they hard headed and largely realistic? I think they were. They realised that they needed intell, and the RFC was the way about it. In the end analysis, if the allies had stormed through at Arras (for example) in 1917 due to the sterling work of the RFC, the question wouldn't even be asked, as the contribution would be entirely obvious. Because the war carried on until November 1918, it's all too easy to see it as the pointless deaths of hundreds of airmen - on both sides.

 

I'm willing to bet that neither sidesaw it that way.

Edited September 4, 2011 by themightysrc

[Olham 164]

Yeah, I guess they had to learn it the hard way, Mighty, that such a modern war between highly industrialised opponents

could not be won without terrible losses. Generals are not made to see such facts.

 

Hauksbee, the map goes even as far as northern Italy (which keeps another front available for P5, perhaps? Hint, hint, devs!)

RAF_Louvert has been flying through the Alpes as far as I know - try it out!

 

Guys, we have made four pages, and remained civilised about the topic, despite Shredward's worst fears.

So, let me bring out a toast to the fine gentlemen on this forum - which must be the best forum in the world!

Cheers, gents!

[themightysrc 5]

Hi Olham,

 

Yes, I think it's been a good discussion without rancour.

 

Because it can be emotive, I think it only right that we reign in any overweening feelings - after all, the subject deserves much better than a testosterone fuelled rant. Only a calm and rational analysis of the subject can do justice.

 

To get back to the original point: I think that via circumlocution, we've more or less pulled the major bones out of the subject, and identified why it is that the jastas won so many battles but lost the war. In essence, it was not their fault. They fought within the constraints placed upon them at the time, and it would have taken an extraordinarily brave commander to have promoted a strategy similar to Trenchard's, given that the German army for much of the war was actually on the defensive. I'd very much like to see research on the activities of the German air service during those periods when offensives were under way (in the West). I suspect that until quite late in the war, their activities would have remained as they generally did: local air superiority. If anyone can point me in the direction of any works regarding this aspect of the war, I'll stand you a virtual beer!

 

Cheers,

Si

[Flyby PC 23]

I think in this forum, all of us, and I mean all of us, are here because we want to learn. In other forums, from time to time there are too many wanting only to teach.

 

The frustrating thing for me with WW1 history is, well, how can I put this? It feels like it doesn't come from raw data. Too often stories are based on numbers and data, and presented as conclusions, but for some reason the 'reasoning' behind these decisions and events is left as speculation. We have 100 opinions of everything, but rarely the truth straight from the horses mouth. And even when we do have comments from the people who were there, it's so often filtered by a supporting narrative that "he meant this", or "he said this because the thought this". Yes, but how do we know what he was thinking? Can't we just have the history without the opinion? When I read about the history of WW1, it feels like a history which wasn't written at the time. The important questions weren't asked until the answers were already gone.

 

Take for example Douglas Haig, the man in charge, who many hold responsible for a significant part of the carnage,- our critical 'modern' opinion of Haig is a world apart from the devotion and popular reverence held for him by his troops at the time, - including those who survived being sent over the top by Haig's strategy. We can't both be right. Either the Tommies of WW1 had the wrong idea of Haig, or we haven't understood the full story, and this is just one example why I find WW1 very frustrating to read up on. I don't have enough data to make up my own mind. Where the stories don't converge, surely the most authentic source of information must come from the people who were there mustn't it?, - but yet we seem a little too happy to set aside the testimony of witnesses who were actually there.

 

To a lesser extent, it's like Bloody April. The 'proof' of carnage seems based upon the fact the period was called Bloody April, rather than detailed analysis of the actual events which caused the month to be named Bloody. How much worse was April than March? What happened to slow the carnage in May? Did the pilots there at the time call April Bloody? How could they, what perspective did they have to judge? To me, the title Bloody April suggests a retrospective review of 1917 casualties with April being recognised as the bloodiest. See what I mean? Bloody April is a term of reference from contempory history, but not immediate history. If I was to read an immediate history of 1917, would I come to the same conclusion on my own that something extreme happened in April?

 

It's like we are not reading the history itself, but base our understanding on what the contemporary newspapers said, and calling that the history. Well, it is history in some ways, but it's already someone elses opinion of it.

 

Too often for my liking it leaves me with nagging doubts about experts of WW1 history.

Edited September 5, 2011 by Flyby PC

[UK_Widowmaker 571]

You're all buffoons...I know everything!

[Flyby PC 23]

You're all buffoons...I know everything!

 

 

I knew you'd say that. :yes:

 

Correction - Rather than all of us being buffoons, I think you'll find that only a mere 27% of us are buffoons on a permanent basis, (assuming 'permanent' represents something in excess of 80% of the time), whereas a much greater precentage of us, close to 80% of us, have only sufferred instances of buffoonery on a periodic basis, but suffered such instances with insufficient frequency as to render us 'permanent' buffoons. 71% of those surveyed agreed it would be more correct to say we have all been buffoons at one time, rather than we are all buffoons on a permanent basis. There are of course instances where those of us who might once have fallen into the category of permanent buffoons, have sought treatment for our buffonery, and now fall into the semi-permanent category of buffoonery. However, there are also a small number of semi-permanent, even one or two 'occassional' buffoons who have suffered relapses in their condition and could now legitimately be referred to as buffoons proper.

 

You will of course be aware that in the buffoonery spectrum, those amongst us at the bottom end who are not buffoons, or have never been buffoons, may find themselves excluded from membership of BOC, where a certain level of buffoonery is a pre-requisite to membership.

 

Those of us who are fully affiliated BOC members there respond to being called buffoon with the jolly repost, "Why thankee sir! Tick Tick Contact Clear!

Edited September 5, 2011 by Flyby PC

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

"Hello, my name is Louvert, and I'm a buffoon."

 

"HI, LOUVERT."

 

.

[Hellshade 110]

You're all buffoons...I know everything!

 

I resent that remark. I'm much closer to a Baboon than a buffoon, I'll have you know.

 

Hellshade

[Olham 164]

I think I'm a bamboo rather - I must have grown so quick, that I'm hollow inside.