MigBuster

Would say u that there must be some missing lines in the ini files considering the games you have. Transparent - could be a bad install - could be graphics related whats your system - can you post dxdiag.exe output?

Unlikely - must be some vets about from the 80s they can call out of retirement? Think they might have to hire some Mercs to fly them.

The Royal Malaysian Air Force and the United States Air Force engage in an air combat exercise called Cope Taufan. Haris Hussain joins the ‘furball’ “FIGHT’s on! Fight’s on!” ‘Mogwai’ immediately picks up his target off the port side. He’s chugging along at a fairly fast clip. Together, the closure speed of both aircraft is nudging north of 900 knots. As the two fighters merge and pass within an eyelash of each other in a blur of black and grey, Mogwai doesn’t even have time to flinch as he rolls the jet, yanks the control stick back into his gut and reefs his big fighter into an eye-wateringly tight left turn. G-forces rip into his body and Mogwai sucks in a lungful of oxygen as he cranes his neck to keep his adversary, a United States Air Force Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor, square in his sights. He works the throttles and makes constant changes to the engine settings. His eyes are fixed on the target but one eyeball is cocked to the airspeed reading on his heads-up display (HUD). At this turn rate, he’s bleeding off airspeed and energy like they’re going out of style. Dogfighting is all about energy management. The two jets are in a classic turning fight at 15,000 feet (4.57km) over the air combat range in Grik, Perak. Mogwai and ‘Smegs’, his weapons systems officer (whizzo in RMAF parlance), are flying the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s latest and most capable aircraft, the Sukhoi Su-30MKM Super Flanker multirole fighter. Outside, the twin nozzles of their thrust-vectoring Lyulka AL-31FP engines crank up at a crazy angle and Mogwai begins to “walk up” the nose of his huge fighter onto the Raptor’s centre fuselage. Up front, Mogwai eyeballs the Raptor, which is also blessed with thrust-vector control, but only in the pitch plane. The target designator box (TDB) on his HUD is locked onto the stealth fighter. The trick now is for Mogwai to bring the “pipper” or gunsight square inside the TDB before he can squeeze off a shot. In the back seat, Smegs provides a running commentary of the unfolding fight. “Makan dia! Makan dia, beb! Lagi! Lagi! Lagi!” Smegs yells into the hot mike in his Ulmer oxygen mask. His job is that of part tactician, analysing the threat picture, part cheerleader, pushing his pilot on, and as an extra pair of eyes for Mogwai. This particular evolution is a 1v1 (one-versus-one) engagement, which calls for the employment of short-range air-to-air missiles or guns. The Raptor is armed with the AIM-9M Sidewinder heat-homer and an internal, six-barrel, Gatling-type 20mm M-61A Vulcan cannon. The Super Flanker is carrying the super-agile Vympel R-73 Archer air-to-air missile and has the 30mm, single-barrel Gsh-301 cannon embedded in the starboard leading edge root extension (LERX). Launching off from Fightertown RMAF Butterworth, this is the second engagement for the two fighters as part of the biggest air combat exercise in the country. Called Cope Taufan, the joint biennial exercise between the RMAF and the USAF is primarily to enhance bilateral training in a realistic environment, ramp up combined readiness, and improve interoperatability between the two fighting forces. In the first “hop” earlier, the advantage went to the Sukhoi boys. Because both aircraft were still hauling bags of gas, the exercise director gave the go-ahead for another fight. ‘GUNS,GUNS,GUNS!’ The outcome of a dogfight hinges on a number of things — the aircraft’s aerodynamic and engine performance, fuel load, the position of the sun, the individual aircrews’ learning curve and the ability to adapt and react to a fluid and rapidly changing set of circumstances. The advantage enjoyed by one aircrew could be lost and shift over to the adversary in the blink of an eye. A gun track can last only one or two seconds. Miss that shot and you’re toast. Just as Mogwai is close to getting a gun solution on the Raptor, the USAF pilot rolls his jet level and pitches the nose up in a high-G manoeuvre. Vortices stream from his wing root as moisture is literally squeezed from the air. The American plugs the afterburners on his twin Pratt and Whitney F-119 turbofan engines and his nozzles belch out tongues of blue flame. He goes vertical and grabs sky like a homesick angel. “Pacak! Pacak! Dia pacak, bai!” screams Smegs, as he instinctively grabs the speed handles on his instrument panel in anticipation of the onslaught of Gs. Pacak, in RMAF fighter lingo, is to go vertical. Mogwai sees the move but he’s nanoseconds too late. The Raptor has so much excess thrust that by the time Mogwai bangs on the throttles and selects Zone 5 on the afterburner, he and Smegs might just as well have been talking to themselves because the Raptor is looong gone... STEEP LEARNING CURVE Back on the ground, the RMAF pilots whom Life&Times spoke to said the training and experience they received in the two weeks of Cope Taufan was invaluable. “The objective of these types of exercises is not to see who wins or loses. It’s more of an opportunity for us to learn new things and expand our mission scenarios and capabilities. It also gives us a chance to validate our procedures,” said a Super Flanker pilot. Sometimes, they have to make things up as they go along. For instance, fighter pilots use what is called EM or energy manoeuvring charts to figure out how best to tackle an adversary. “We had EM charts on the F-15s but had nothing on the Raptors, since it is still highly classified. So we had to rely on other sources, go online and even make educated guesses based on the aircraft design to come up with a plan to capitalise on its weaknesses,” added the Sukhoi driver. “There were a lot of things that we learnt from the Americans. The use of large force employment, planning of strike packages and, overall, how to use our forces effectively were some of the lessons we learnt from Cope Taufan,” added an F/A-18D Hornet pilot with No 18 Squadron, based in Butterworth. A MiG-29N fighter pilot with the famed Smokey Bandits squadron, home ported in RMAF Kuantan, summed it up best. “Bro, both sides’ learning curve went right through the roof. On the first day! We both went home with a mutual and healthy respect for each other’s capabilities. And to have these (USAF) guys say that we were s*** hot is the biggest compliment you could give a fighter jock.” Note: For security reasons, the call signs of the aircrew are fictitious and the engagement is a composite of several dogfights as recounted by RMAF pilots. Star attractions THE star attractions for this edition of Cope Taufan were undoubtedly the United States Air Force’s Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor and the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s Sukhoi Su-30MKM Super Flanker multirole fighter. For the Americans, the Su-30 is an exotic beast, blessed with immense power and agility. The Russian type’s nose-pointing ability, thanks to its thrust-vector and fly-by-wire flight control system, is second-to-none. If there’s one aircraft that can pose a serious threat to the USAF in the air-to-air arena, it would be this baby. On the flip side, the prospect of going head-to-head with the world’s only fully operational, fifth-generation stealth fighter sent RMAF pilots into a tizzy. Many were itching to go up against this much-vaunted fighter. Although the results of the engagements were classified, it was learnt that several RMAF jet jocks acquitted themselves well against the Raptor. The F-22As are from the 154th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii and are the only Air National Guard unit equipped with the type. They were joined by a number of Boeing F-15C Eagles from the 131st Fighter Squadron, 104th Fighter Wing, Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, and other support units. While RMAF pilots had tangled with the Eagles in previous exercises, Cope Taufan 2014 was the Raptors’ first outing in Southeast Asia. Cope Taufan is a biennial large force employment exercise designed to improve the US’s and Malaysia’s combined readiness.This year’s edition from June 9-20, collectively involved close to 1,000 personnel. http://www.nst.com.my/node/7204?d=1

Good predictions - I might take Costa Rica over Greece on current form

Some points I found discussing some of Spreys comments in the video. The F-15 Is Loaded Up With A Bunch Of Junk... A Bunch Of Electronic Stuff That Has No Relevance To Combat ..........Then there is the undeniable combat record of the Eagle, yet Mr. Sprey seems to think that the F-15 is a loser even after four decades of incredible success, not to mention the fact that it has never been bested in air-to-air combat and retains a kill ration of 105.5 to 0. This denial of clear historical reality is a startling indication that Mr. Sprey may be living in the 1970s when it comes to air-combat doctrine, or maybe he simply does not want to admit that his stripped down, all super-maneuverable light-weight visual fighters or nothing initiative was not the right path for America's air combat forces after all. The fact is that the F-16, the same aircraft that Mr. Sprey is said to have had such a great input into during its genesis, has gained thousands of pounds in avionics, targeting pods, fuel tanks and other "frivolous junk" continuously since its introduction into service and some see this as a testament to how inaccurate his light-weight fighter prophesies of the 1970s were. Mr. Sprey's views are questionable considering that the F-15 remains more deadly than ever even after forty years of continuous service in the USAF, not to mention that its even more complicated and heavy brother, the F-15E Strike Eagle, is the most all-around useful machine that the USAF has in its inventory. Additionally, the F-15 Strike Eagle derivatives are still thought of as one of the top-of-the-line fighter aircraft available on the world market today. Bottom-line, the idea that Mr. Sprey still thinks the F-15 is a dog when every metric and battle has proven him otherwise is more indicative of a character flaw than an argumentative one. 'The Marines Have This Mindless Passion Now, Recently, For Vertical Takeoff Airplanes' Is Pierre Sprey really Doc Brown who traded in his Delorean for a time traveling F-16 that runs on banana peels and flux capacitors? FACT: The USMC introduced the AV-8A Harrier in 1971 and it has been a mainstay of their air arm ever since. Much of the Marine's combined arms combat doctrine is built around a STOVL capable fixed-wing attack platform. So the Marine's STOVL requirement is not something that is going to go away anytime soon, nor should it, regardless of the F-35 debate. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/pierre-spreys-anti-f-35-diatribe-is-half-brilliant-and-1592445665

ha - any weight that's not associated with what PS wants on his jets is very bad as we know. EOTS (AN/AAQ-40) is pretty much a combined Sniper TGP and IRST from what I know - I cant see it being bad considering how good some of the older systems were . But the ultimate frustration for the Air Force was often the Critics simply did not tell the truth. The most prominent but by no means only example of this was when the Critics said that the AIM-7 was not useful in BVR combat because the Air Force did not have a system that could identify a radar target as an enemy aircraft. In fact, such long range identification systems had been available since World War II, and an Air Force system, called Combat Tree, had been used successfully in Vietnam from 1971-1973. Additionally, a newer and even more effective long-range identification system, called Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR) had been developed for the F-15 to use with the AMRAAM. Sprey had worked on fighters in DoD since the mid-60s and certainly knew that Combat Tree and its follow on systems existed, but to make his point against the AIM-7 he ignored it, as did Spinney, another DoD employee very familiar with weapons systems.73 Because Combat Tree and the NCTR systems were classified, the Air Force could not publicly counter the Critics false contention that Air Force fighters with radar missiles had no way to identify targets at long range. One is left to wonder if the Critics deliberately made this false argument knowing that, because of classification, the Air Force would not refute it. (THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM (Marshall L Michell III, 2006)

Some points in the first paragraph but really have to question the rest of it Sprey does not divulge how he intends to maintain surprise when enemy radar picks him up a few hundred miles out - obviously Stealth is out of the question because stealth skin is too heavy it seems Center for Defense Information World Security Institute February 2011 “Evaluating Weapons: Sorting the Good from the Bad” by Pierre M. Sprey Similarly, real air-to-air combat is separated by a chasm from the technologist’s dangerously beguiling dream of beyond-visual-range (BVR) combat: push a button, launch a missile at a blip on the scope at 25 miles, then watch the blip disappear without ever having laid eyes on the target. That concept of combat, oblivious to the inconvenient details of real air-to-air fights , leads to huge, cumbersome fighters loaded down with tons and tons of heavy stealth skins, massive radars and missiles, and failure-ridden electronics of unmanageable complexity. The most recent fighter built in pursuit of the BVR combat delusion, the F-22, has a $355 million sticker price and costs $47,000 per hour to fly, making it impossible to fly the hours necessary to train pilots adequately (people first!) and impossible to buy enough fighters to influence any seriously contested air war. As opposed to the BVR dream, actual air combat almost invariably starts with two or more attackers “bouncing” and surprising an unaware flight of fighters at their normal cruise speed (no more than mach .7 to .9 for all existing fighters). The surprise factor looms large: in every war of the past century, 75 percent to 90 percent of all pilots shot down in air-to-air combat were unaware. Attackers must close to within roughly a quarter mile or less to get positive eyeball identification of friend or foe (no current electronic identification is secure) To win this kind of fight places a premium on gifted pilots, above all else. In distant second place are the airplane characteristics that will help those pilots to win, as follows: achieving surprise by visual and electronic undetectability, e.g. tiny size, no radar emissions and higher cruise speed than the enemy’s (which ensures that he can’t sneak up from behind); ability to launch lots of friendly fighters into enemy skies every day (achieved through low sticker price, low maintenance leading to many sorties per day and long cruise endurance) and ability to generate lots of air combat training hours (ditto) to produce plenty of gifted pilots; superior agility i.e., better turn, better acceleration and quicker control response to gain firing position and defeat enemy firing passes (less weight, more thrust and more wing area each increase agility); carrying weapons that deliver reliable kills quickly (cannons first, simple infrared missiles second, radar missiles are off the table since they are neither quick nor reliable).

The Case for More Effective, Less expensive weapon systems: what "Quality versus quality" issue? Pierre M Sprey (1982) Isn't that the year the MiG-23MLD is coming in with R-60 (AA-8) and R-73 (AA-11)? - good job you've got our backs! Some of this analysis might not be far off regarding early MiG-23s - not that I suppose he cares because he is only putting it forward to push his agenda through - otherwise he might have mentioned why it was still a threat.

The entire argument for a 1970s F-86 with no radar at all was somewhat ridiculous when you consider the technological improvements just from 1965 to 1972 that Sprey never considers - these improvements were happening already and he is none the wiser. His theories about radar above are so far off - Not saying everything he says is wrong but there is a so much dodgy there (look at the T/W comparison on the F-16 above ) Actually there is a bit about AIMVAL / ACEVAL - THE AIMVAL/ACEVAL CONTROVERSY (THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM (Marshall L Michell III, 2006) While the F-15 was plagued with engine problems, in 1977 there were more serious questions raised about its operational effectiveness, ironically because of a joint Air Force-Navy exercise that would eventually vastly improve both services air combat capability. While their performance was outstanding, the F-15 and the F-14 had major problems with armament. Their designers had learned a lesson from the early F-4s, which had been handicapped because they only had missile armament, and both the F-15 and F-14 carried a 20mm cannon. However, the missiles the new fighters carried were only slightly modified variants of Vietnam-era AIM-7s and AIM-9s, and it was clear that to fully utilize their radar and avionics capabilities these fighters they would need better missiles. With only enough development funds for one type of missile, both services agreed the first priority was a new, short-range, heat-seeking missile, the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM), to replace their AIM-9s. To define exactly what characteristics the missile would need the Air Force and Navy commissioned a largescale exercise study, called Air Intercept Missile Evaluation/Air Combat Evaluation, AIMVAL/ACEVAL AIMVAL/ACEVAL took place at Nellis and the test aircraft consisted of a highly instrumented Blue Force of F-14s and F-15s against a Red Force of Northrop F-5Es flown by the Aggressors. Because the AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests were to look for the best characteristics for short-range missiles, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) forced close-in dogfights. The ROE varied depending on the specific test, but generally they were Vietnam War ROE, which required a visual identification (VID) of the target as hostile before firing. In the real world, the American fighters had ways to identify Communist aircraft beyond visual range, notably the previously mentioned Vietnam-era Combat Tree, but because Tree was still classified the system was not part of the exercise. 49 The result of the ROE was that the Blue Force could not use its long-range AIM-7 missiles, thus negating one of the F-15/14s main advantages. Additionally, Red Force always outnumbered the Blue Force fighters and the Blue Force had no ground radar control, while ground based radar guided the Red Force F-5s (which had no radar) to an attacking position. Thus the Rules of Engagement produced the worst possible case for the Blue Forces ROE for a Third World conflict, but a large number of enemy aircraft with excellent radar control, numbers and control that would only be found in a major war in Europe. With the ROE the battles invariably started when the two sides caught sight of each other, and this gave an advantage to the small, hard to see, well flown and more numerous F-5s. The problems with fighting large numbers of small aircraft in closein, turning dogfights was well known in the Air Force fighter force, and was one of the reasons the service insisted the F-15 have a beyond visual range missile. At the end of the exercise, although fighting outnumbered and with the F-5s having all the advantages, the F-15/F-14 Blue Force had a kill ratio of 2:1. This was satisfactory, and besides it was irrelevant the purpose of the test was to try to develop characteristics for a new shortrange missile. In terms of developing a new missile, from Air Forces and Navys point of view the tests were highly successful and crucial to future air-to-air missile programs. The tests showed that a modified AIM-9, the AIM-9L, had a performance close to the proposed (and very expensive) new ASRAAM, and a newer AIM-9, the AIM-9M, would actually be superior to the ASRAAM. This meant the services could accept improved, inexpensive AIM-9s and shift their limited missile development funds from the ASRAAM to a new, radar-guided, medium-range missile to replace the AIM-7. This new missile was designated the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM After the exercise, the AIMVAL/ACEVAL test results and kill ratios were contained in a large body of complex documents that were classified because they showed the capabilities of the various missiles tested, as well as the capabilities the Air Force and Navy considered most important. There was some small concern that the complex data might be misinterpreted, but that was a minor consideration This was to prove a mistake. AIMVAL/ACEVAL was a highly successful program for what it was intended to achieve, but proved to have some serious unintended consequences as the open spaces for communication and IPN channels that had served the iron majors so well for Red Flag and other programs proved a two-edged sword. In the hard fought air battles, at times the well-trained F-5 Aggressor pilots gave as good as they got. When the Aggressors made their regularly scheduled training visits to TAC fighter bases around the country, the Aggressor pilots recounted their own highly colored versions of AIMVAL/ACEVAL around the bar. The urban legend soon spread that the F-5s had beaten the F-15s in head-to-head air combat. This story soon arrived in Washington where Colonel Everest Riccioni, retired and working for Northrop, the builder of the F-5, pounced on it. 53At the same time John Boyd, despite his retirement, had maintained his contempt for the F-15 and multi-role F-16 and continued to cultivate a group of officers he had hired in the Pentagon. Boyd learned of the cheap, simple F-5s success in AIMVAL/ACEVAL and saw this as an opportunity to strike back at those who had changed the F-16 into a multi-role fighter. At the same time, Riccioni and Sprey (whom Northrop also had hired as a consultant) saw this as an opportunity to push an advanced version of the F-5, the F-20, on the Air Force.54 For technical reasons, the F-20 had only a pure air-to-air capability, so it fit perfectly with what the Critics still wanted, a simple, high performance air-to-air fighter.55 For the next several years Riccioni, aided by Sprey and Boyd, tried to sell the F-20 which TAC commander Wilbur Creech said had no utility in big league combat -- to the Air Force, then to overseas customers, then to the Air Force National Guard and Reserves, without success.56 The multi-role F-16 offered more capability, and Northrops business practices with overseas customers gave the American government pause; when two out of the three of the F-20 prototypes crashed, the program ended.57 However, the Critics continued to use the results of AIMVAL/ACEVAL to hector the F-15 program and Air Force weapons selection in general. (note this paper is not always perfect in its arguments)

On the F-16 - his specialist subject : From Comparing the effectiveness of Air to Air Fighters: F-86 to F-18 (Sprey , M, Pierre, 1982) However - John Williams who worked on the YF-16 & F-16: ..........I was a structural engineer on the YF-16 and F-16 flight test teams, so was familiar with weights at the time. Forty years is too long to remember all the numbers, but when the F-16 was in early flight test, I did a weight comparison between the two and was very surprised to find the F-16 empty weight was less than the YF-16. So, the YF-16, designed for 6.5g at 14900 lb was heavier than the F-16, designed for 9g at 22,500 lb. Don't confuse the design weight as the actual weight, two totally different things. Here's why the YF-16 was heavier. First, it had a much larger structural margin. meaning it was designed for 25% overload capability, because no 150% static test was performed. Second, it was not a refined structural design, either design loads or stress analysis. If there was any doubt about load or stress, it was made a little heavier. Third, manufacturing processes were not refined. It was built as cheaply as possible. Remarkable, when you consider the added g and design weight, larger wing, horizontal tail, and ventral fins, and longer fuselage of the F-16, in addition to an 8,000 hour service life. http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=58&t=25121&p=266379#p266379 Have to assume ballast or radar included - but even if not more 400 lbs than 4000 lbs!!

Should have called this the Sprey thread - actually might rename it Not a very flatering disertation or the Fighter Mafia THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM (Marshall L Michell III, 2006) Heres a few bits: =============================================== While working on the F-X, Boyd met Pierre Sprey, a weapons system analyst on the OASD/SA staff, whose background was similar to Enthovens but much less distinguished. By his own account, Sprey was a dilettante with an engineering degree but no military experience. After graduation from Yale, Sprey became a research analyst at the Grumman Aircraft Corporation for space and commercial transportation projects. He came to OSD/SA in 1966, where he declared himself an expert on military fighter aircraft, despite his lack of experience. Sprey admitted being a gadfly, a nuisance, and an automatic opponent of any program he was not a part of. He was opposed to many Navy and Air Force tactical air systems, especially the Navys Grumman F-14, because of its size and complexity. Somehow, Sprey concluded that numbers were critically important in air combat, and he and Boyd both glib, iconoclastic, ambitious, self-aggrandizing, and excluded from the decision-making process -- found a common cause in opposing larger, complex fighters ========================================== Sprey and Boyd disagreed with this doctrine and the high-tech systems it required. The two began to work on an alternate concept to the Blue Bird, called the Red Bird, a clear weather, air-to-air combat only fighter with a top speed of Mach 1.6 instead of the Blue Birds Mach 2.5+. Boyd and Sprey viewed any speed higher than Mach 1.6 as unnecessary because at that time, for aerodynamic reasons, all dogfights took place at subsonic speed and there was a significant technical and financial price for flying at Mach 2+.52 They claimed the reduced top speed was the only area where the Red Birds performance was lower than the Blue Birds, and that by limiting the Red Bird to Mach 1.6 the fighter would be much less expensive, lighter, and have better performance. Sprey and Boyd also decided to remove the radar and the associated radar-guided missiles, which they considered unreliable, further reducing the Red Birds weight. They estimated the Red Bird would weigh about 23,000 pounds and would provide air-to-air performance equal to the Blue Bird for a far lower unit cost. Additionally, they felt these changes would make the Red Bird more reliable.53 This seemed to be classic example of out of the box thinking, but what Boyd and Sprey were actually doing was not meeting a requirement but changing it. ======================================== The Navy engineers said the lightweight claimed for the VF-XX was unachievable and the proposed thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading could only be achieved by a larger airplane. They added it was obvious that Sprey was not an aeronautical engineer and that: [spreys] basic concepts have been considered in detail by the Services during the formative stages of the F-14 and F-15, have been reviewed by DDR&E [Deputy Director of Research and Evaluation], and rejected in all decisions to date...the reconsideration of the concept [VF-XX/F-XX] as a viable alternative should have been turned down before submission to the services... In common with past papers by the same author, this study contains many fallacious assumptions, half-truths, distortions, and erroneous extrapolations. Unsubstantiated opinions are presented as facts. Any rebuttals give the appearance of arguments against the rudimentary virtues of simplicity, high performance, and low cost. This response, while delivered with feeling, was factual and analytical and effectively blunted Spreys attempt to forward the DPM. It also showed that Sprey was out of his class when confronted with knowledgeable aeronautical engineers, but it was a valuable lesson for Sprey, Boyd, Riccioni, and other Critics do not make arguments in front of experts. ============================================ Sprey used the AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests to support his arguments, saying AIMVAL/ACEVAL showed that numerical superiority was the dominant factor in air combat and that radar missile-equipped fighters had no advantage over fighters equipped with advanced heat-seeking missiles. Sprey also used 1973 Middle East combat results to bolster his arguments, pointing out that the Israelis, though they had F-4s equipped with radar missiles, used the very simple French-built Mirage III to score virtually all their kills with guns and heat-seeking air-to-air missiles. None of Spreys arguments were footnoted nor the sources of his data provided ================================================= It was true the early AIM-7s had a very poor record in Vietnam, but Sprey was also critical of the AIM-7s replacement, the AMRAAM, which the Air Force claimed would correct most the AIM-7s problems. Sprey said the AMRAAM was too expensive to be bought in large quantities and too complex to function well in combat. Sprey also argued that radar would be jammed in wartime, and also claimed that the F-15 did not have a reliable method of identifying the radar target as enemy, and thus could not fire at targets beyond visual range for fear of fratricide. Sprey offered an even more extreme argument, that the radar required for BVR combat would endanger the fighter that used it. Sprey said that a fighter with an inexpensive, passive (non-emitting) radar detection receiver, called Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW), could follow the signal from a radar-equipped aircraft to attack by surprise with heat-seeking missiles or, even better, with anti-radiation missiles that would home in on the radar-equipped fighters radar signal. Overall, Sprey said the radar missile was illustrative of how [the Air Forces] now-entrenched defense of high-cost, high-complexity programs [that] blocks us from using advanced, brilliant-simple technology to achieve the large increases in both quantity and quality of weapons that the nation needs desperately every year =================================================== The IAF also demolished another of Spreys theories of combat effectiveness, that fighter radar would be jammed and useless in combat. The leading IAF F-16 MiG killer, Colonel Amir Nahumi, said after the war (and six kills) that the reason the F-16 was so effective was because its look-down pulse Doppler radar allowed the F-16s to locate the Syrian MiGs trying to sneak in at low level, something that had been impossible with earlier radars. This was the radar Sprey said would be useless and that Fallows and the Critics would have left out of the aircraft.

Many congrats Geezer - may all your work be blessed from now on

From Comparing the effectiveness of Air to Air Fighters: F-86 to F-18 (Sprey , M, Pierre, 1982) Yes the dashed lines are his extrapolation and there is text for more context - just made me laugh. Pretty sure he was back in a civvie job at this point.

Unless they are piloted and maintained by Russians I'm not entirely sure about the optimistic time scale - unless they are getting the same stuff they had in the 80s Delusion could be the contract terms - whatever they are - or the time to get them in service due to the amount of things they have to learn.

Sprey was a very outspoken civilian defense analyst at the Pentagon in the 60s/70s - he had no Military experience prior that. His main involvement was with the A-x (which became A-10) - Coram credited him with writing specifications for it and leading a technical design team. He was part of the Fighter Mafia with 2 ex pilots John Boyd and Everest Riccioni and It is very hazy what if anything he had to do with the F-15 and F-16 apart from try and push their argument for a Light Weight Fighter concept. These guys it seems were in a position to influence and specify initial requirements - but not much else. Luckily the A-10 was the only one of their concepts that made it to production. Some points from Coram - states Sprey wanted the F-16 to have less fuel (for more performance) - which Boyd rejected, that the F-15 engine was not good enough for the F-16 , credits him with working with Boyd on Draft LWF plans (what putting his name on them?) If I find evidence on where he has admitted he has been wrong on anything he said I will let you know. Regarding the YF-16 from http://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=131 The YF-16 Design The General Dynamics Model 401, as the YF-16 was known in-house, was the product of a lengthy design study and wind tunnel test program that had been executed during the preliminary discussion days with John Boyd, test pilot and defense analyst Col. Everest Riccioni, and by the General Dynamics chief project engineer Harry Hillaker, who had guided the project through several years of low-level company support. To perform the prototype contract, company vice president and program director Lyman Josephs and director of engineering William Dietz were assigned to the program in November 1971. Additionally, a total of 650 personnel participated in detail design and fabrication of the prototypes. The project was divided into twenty-eight work breakdown structure elements, with a manager responsible for engineering, tooling, fabrication, and assembly budget in each element. The concept of the YF-16, as formulated by Hillaker, involved the prudent application of integrated advanced technologies and design innovations to achieve an aircraft that could satisfy the conflicting requirements of high performance and low cost. Emphasis was placed on small size and low weight in the selection of technologies to realize the best balance of combat capability (turn rate and acceleration) and lowest possible mission weight............... http://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=131

hmm.......... http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28042302 Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri Maliki has told the BBC that he hopes jets from Russia and Belarus will turn the tide against rebels in the coming days. "God willing within one week this force will be effective and will destroy the terrorists' dens," he said. He said that the process of buying US jets had been "long-winded" and that the militants' advance could have been avoided if air cover had been in place. Isis and its Sunni Muslim allies seized large parts of Iraq this month. Mr Maliki was speaking to the BBC's Arabic service in his first interview for an international broadcaster since Isis - the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - began its major offensive. "I'll be frank and say that we were deluded when we signed the contract [with the US]," Mr Maliki said. "We should have sought to buy other jet fighters like British, French and Russian to secure the air cover for our forces; if we had air cover we would have averted what had happened," he went on. He said Iraq was acquiring second-hand jet fighters from Russia and Belarus "that should arrive in Iraq in two or three days".

These things are expected to happen really - expect a few crashes as well before IOC I have been doing more research into Pierre Sprey past Corams Boyd - and it doesnt look good - seems he has been ranting similar clueless crap for many years.

Definitely with Suarez in the team. He has snapped like that before but its a bit weird - Italy's defenders were winding him up for most of the match and it nearly paid off!

Posted a review a while back - looks like a winner for flight fans! http://combatace.com/topic/82905-new-aircraft-simulator/

Aerial combat between U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors and F-15 Eagles, seen from the inside. The image in this post was taken from a U.S. Air Force F-15 Eagle from the 131st Fighter Squadron, 104th Fighter Wing, Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, during a close range aerial combat exercise against a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor from the 154th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. You can clearly see the two planes maneuvering at very close range, pulling Gs, with the F-22 releasing flares counter measures against (simulated) heat seeking air-to-air missiles. The dogfight took place off the coast of Penang, Malaysia, Jun. 16, 2014, during “Cope Taufan 2014″ a biennial LFE (large force employment) exercise taking place June 9 to 20 designed to improve U.S. and Malaysian combined readiness. Both aircraft are currently deployed to Royal Malaysian Air Force P.U. Butterworth, Malaysia. The exercise, that marks the F-22′s first deployment to Southeast Asia, featured also some interesting mixed formation between U.S. planes with Royal Malaysian Air Force MIG-29N Fulcrum, Su-30 and F-18 Hornet jets. Image credit: U.S. Air Force It’s not clear whether the F-22 has flown DACT (Dissimilar Air Combat Training) against Malaysian Migs or Sukhois; if this is the case, it would be interesting to know which ROE (Rules Of Engagement) were applied and the outcome of the confrontations between the Russian multirole planes and the U.S. most advanced fighters. http://theaviationist.com/2014/06/18/close-aerial-combat-f15-f22/

Hmm - well remains to be seen if the code is more optimized or whether they do a TW and just hope everyone is happy to upgrade again Waiting for the Nvidia 880 to come out myself..........

USA nearly did it and were far better IMO - great to watch for the neutral. Germany are top class for sure - but anything can happen in Football..........

No - you would need to use FRAPs or something similar