Boche Run Out of Steam! Victory on the Marne!

[Hauksbee 103]

This is it! The high-water mark of the German advance. The last Hoorah! of the Schleiffen Plan. The last battle of "The Battles of the Frontiers".The war of movement is over; now we can settle down to a restful, no-marching four years when all parties get pummeled in place by one billion, five hundred million artillery shells. Enjoy!
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Edited September 14, 2014 by Hauksbee

[RAF_Louvert 101]

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Imagine how different it all might have been if the German advance had been able to make that last push and take Paris.  It is more than probable that, had this happened, the Entente powers would have been willing to sit down at the peace table and work out an agreement ASAP.  The war could have been over by Christmas.

 

So many what ifs.

 

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[Hauksbee 103]

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So many what ifs..

It is said that von Schlieffen, on his deathbed, (1913 A year before the war) cautioned: "Always keep the right wing strong. Let the sleeve of the last man on the right brush the English Channel." But Moltke, et al could not resist the temptation to meddle with the plan. A vast pin-wheel movement through Belgium and Holland was envisioned. (1) But Holland's neutrality was to be honored (?) which squeezed the corridor for advancing troops, giving France a smaller front to defend. (2) The Russians mobilized faster than expected and the Junker class saw their estates in northern Germany threatened and begged  for protection. Additional strength was bled off from the right wing. (3) While the right wing maneuvered, the left wing was supposed to stay in place to blunt the main French assault up through the Metz-Strasburg area. Its commander, Crown Prince Wilhelm (I think) chafed at being cut out of the glory and repeatedly demanded to take the offensive. Even more troops were diverted to him. To no avail. The constant meddling with the Schlieffen Plan. By the time of the Marne, German troops were worn down, physically exhausted and had outstripped their supply lines. Three potentially game-changing "What-if's".

 

A most wonderful irony presents itself in wondering what would have happened if all the plans had worked out as originally envisioned? The Germans would have swept south through Holland and Belgium, then west taking Paris and all of northern France. The French would have punched through and been in control of southern Germany. Each would be in control of large parts of the others country. Each would have the opposing force in its rear and would have its supply line threatened or cut. It would have been a fine mess.

[jeanba 1,920]

This is it! The high-water mark of the German advance. The last Hoorah! of the Schleiffen Plan. The last battle of "The Battles of the Frontiers".The war of movement is over; now we can settles down to a restful, no-marching four years when all parties get pummeled in place by one billion, five hundred million artillery shells. Enjoy!

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The top pictures are not from the Marne time I think (helmets), the last one, I don't know

[Hauksbee 103]

The top pictures are not from the Marne time I think (helmets), the last one, I don't know

I did a Yahoo Search for 'Battle of the Marne, Images' and these turned up. I know that these searches often include extraneous stuff, but I don't know what the Marne looked like. The Marne was famous for the French shuttling fresh troops to the front by taxi cab. According to legend virtually every taxi in Paris was commandeered. The last pic. looked like a mix of taxis and buses.

[jeanba 1,920]

The french and britsh helmet are a fairly obvious mistake, I always checjk the link to check there are no misassociation by the search engine

 

 

 

 

Every french who attended school at the age of 8-10 (at least before the 80's) know about the legend of the "Taxi de la Marne", but actually only around 3000 soldiers were so transported

 

Check "bataille de la marne" in the text of the link below, and you will have nice pictures of the battle :

https://www.flickr.com/photos/39887688@N02/8209420142/in/photostream/

Edited September 10, 2014 by jeanba

[Capitaine Vengeur 263]

Maybe the most praiseful comment ever about the French military had been stated by Alexander von Kluck, commander of the outflanked 1. Armee, in the afterwards of this battle:

 

"If you search for the reasons of our failure, refer to the papers of that time; they will tell you of the lacking of ammunition, of the failing supply: all of that is true. But there is one reason prevailing over all others, one reason totally decisive in my opinion: this is the most extraordinary and specific ability of the French soldier to rally quickly. It is a factor that can hardly be translated into numbers, and therefore, that disconcerts the most accurate and foreseeing planner.

Men can fight to death where they stand, this is something known and expected in every battle plan. But men having retreated for ten days, men lying down dead tired, that could yet take their rifles again and attack at the sound of bugle, that is something with which we had never learnt to reckon. That is a possibility never taken into account in our war colleges."

 

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In his Memoirs, Charles de Gaulle gave a much less fair comment about his enemies' behaviour during this battle:

 

"While the French, once paid his negligence, rises again by surprise, the German, unmatchable in the planned effort, loses balance facing the unexpected. That is the philosophy of the War's first act."

 

And he carries on with the following analysis:

 

"Besides, by strange fate, the generals of the Imperial Army, where the troops observe an unmatched discipline, are in open conflict. Kluck's disobedience, Bülow's apartness, the Kronprinz' distension, are the results of a fateful command system.

On the account of imitating the victorious initiatives of 1866 and 1870, every one wants to act on his own way. To cap it all, those Nietzscheans tolerate no limit to their greed for power. At least, shall a firm hand tighten the bundle? By no means. For by superstition of the name – common in the victorious armies –, has been chosen, as representative of the supreme authority, Moltke, a distinguished mind, a fine-shaded soul, but lacking that raw rigour of character through which the leader imposes his rule."

 

[De Gaulle did not actually participate in the battle, having been one of the hundreds thousands of French soldiers who had drawn lead during the first terrible month of August 1914.]

[jeanba 1,920]

Maybe the most praiseful comment ever about the French military had been stated by Alexander von Kluck, commander of the outflanked 1. Armee, in the afterwards of this battle:

 

"If you search for the reasons of our failure, refer to the papers of that time; they will tell you of the lacking of ammunition, of the failing supply: all of that is true. But there is one reason prevailing over all others, one reason totally decisive in my opinion: this is the most extraordinary and specific ability of the French soldier to rally quickly. It is a factor that can hardly be translated into numbers, and therefore, that disconcerts the most accurate and foreseeing planner.

Men can fight to death where they stand, this is something known and expected in every battle plan. But men having retreated for ten days, men lying down dead tired, that could yet take their rifles again and attack at the sound of bugle, that is something with which we had never learnt to reckon. That is a possibility never taken into account in our war colleges."

 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 

In his Memoirs, Charles de Gaulle gave a much less fair comment about his enemies' behaviour during this battle:

 

"While the French, once paid his negligence, rises again by surprise, the German, unmatchable in the planned effort, loses balance facing the unexpected. That is the philosophy of the War's first act."

 

And he carries on with the following analysis:

 

"Besides, by strange fate, the generals of the Imperial Army, where the troops observe an unmatched discipline, are in open conflict. Kluck's disobedience, Bülow's apartness, the Kronprinz' distension, are the results of a fateful command system.

On the account of imitating the victorious initiatives of 1866 and 1870, every one wants to act on his own way. To cap it all, those Nietzscheans tolerate no limit to their greed for power. At least, shall a firm hand tighten the bundle? By no means. For by superstition of the name – common in the victorious armies –, has been chosen, as representative of the supreme authority, Moltke, a distinguished mind, a fine-shaded soul, but lacking that raw rigour of character through which the leader imposes his rule."

 

[De Gaulle did not actually participate in the battle, having been one of the hundreds thousands of French soldiers who had drawn lead during the first terrible month of August 1914.]

Very good quotes, I think we find this also during the early Verdun offensive.

The German were stopped not by the intelligence of the Franch HQ, but by french "simple" soldiers who fought desperatly

Hence came the lack of trust between the HQ and the French, which would culminate in 1917 after the Nivelle offensive and then in 1940

[Hauksbee 103]

 

 

Hence came the lack of trust between the HQ and the French, which would culminate in 1917 after the Nivelle offensive and then in 1940

 

Could you elaborate on this?

[Olham 164]

Good observations about some of the (negative) German character attributes - I feel a strong ring of truth.

[rjw 48]

I believe, Generally speaking, I think it is always a mistake to attribute the foibles and characteristics of the few (leaders and decision makers of a nation) to the national character of a nation. It is often true that you are only as good as your leader and that in those times (WW1) most of the general populace were heavily influenced by the authorities that ran the countries. All humans possess the same characteristics and capabilities. It is only through learning/training/indoctrination set out by societal views (often determined by the powers that be in government) that values and beliefs are set in motion and tend to reflect in the characteristics of a nation. Example the city of Sparta and it's warrior culture, The city of Athens and its philosophical and artistic culture. Both attibutable to their laws and values set out by their governing bodies.

[Capitaine Vengeur 263]

One of the reasons why I fancy studying the American Civil War, is the large variety of characters one can find among the military leaders of both sides. Virtually all of the failings in mankind can be identified there, sometimes an incredible amount of them in one single hopeless man. On both sides, many imcompetents reached high positions only due to their political supports, and as well, some valuable leaders lost their commission due to the lack or withdrawal of such supports. Among faults, alcoholism was probably the most common, but one can also enumerate: messianic lunacy, narcissism and unability to listen to others' recommendations, acrimony and unability to keep good relations with superiors or subordinates (several senior officers challenged in duel or even shot dead some others), unbalanced recklessness or hopeless faint of heart, unability to obey orders or complete lack of initiative, and also the "lack of that raw rigour of character through which the leader imposes his rule" mentionned by de Gaulle (the main fault of Robert Lee)... At least, physical cowardice was extremely rare in that lunatic asylum honorable corps.

Edited September 21, 2014 by Capitaine Vengeur

[Hauksbee 103]

Example the city of Sparta and it's warrior culture, The city of Athens and its philosophical and artistic culture. Both attibutable to their laws and values set out by their governing bodies.

Good point. The phrase "A certain kind at a certain time" comes to mind, and when the time passes, the kind changes. Witness the Scottish Renaissance of the 1800's, Egypt of Seti I/Rameses II, Elizabethian England, the Italian Renaissance, America between the end of the Civil War and 1900, Napoleonic France...all cultures that experienced a great burst of political (and creative) energy. Add to that, Victorian England. A list of quintessential American Characteristics made prior to the Civil War would have to be seriously amended by 1900.

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The failures of leadership that Captain Vengeur points out were, in large part, examples of 'changing times'. Men of wealth and influence in their communities who raised companies were given command. Utter lack of military experience was no bar to holding a Colonelcy. These men also had a very prickly sense of personal honor. No wonder there was much bumbling. In addition their conception of war was formed prior to the railroad, the telegraph, and the observation balloon. They estimated fire power in terms of muskets, not rifled barrels (and, in the end, repeating rifles).

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Changing times changed everything, and conceptions of national character change with it.