OT - New Pilot asking for help!

[Mafiozo 0]

Salute, fellow flyers!

 

I am a new pilot to OFF who has just recently discovered this amazing game. spending a few days pondering if to purchase P3 or wait it out for P4, one night upon falling asleep, a magical force just got a hold of me and made me place an order.

come 5 days and my dreams are dropped into my mailbox. installing CFS 3 (also ordered), installing OFF, and waving goodbye to six fruitful hours, in which, as a member of RFC 56 in April 1917, I have managed to shoot down 3 Albatross D.IIIs and to get shot down a few times myself. but as a newbie, I gave my pilot, for the time being, the privilege of being death proof.

 

this is really one of a kind experience. all the reports about the immersion of the game couldn't have been more true. anyone who is interested in the history of world war I, history of wars, or just history by itself, owes it to himself to play this. hell, everyone should play it. it makes you fall in love with WWI aerial combat, clear and simple. like the last of the last of an old guard, Knights fighting in the air, before modernism bearing heat seeking missiles ruined everything.

 

however like everything in life, my OFF story has its downside to it: being a University student, I've gotten into it at a very stressful time - Exam period. so I'll have to delay the joy of all those Huns on my Hard Drive just waiting to smoke me, and get back to flanders fields only when I have some spare time.

 

and this is where I ask for your help!

 

In one of my courses I have to write an essay about 20th century history, and WWI is included in the subjects I am allowed to write about. so what I want to do is write about WWI aviation, linking it to the sub-subject of technological advance. that is to say: how did the advancement of Aerial Combat affect the ground war and more importantly, how did it affect combat pilots. were WWI pilots chivalric as they are sometimes portrayed in popular culture? truth is, I have to find a research question and try to answer it. as I said it's a paper of not more than 6 or 7 pages, even less.

 

so I would very much appreciate any advice from the schooled friends here on the forum, regarding books, sources and even ideas for a subject to write about regarding WWI Aviation. and of course, OFF tips!

 

Cheers,

Mafiozo

Edited May 30, 2011 by Mafiozo

[Dej 17]

Welcome Mafiozo.

 

In the Scenery and Ground Objects part of the OFF Downloads section here on CombatAce you'll find five RAR files containing .pdf versions of much essential reading... kindly uploaded by RAF_Louvert. You will find some answers amongst them. There are several WW1 sites worth visiting too:

 

The Aerodrome

The Great War Forum (has an Air War Section)

The Illustrated History of WWI: The Story of WW1 Aviation

 

There's also an interesting thesis by Lt. Col Bradbeer on the Battle for Air Supremacy Over The Somme which should inspire you.

 

Book-wise, considering the scope of your question Alan Clark's 'Aces High' and Aaron Norman's 'The Great Air War, whilst a little dated do cover the broad scope, the former more shallowly (and therefore readily digestible) than the latter. Both should be obtainable from the library.

 

And there's Wikipaedia of course, with its attendant patchy realiabilty. But, being a diligent student you will of course cross-check your references anyway.

Edited May 30, 2011 by Dej

[UK_Widowmaker 571]

welcome to OFF and the Forum!...you've certainly come to the right place!

 

I can't help you much personally...but the wealth of knowledge here knows no bounds!

 

good luck with your studies...and enjoy the sim

[Olham 164]

... one night upon falling asleep, a magical force just got a hold of me and made me place an order

Hmmm - could have been RAF_Louvert - or UncleAl - or even myself!

(We don't know what we do in our sleep, do we?)

 

 

 

I have to find a research question and try to answer it.

Well, there will be better experts to help with book tips.

But a good question would be, how quickly the technological developments advanced in only 4 years time.

Because all forces got to understand, how important it was for reconnaisance and artillery oberservers,

who controlled the air space.

 

Welcome to OFF, mafiozo! I'll have a virtual Warsteiner Pilsener!

And if you give me your town and country, I'll add you to our OFF Forum Pilots' maps.

Edited May 30, 2011 by Olham

[themightysrc 5]

Hi Maf,

 

"In one of my courses I have to write an essay about 20th century history, and WWI is included in the subjects I am allowed to write about. so what I want to do is write about WWI aviation, linking it to the sub-subject of technological advance. that is to say: how did the advancement of Aerial Combat affect the ground war"

 

I'd limit yourself to that if I were you. You've only got a few pages, and you'll overrun massively unless you produce the most scanty precis of what is an in depth subject. Trust me. The question you pose has much more to do with the ground war - which is an immense and fast moving subject - than it does the air war. I'd tackle it from that angle, otherwise you'll build up a (brief) narrative that will leave readers thinking; yes, but why? Don't forget: the war in the air changed in response to the war on the ground, and not vice versa (as a rule of thumb).

 

"and more importantly, how did it affect combat pilots. were WWI pilots chivalric as they are sometimes portrayed in popular culture?"

 

A fun question to tackle, but ancillary to the question that, IMHO, you should try and thumbnail in the little space you have.

 

"truth is, I have to find a research question and try to answer it. as I said it's a paper of not more than 6 or 7 pages, even less."

 

So - you have in effect an essay whose length won't allow you to expand too much on any subject or angle. Make it easy for yourself and write only about subjects you already know. This isn't the time to be breaking new (for you) ground. If it's effectively an intro piece into what would then become a research subject (and having worked up to MA standards here in the UK, I appreciate just how limited your options are), then I'd suggest that sticking to what you know is best, unless you already have a question - and, more importantly, arguments and impeccable sources - to hand. Good luck!

 

Welcome to our little corner of hell on Earth. Here's to the dead already; here's to the next to die! (Mine's a pint of Speckled Hen).

 

Cheers,

Si

[Slartibartfast 153]

Welcome to the madhouse the mud etc... As to helping out I would if I could... So all I will say is welcome these chaps are very knowledgeable in the subject of WW1 to the point of somedays I wonder if they have time machines!!! Yes Olham and Raf_Lou... so welcome again and mines ein melange mit ein Schnapps need something to keep the chill off at 4000metres

[Bullethead 12]

In one of my courses I have to write an essay about 20th century history, and WWI is included in the subjects I am allowed to write about. so what I want to do is write about WWI aviation, linking it to the sub-subject of technological advance. that is to say: how did the advancement of Aerial Combat affect the ground war and more importantly, how did it affect combat pilots. were WWI pilots chivalric as they are sometimes portrayed in popular culture? truth is, I have to find a research question and try to answer it. as I said it's a paper of not more than 6 or 7 pages, even less.

 

I hope this class is one you're taking over the summer or even next fall, and not one with a paper due in the next few days. Once you get into reading about WW1 aviation, it's hard to stop. First you'll get general histories, but they're usually well-laced with quotes from pilot memoirs and of course have extensive bibliographies, so you'll want to read all those sources, too. And then you'll find all sorts of contradictory info so will have to read more and ask questions in forums like this, and before you know it 20 years have gone by and you still haven't touched pen to paper because neither you nor anybody else equally well-read can be 100% sure about certain key issues .

 

As to your specific questions, I can sum things up like this: Most folks say WW1 aviation had no significant impact on WW1 ground action, in that the ground war would have played out the same way it did without airplanes. This isn't true. In August 1914, it was an airplane that noticed the gap between the German armies near Paris, which led to the "Taxicabs of Paris" moving an army into the gap and thus stopping the Germans at the Marne. This caused the "Race to the Sea", and that ultimately resulted in the stalemate that ensued for the next few years.

 

Thus, the entire Western Front stalemate was the direct result of 1 airplane (incidentially, it was the prototype Breguet AG 4 flown by Louis Breguet himself) in the right place at the right time. Now, after late 1914, when the trenches were in place and the stalemate had set in, aircraft ceased to have any significant effect on the ground war. But NOTHING ELSE had a significant effect, either, for several more years. That's why there was a stalemate for so long. The best airplanes in the world couldn't change this, but neither could the best infantry and artillery tactics, nor the introduction of poison gas, flamethrowers, submachineguns, hand grenades, trench mortars, and tanks. So IMHO, the so-called "failure" or aircraft to break the Western Front stalemate, despite their rapid pace of development, must be measured agains the identical failures of advances in ground warfare weapons and tactics.

 

As to chivalry, they were just as chivalrous as anybody else before or since. By that I mean that very occasionally, when circumstances permitted, somebody might show mercy to a crippled foe or respect to a dead enemy, but usually it was bloody murder. And remember, the knights of old who wrote the code of chivalry spent most of their time during wars in raping and pillaging peasant villages (economic warfare, IOW), not fighting each other. They most only fought each other under controlled circumstances during peacetime tournaments.

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

Welcome to the the OFF virtual front, Mafiozo. As other veterans of this haunt have already given you a plethora of sage advice I won't add further, other than to say I'll have a nice pinta' red ale and a bag of salt and vinegar crisps, thank you very much.

 

 

Cheers!

 

Lou

 

.

[Hasse Wind 46]

Welcome! This is a very nice community here, so I'm sure you won't be disappointed with the company.

 

Regarding chivalry in the air, well, remember that the best hunter was the guy who managed to shoot the other fellow in the back and end the fight in a second. If he managed to do all this unnoticed, so much the better.

 

If I were you, I'd follow themightysrc's advice and write about something that you already know well. But that's just my opinion. I was usually a lazy student and tended to take the easiest route whenever possible.

 

@Bullethead: In my opinion, Motlke the Younger's decision to ruin the Schlieffen Plan by not reinforcing his right wing with the several new divisions that became availabe in the years following Schlieffen's retirement was more decisive than that one recon flight by Breguet. But yeah, that flight definitely had an impact on history, that can't be denied.

[carrick58 23]

Welcome to the Meat Grinder. Its fun.

[Bullethead 12]

@Bullethead: In my opinion, Motlke the Younger's decision to ruin the Schlieffen Plan by not reinforcing his right wing with the several new divisions that became availabe in the years following Schlieffen's retirement was more decisive than that one recon flight by Breguet. But yeah, that flight definitely had an impact on history, that can't be denied.

 

Sure, Moltke the Dweeb set the table with his faulty decisions, but he'd have gotten away with it had it not been for Breguet. Without the air recon reports, the French wouldn't have known there was a gap to exploit and thus stop the Germans. In previous wars (for example, the Franco-Prussian War), similar gaps had always developed but nobody knew about them in time to exploit them.

 

And for the benefit of the OP, THIS is why you'll never write your paper on this subject. Myself and HW and most of the others here have spent decades reading up on this sort of thing and arguing about them in forums like this, but we still can't agree on key details. You'll suffer the same fate should you pursue this research topic

[themightysrc 5]

"So IMHO, the so-called "failure" or aircraft to break the Western Front stalemate, despite their rapid pace of development, must be measured agains the identical failures of advances in ground warfare weapons and tactics."

 

It's arguable that the failures that you allude to weren't actually failures as such, but more the evolution of warfare in a period when nobody knew pretty much where things were going, and thus were still geared up to fight the most likely war - ie, an open one. If someone had told boht sides in 1914 -"oh, by the way; you'll all be spending the next four years conducting siege warfare against each other, for the most part" - the I guess that creeping barrages and HE shells would have appeared a lot sooner. And, don't forget, the armies themselves, even with recent wars under their belts had to learn this new way of conducting war against their enemy, and, what's more, to do it with troops who were only initially volunteers, and later, conscripts. It takes time to meld that mass into an army, and, perhaps, even longer for the control structures (like good spotting and recon methods, for example) to enable such a masse de manouvre to make a meaningful impact on a battlefield where fronts where measured in many miles.

 

Aircraft were very much a part of this evolutionary process. It's easy to see the use of both German and Entente planes in Operation Michael as unique - the truth is this reflected Cambrai some months earlier, which in its turn was a tank development following on from the Somme, etc. I guess that's why I said to the OP that it wouldn't be wise or easy to write about WWI air fighting as separate subject; it's too intertwined with the ground war, and it's the ground war that had the most profound effects on all the societies which it drew in. 6 or 7 pages? I'd want 6 or 7 years, minimum!

[Bullethead 12]

It's arguable that the failures that you allude to weren't actually failures as such, but more the evolution of warfare in a period when nobody knew pretty much where things were going, and thus were still geared up to fight the most likely war - ie, an open one. If someone had told boht sides in 1914 -"oh, by the way; you'll all be spending the next four years conducting siege warfare against each other, for the most part" - the I guess that creeping barrages and HE shells would have appeared a lot sooner. And, don't forget, the armies themselves, even with recent wars under their belts had to learn this new way of conducting war against their enemy, and, what's more, to do it with troops who were only initially volunteers, and later, conscripts. It takes time to meld that mass into an army, and, perhaps, even longer for the control structures (like good spotting and recon methods, for example) to enable such a masse de manouvre to make a meaningful impact on a battlefield where fronts where measured in many miles.

 

I disagree. The stalemate on the Western Front was the result of the size of the armies then available compared to the available space. On the Western Front, army frontages spanned the entire continent so there were no flanks to turn, let alone room to manuever beyond flanks. Thus, everything there had to be a direct frontal assault. As a result, the ONLY way to break the stalemate by offensive action was to find ways to 1) utterly smash what was directly ahead, 2) move enough troops through the resulting hole faster than the enemy could move reserves to plug it, and 3) communicate in real time with forward troops and their supporting arty well enough to exploit opportunities created by successfully accomplishing steps 1 and 2. As WW1 on the Western Front went on, the armies got pretty good at step #1 to start with and then step #2 by the end of the war, but they always broke down on step #3 provided the enemy was still willing to fight. There are many examples of this failure to communicate aborting what might have been major breakthroughs.

 

In fact, problem #3 was never overcome during WW1, the final Entente advance being yet another wide-front offensive just like all those before it, and would have been no more successful if it had happened at any time before the German army fell apart from the long-term effects of attrition and the blockade. It really wasn't until WW2 that problem #3 was solved.

 

Now compare the Western Front with the tohers. Where similar ratios of troops per mile of useable front prevailed, things where similarly stalemated, such as Gallipoli, the Gebirgskrieg, etc. But on the Eastern Front, even offensives that ultimately fell short of their strategic goals still often covered several hundred kilometers at less cost than an advance of a half-dozen kilometers on the Western Front. This was because there WAS room to maneuver there. And in East Africa, a handful of battalions managed to play hide-and-seek over truly vast distances for the whole duration of the war without ever coming to a decision, because they had so much elbow room.

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

BH, while I agree with you on your analysis of the stalemate along the Western Front, and with your outline of steps 1 and 2, I must take exception to your conclusion about the third step. Throughout the war both sides' abilities to use their respective air forces to reconnoiter, direct artillery fire, and communicate effectively in real time grew by leaps and bounds to the point where, by the end of the conflict, neither side was able to exploit opportunities created by successfully accomplishing steps 1 and 2 for any length of time BECAUSE of their success with step 3. The ‘eye in the sky’ was giving both sides vital information concerning battle at a faster rate and with far greater accuracy than they had ever had in the past. With the exception of bad weather days when aerial viewing of the ground was limited or non-existent, army leaders on both sides of the mud had a handle on what the situation was at any given time that was unimaginable in past conflicts.

 

.

[Hasse Wind 46]

 

And, don't forget, the armies themselves, even with recent wars under their belts had to learn this new way of conducting war against their enemy, and, what's more, to do it with troops who were only initially volunteers, and later, conscripts. It takes time to meld that mass into an army, and, perhaps, even longer for the control structures (like good spotting and recon methods, for example) to enable such a masse de manouvre to make a meaningful impact on a battlefield where fronts where measured in many miles.

 

 

It should be remembered that of the European great powers, only Britain relied on a volunteer army in the years preceding WW1. All the other great powers had compulsory military service for their citizens, which usually lasted at least two years, or even three. When war broke out in 1914, these countries could quickly mobilize millions of adequately trained reservists into mass armies, something that wouldn't be possible for the majority of western countries in our day. Britain quickly ran into manpower problems, because the highly trained professional army of 1914 was simply too small for a major European war. So the other great powers had a definite advantage in that they could suffer heavy losses in a short period of time and still find plenty of reservists among their population to fill in the gaps in the ranks.

[Mafiozo 0]

Hello again fellas. sorry for the time distance between my first message and this one, academic life on the brink of exam period can be quite demanding.

 

I wish to thank you all for the warm welcome and informative advice, indeed I am going to use the blessed heap of reading materials to which Dej directed me. I've already came across some great memoirs there which transfer "How they felt".

my professor just yesterday confirmed my request to write about the subject, with much enthusiasm I must add! "This is a wonderful subject, well done on your choice to write about it" he wrote.

now this on the one hand infuses me with motivation, but on the other, you know - this is just a paper to show how I write about historic subjects and analyze them.

but I will do my best. the paper is going to deal with how the new technology was grasped by pilots, soldiers and the public alike, and the implications of this grasp. I have yet to come up with a pragmatic question, but I think I'll begin my introduction with a story of two opposing pilots who met after a dogfight. if anyone has any good examples of such occurrences I'd be glad to hear. I'm thinking of beginning with young Hermann Goering and the Australian Frank Slee, but already the sources on that seem elusive. beh, academy.

 

also - I've borrowed two books from the library regarding the subject. the first is "The Great Air War" by Lee Kennett which proved to be, so far, very readable and interesting, and the other: "Aces Falling" by Peter Hart.

the first one seems to be more accessible for my needs, but there's loads of memoirs and sources on the second one. I'm sure most of you know them.

also, another essay I'll be using was written by A.D. Harvey and is called: "Why Was the Red Baron's Fokker Painted Red? Decoding the Way Aeroplanes Were Painted in the First World War. an absorbing read, I must say!

 

again I thank you all for your very warm welcome. I've introduced myself to some internet communities in my time and I don't think I've ever experienced such hospitality. so please, by all means, drinks on me!

[Olham 164]

Well, as I said, the question for your essay could be, how much warfare changed, since the conflicting parts could now see

each other's positions and weak spots; and could attack targets far behind the front. They could collect photographic evidence

of the enemy's movements, which could now be evaluated by intelligence.

The whole idea of air superiority is about that, and the logical high tech evolution led to satelites. Just my 2 pence.

Edited June 2, 2011 by Olham

[Dej 17]

I say this with caution, quite certain that my fellows here will find contrary examples with which to shoot me down in good-natured flames, but I lean toward the notion that the early years of the air war may prove more fruitful for your essay.

 

Not only was the technology new, but the whole concept of 'fighting' a flying machine represented a psychological hurdle too. The transition from 'unarmed stability' as the byword in design where pilots were in abject terror of 'the spin' to 'manouverable gun platforms' where agility was an asset, for example.

 

It was in the early years that the techniques of air-fighting and the exploitation of technological mastery of the air were formed, IMHO, the later years just developed these true innovations further.

Edited June 2, 2011 by Dej

[themightysrc 5]

"I disagree. The stalemate on the Western Front was the result of the size of the armies then available compared to the available space. On the Western Front, army frontages spanned the entire continent so there were no flanks to turn, let alone room to manuever beyond flanks. Thus, everything there had to be a direct frontal assault. As a result, the ONLY way to break the stalemate by offensive action was to find ways to 1) utterly smash what was directly ahead, 2) move enough troops through the resulting hole faster than the enemy could move reserves to plug it, and 3) communicate in real time with forward troops and their supporting arty well enough to exploit opportunities created by successfully accomplishing steps 1 and 2. As WW1 on the Western Front went on, the armies got pretty good at step #1 to start with and then step #2 by the end of the war, but they always broke down on step #3 provided the enemy was still willing to fight. There are many examples of this failure to communicate aborting what might have been major breakthroughs."

 

BH,

 

I think you've missed my point somewhat, if you don't mind me saying so. What you say is absolutely correct, and I wouldn't disagree with any of it, however you seem to be implicitly acknowledging and agreeing with my argument, which is that circumstances which all combatant armies found themselves in forced a major rethink, rearming, retraining and retooling. It was an entirely new form of war to the armies that took part - the Franco-Prussian war was no preparation, and the American Civil War only faintly echoed the horrors that awaited the armies in Belgium and France. There was no precedent, and hence the learning curve - aided and abetted by technological developments. Arguably, the biggest single change experienced in WWI had nothing to do with the Western Front per se. The idea that a total war might be fought and that entire nations would risk their very existence was something unknown in Europe - not even the Napoleonic or 30 Years wars had been a fight until a nation was destroyed. But that's, effectively, what WWI became as empires and nations went into the melting pot. In the end, the greatest effects were those on the mass populations of the combatant countries, and the perceptions of power and nationhood amongst those people. WWI ended in an armistice, but it unleashed political and nationalist movements whose reverberations echo not just around Europe to this day, but around the entire world.

 

I heartily recommend Huw Strachen's one volume history of WWI as an adjunct to this conversation - you'll absolutely love it.

 

***

 

"my professor just yesterday confirmed my request to write about the subject, with much enthusiasm I must add! "This is a wonderful subject, well done on your choice to write about it" he wrote."

 

Well, go on Maf - what's your title and thesis then? I'm actually very interesting to know.

 

Cheers,

Si

Edited June 2, 2011 by themightysrc

[Bullethead 12]

BH, while I agree with you on your analysis of the stalemate along the Western Front, and with your outline of steps 1 and 2, I must take exception to your conclusion about the third step. Throughout the war both sides' abilities to use their respective air forces to reconnoiter, direct artillery fire, and communicate effectively in real time grew by leaps and bounds to the point where, by the end of the conflict, neither side was able to exploit opportunities created by successfully accomplishing steps 1 and 2 for any length of time BECAUSE of their success with step 3.

 

The failure of communications I was talking about was between the offensive army HQ and its forward ground units and their supporting arms. During an advance, the distance between them necessarily increased and the rapidity and reliability of communications between them necessarily decreased. In the absence of radio (there were no voice radios at all back then, and no man-portable Morse radios that could be set up and used in the front-line trenches), HQ could only communicate with the units at the point of attack via telephone, carrier pidgeon, and runner. The pidgeon was 1-way only, from front to rear, usually wasn't timely, and often didn't get through at all. The runner was 2-way but took way longer than a pidgeon, although tended to get through more often. The telephone was real-time AND direct voice communications, but depended on guys lugging heavy spools of wire through enemy fire across the muddy moonscape of the Western Front battlefield. That was hard enough and often failed at that point. If the wire actually made it to the forward units, however, it was almost always soon cut by the barrage the enemy always put down behind attacking forces to delay or prevent the attackers reinforcing their successes.

 

So, offensive HQs could plan an attack but it was like a PBEM game to them, all moves committed to paper and no way to change them until the next turn. Knowing this, H!Qs would send out orders for several likely scenarios of partial success, but nothing ever worked out that way. Thus, some units would achieve unexpected success but weren't told how to exploit it themselves and HQ couldn't exploit it because it didn't know about it. Or units would be told to get to Point A, wait for the adjacent unit get pull up alongside, then advance to Point B. Because the adjacent unit never got there, the 1st unit just sat, and HQ didn't know or, if it knew, couldn't get the word through fast enough to push on before the window of opportunity closed.

 

Things were quite different on the defensive. Defending HQs almost always had at least something in reserve at a fairly close distance to HQ. Often telephone lines were in place and safely buried so would often survive the enemy bombardment of rear areas, and if they didn't, it wasn't a hard trip for a runner. Hell, the runner could often go by motorcycle without having to dodge anything but the odd arty salvo. Thus, committing reserves to shore up defenses or plug holes was always much faster and reliable than committing reserves to exploit successes. And knowing where to send them was easier as well, because telephone communications with the defending front lines were also often well-buried, and runners from there requesting help didn't have to cross No-Man's-Land.

 

Notice I haven't mentioned airplanes at all yet. But getting around to them now, you have the same bias in favor of the defense. The airplanes couldn't do real-time communications with the ground troops at the point of attack so whatever they saw had to go back to the rear HQ. After that, to get to the forward units, it had to go through the same system as other ground communications.

 

What solved this problem was voice radio that could be taken along by the spearhead ground units, and set up and used at cannon's mouth. But that wasn't an option in WW1.

 

The idea that a total war might be fought and that entire nations would risk their very existence was something unknown in Europe - not even the Napoleonic or 30 Years wars had been a fight until a nation was destroyed.

 

I have to disagree with this because there are many examples to the contrary. Start with the dawn of recorded history and you find city states being utterly destroyed, then mighty empires falling in the Bronze Age. Things continued in this vein throughout the Iron Age, the Classical Period, the Middle Ages, and the Rennaissance. It just wasn't as frequent as before, but it still happened. Troy, Jericho, Babylon, the Minoans, the Hittites, Carthage, both the Western and eventually the Eastern Roman Empires, post-Roman Brittain, the kingdoms of the Huns, Vandals and various types of Goths, the Sarmatians, the Tartars, the Aztecs, both Kingdoms of Burgundy, the Holy Roman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and eventually Poland itself, the Papal States, the Confederacy, and countless others, all before 1914.

[RAF_Louvert 101]

.

 

BH, you forgot to mention the brave crews of loyal runner dogs that brought messages back and forth to the frontline troops throughout the War. Unsung heros the lot of them.

 

I agree the primary breakdown in communication was still between offensive, (and defensive), army HQ's and their forward ground units, however the situation was still greatly improved over what it was before the aeroplane. Indeed radio made THE difference in later years, but the ability to fly immediately over battles in action and relay information back within minutes rather than hours did alter the War, (regardless of how imperfect that information may have been on occasion, or how slowly the HQ's may have chosen to react to it, or how long it may have taken the information to work it's way back up to the troops fighting).

 

.

[Hasse Wind 46]

In short, WW1 armies and battlefields were far too big for the methods of command and control that had been in use for centuries and had been adequate for the task until the late 19th century.

[themightysrc 5]

BH,

 

"I have to disagree with this because there are many examples to the contrary. Start with the dawn of recorded history and you find city states being utterly destroyed, then mighty empires falling in the Bronze Age. Things continued in this vein throughout the Iron Age, the Classical Period, the Middle Ages, and the Rennaissance. It just wasn't as frequent as before, but it still happened. Troy, Jericho, Babylon, the Minoans, the Hittites, Carthage, both the Western and eventually the Eastern Roman Empires, post-Roman Brittain, the kingdoms of the Huns, Vandals and various types of Goths, the Sarmatians, the Tartars, the Aztecs, both Kingdoms of Burgundy, the Holy Roman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and eventually Poland itself, the Papal States, the Confederacy, and countless others, all before 1914."

 

I mentioned European history - I doubt that (a) people in 1914 would have had a profound and widespread knowledge of the Aztecs, (b) you're also invoking states - like the Confederacy - that had dubious legality for existence and © were simply not the stolid and reliable bodies that had continued to exist for hundreds of years. It's easy to invoke the Hittites - as though it would have had much traction in late 19th and early 20th century Europe, and I'll offer you a free hit in places like Savoy, etc, but my point stands: no-one had, until this point, and in recent European history (dammit, you've made me qualify myself!) had seriously thought that a country like France might be taken apart, along with its empire. People had doubts about the Ottoman Empire, but I wonder how many saw the destruction of that, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire (and state) as outcomes in 1914? And yet, by 1917-18, these were all too visible outcomes for these states, and, to be frank, France had missed out on such a fate by a slim margin.

[Olham 164]

From "New pilot asking for help!" to Aztecs and the Ottoman Empire in 25 posts.

[Bullethead 12]

I mentioned European history - I doubt that (a) people in 1914 would have had a profound and widespread knowledge of the Aztecs, (b) you're also invoking states - like the Confederacy - that had dubious legality for existence and © were simply not the stolid and reliable bodies that had continued to exist for hundreds of years.

 

OK, forget the Aztecs. And I don't want to get into the argument that the pre-1865 US was more like the EU than the USSR, so we'll ignore the perfectly legitmate (by the standards of its time) CSA. Besides, neither was European.

 

HOWEVER, Poland was European, and in fairly recent European history (as seen from WW1's timeframe) had gone from being a mighty empire to not existing at all. There were still Poles but they all lived neighboring parts of other mighty empires, which between them had divided and absorded what had been Poland not so long before. Poland has been resurrected 3 times since then: after WW1 (for a couple decades), after WW2 (in theory only), and after the break-up of the USSR (as we find it today). Seems a good example to me.

 

There are also, of course, the many minor but independent German states, which had existed for centuries, that disappeared as a result of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars (in which some WW1 senior officers had served in their youths). The same thing happened in the several Wars of Italian Unification in the mid-1800s which, when combined with the Austro-Prussian War, also split what had once been the monolithic Habsburg Empire into the Dual Monarchy. The Baltic States came and went at various times, too. And the Holy Roman Empire had lasted, at least in name, up until Napolean abolished it less than a century before WW1.

 

Anyway, the extinction of nations was not an alien concept in European warfare prior to WW1. It had happened before many times, sometimes within living memory at that time, and even to states on the winning side, as in the unification of Germany. Which is all I was trying to say.

 

I mentioned European history - I doubt that (a) people in 1914 would have had a profound and widespread knowledge of the Aztecs, (b) you're also invoking states - like the Confederacy - that had dubious legality for existence and © were simply not the stolid and reliable bodies that had continued to exist for hundreds of years.

 

OK, forget the Aztecs. And I don't want to get into the argument that the pre-1865 US was more like the EU than the USSR, so we'll ignore the perfectly legitmate (by the standards of its time) CSA. Besides, neither was European.

 

HOWEVER, Poland was European, and in fairly recent European history (as seen from WW1's timeframe) had gone from being a mighty empire to not existing at all. There were still Poles but they all lived neighboring parts of other mighty empires, which between them had divided and absorded what had been Poland not so long before. Poland has been resurrected 3 times since then: after WW1 (for a couple decades), after WW2 (in theory only), and after the break-up of the USSR (as we find it today). Seems a good example to me.

 

There are also, of course, the many minor but independent German states, which had existed for centuries, that disappeared as a result of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars (in which some WW1 senior officers had served in their youths). The same thing happened in the several Wars of Italian Unification in the mid-1800s which, when combined with the Austro-Prussian War, also split what had once been the monolithic Habsburg Empire into the Dual Monarchy. The Baltic States came and went at various times, too. And the Holy Roman Empire had lasted, at least in name, up until Napolean abolished it less than a century before WW1.

 

Anyway, the extinction of nations was not an alien concept in European warfare prior to WW1. It had happened before many times, sometimes within living memory at that time, and even to states on the winning side, as in the unification of Germany. Which is all I was trying to say.