The F-35 is grounded + Who is Pierre Sprey anyway

[Nesher 629]

funny it wasn't mentioned by now

 

an F-35 caught fire a few days ago shutting the program into a halt

 

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140623/DEFREG02/306230025/F-35-Catches-Fire-Takeoff-Eglin-AFB

 

that's after my best friend sent me this video 

 

haha

[MigBuster 2,879]

These things are expected to happen really - expect a few crashes as well before IOC

 

 

 

 I have been doing more research into Pierre Sprey past Corams Boyd - and it doesnt look good - seems he has been ranting similar clueless crap for many years.

[warthog64 89]

Pierre Sprey certainly likes to change his mind a lot to fit current events. I bet he'll change his mind on the F-35 in six months and claim he never doubted the aircraft's capabilities. No credibility for him!

 

He claims that the "High-Low" approach is stupid, but isn't that the exact same approach that created the F-15 and F-16 40 years ago? It seems to have worked perfectly with the 15 and 16. Sure the F-16 wasn't initially meant to do everything it evolved to do, and the F-35 was designed from the start to be multi-role but what difference does that make? Is he saying we should "dumb-down" the design of the F-35 and then let it be modified and evolve over time like the F-16 did? I'm confused as to how that makes a difference.

 

The F-35 may not be that much better than an F-16 in terms of overall combat capability and accuracy, but it incorporates stealth and modern avionics, and technology must continue to improve and evolve. That's just the way it has been and will continue to be forever.

 

The only area that I doubt the capability of the F-35 is the CAS role when compared to the A-10. No mach 2 superfighter can fulfill the role the slow and rugged and enormously effective A-10 fulfills today. I mean come on! The A-10 will eventually need a replacement, but the F-35 is not the answer!

Edited June 26, 2014 by warthog64

[Peugeot205 2,745]

uhmmmm Pierre Sprey  a man who took place in the development  of the F-16 (General Dynamics) and F-15 (Mcdonnell-Douglas)....... So the F-35 (Lockeed Martin) is not a good bird according to him.... uhmmm  May be because of this?

 

 

The F-35 Is going to replace in the USAF, USN and USMC these type of aircraft:

 

F-18 Hornet (Mcdonnell-Douglas  now Boeing)

Harrier (Mcdonnell-Douglas  now Boeing)

F-18 Super Hornet (Boeing)

A-10 (Fairchild-Republic now Elbit I think)

F-16 (General Dynamics)

 

To be honest  I think that Monsieur Sprey is given more a corporative opinion rather than a "professional" one . At least this is what I think.

[MigBuster 2,879]

Sprey was a very outspoken civilian defense analyst at the Pentagon in the 60s/70s - he had no Military experience prior that. 

 

His main involvement was with the A-x (which became A-10) -  Coram credited him with writing specifications for it and leading a technical design team.

 

He was part of the Fighter Mafia with 2 ex pilots John Boyd and Everest Riccioni and It is very hazy what if anything he had to do with the F-15 and F-16 apart from try and push their argument for a Light Weight Fighter concept. These guys it seems were in a position to influence and specify initial requirements - but not much else. Luckily the A-10 was the only one of their concepts that made it to production.

 

Some points from Coram - states Sprey wanted the F-16 to have less fuel (for more performance) - which Boyd rejected, that the F-15 engine was not good enough for the F-16 , credits him with working with Boyd on Draft LWF plans (what putting his name on them?)

 

If I find evidence on where he has admitted he has been wrong on anything he said I will let you know.

 

 

 

Regarding the YF-16 from http://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=131

 

The YF-16 Design
The General Dynamics Model 401, as the YF-16 was known in-house, was the product of a lengthy design study and wind tunnel test program that had been executed during the preliminary discussion days with John Boyd, test pilot and defense analyst Col. Everest Riccioni, and by the General Dynamics chief project engineer Harry Hillaker, who had guided the project through several years of low-level company support.

To perform the prototype contract, company vice president and program director Lyman Josephs and director of engineering William Dietz were assigned to the program in November 1971. Additionally, a total of 650 personnel participated in detail design and fabrication of the prototypes. The project was divided into twenty-eight work breakdown structure elements, with a manager responsible for engineering, tooling, fabrication, and assembly budget in each element.

The concept of the YF-16, as formulated by Hillaker, involved the prudent application of integrated advanced technologies and design innovations to achieve an aircraft that could satisfy the conflicting requirements of high performance and low cost. Emphasis was placed on small size and low weight in the selection of technologies to realize the best balance of combat capability (turn rate and acceleration) and lowest possible mission weight...............

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=131

Edited June 26, 2014 by MigBuster

[+CrazyhorseB34 937]

Jeez guys, let them massage this thing and get the bugs out. In the end it will be a world beater. Remember how many F-14s where lost during development?

[MAKO69 186]

Jeez guys, let them massage this thing and get the bugs out. In the end it will be a world beater. Remember how many F-14s where lost during development?

Only a few right?

[MigBuster 2,879]

From Comparing the effectiveness of Air to Air Fighters: F-86 to F-18 (Sprey , M, Pierre, 1982)

 

Yes the dashed lines are his extrapolation and there is text for more context - just made me laugh. Pretty sure he was back in a civvie job at this point.

 

[MigBuster 2,879]

Should have called this the Sprey thread - actually might rename it 

 

 

 

 

Not a very flatering disertation or the Fighter Mafia THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE

CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM (Marshall L Michell III, 2006)

 

 

Heres a few bits:

 

===============================================

 

 

While working on the F-X, Boyd met Pierre Sprey, a weapons system analyst on the

OASD/SA staff, whose background was similar to Enthovens but much less

distinguished. By his own account, Sprey was a dilettante with an engineering degree but

no military experience. After graduation from Yale, Sprey became a research analyst at

the Grumman Aircraft Corporation for space and commercial transportation projects. He

came to OSD/SA in 1966, where he declared himself an expert on military fighter

aircraft, despite his lack of experience. Sprey admitted being a gadfly, a nuisance, and an

automatic opponent of any program he was not a part of. He was opposed to many Navy

and Air Force tactical air systems, especially the Navys Grumman F-14, because of its

size and complexity.

Somehow, Sprey concluded that numbers were critically important in air combat, and

he and Boyd both glib, iconoclastic, ambitious, self-aggrandizing, and excluded from

the decision-making process -- found a common cause in opposing larger, complex

fighters

 

==========================================

 

 

Sprey and Boyd disagreed with this doctrine and the high-tech systems it required.

The two began to work on an alternate concept to the Blue Bird, called the Red Bird,

a clear weather, air-to-air combat only fighter with a top speed of Mach 1.6 instead of the

Blue Birds Mach 2.5+. Boyd and Sprey viewed any speed higher than Mach 1.6 as

unnecessary because at that time, for aerodynamic reasons, all dogfights took place at

subsonic speed and there was a significant technical and financial price for flying at Mach

2+.52 They claimed the reduced top speed was the only area where the Red Birds

performance was lower than the Blue Birds, and that by limiting the Red Bird to Mach 1.6 the fighter would be much less expensive, lighter, and have better performance. Sprey

and Boyd also decided to remove the radar and the associated radar-guided missiles,

which they considered unreliable, further reducing the Red Birds weight. They estimated

the Red Bird would weigh about 23,000 pounds and would provide air-to-air

performance equal to the Blue Bird for a far lower unit cost. Additionally, they felt these

changes would make the Red Bird more reliable.53 This seemed to be classic example of

out of the box thinking, but what Boyd and Sprey were actually doing was not meeting

a requirement but changing it.

 

 

========================================

 

The Navy engineers said the lightweight claimed for the VF-XX was unachievable and the

proposed thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading could only be achieved by a larger

airplane. They added it was obvious that Sprey was not an aeronautical engineer and

that:

[spreys] basic concepts have been considered in detail by the Services

during the formative stages of the F-14 and F-15, have been reviewed by

DDR&E [Deputy Director of Research and Evaluation], and rejected in all

decisions to date...the reconsideration of the concept [VF-XX/F-XX] as a

viable alternative should have been turned down before submission to the

services...

In common with past papers by the same author, this study contains

many fallacious assumptions, half-truths, distortions, and erroneous

extrapolations. Unsubstantiated opinions are presented as facts. Any

rebuttals give the appearance of arguments against the rudimentary virtues

of simplicity, high performance, and low cost. 

 

 

This response, while delivered with feeling, was factual and analytical and effectively

blunted Spreys attempt to forward the DPM. It also showed that Sprey was out of his

class when confronted with knowledgeable aeronautical engineers, but it was a valuable

lesson for Sprey, Boyd, Riccioni, and other Critics do not make arguments in front of

experts.

 

============================================

 

Sprey used the AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests to support his arguments, saying

AIMVAL/ACEVAL showed that numerical superiority was the dominant factor in air

combat and that radar missile-equipped fighters had no advantage over fighters equipped

with advanced heat-seeking missiles. Sprey also used 1973 Middle East combat results to

bolster his arguments, pointing out that the Israelis, though they had F-4s equipped with

radar missiles, used the very simple French-built Mirage III to score virtually all their kills with guns and heat-seeking air-to-air missiles. None of Spreys arguments were

footnoted nor the sources of his data provided

 

=================================================

 

 

It was true the early AIM-7s had a very poor

record in Vietnam, but Sprey was also critical of the AIM-7s replacement, the

AMRAAM, which the Air Force claimed would correct most the AIM-7s problems.

Sprey said the AMRAAM was too expensive to be bought in large quantities and too

complex to function well in combat. Sprey also argued that radar would be jammed in

wartime, and also claimed that the F-15 did not have a reliable method of identifying the

radar target as enemy, and thus could not fire at targets beyond visual range for fear of

fratricide.

Sprey offered an even more extreme argument, that the radar required for BVR

combat would endanger the fighter that used it. Sprey said that a fighter with an

inexpensive, passive (non-emitting) radar detection receiver, called Radar Homing and

Warning (RHAW), could follow the signal from a radar-equipped aircraft to attack by

surprise with heat-seeking missiles or, even better, with anti-radiation missiles that would

home in on the radar-equipped fighters radar signal. Overall, Sprey said the radar

missile was illustrative of how [the Air Forces] now-entrenched defense of high-cost,

high-complexity programs [that] blocks us from using advanced, brilliant-simple

technology to achieve the large increases in both quantity and quality of weapons that the

nation needs desperately every year

 

===================================================

 

The IAF also demolished another of Spreys theories of combat effectiveness, that

fighter radar would be jammed and useless in combat. The leading IAF F-16 MiG killer,

Colonel Amir Nahumi, said after the war (and six kills) that the reason the F-16 was so

effective was because its look-down pulse Doppler radar allowed the F-16s to locate the

Syrian MiGs trying to sneak in at low level, something that had been impossible with

earlier radars. This was the radar Sprey said would be useless and that Fallows and the

Critics would have left out of the aircraft.

Edited June 26, 2014 by MigBuster

[MigBuster 2,879]

On the F-16 - his specialist subject  :

 

From Comparing the effectiveness of Air to Air Fighters: F-86 to F-18 (Sprey , M, Pierre, 1982)

 

 

 

 

 

However - John Williams who worked on the YF-16 & F-16:

 

..........I was a structural engineer on the YF-16 and F-16 flight test teams, so was familiar with weights at the time. Forty years is too long to remember all the numbers, but when the F-16 was in early flight test, I did a weight comparison between the two and was very surprised to find the F-16 empty weight was less than the YF-16. So, the YF-16, designed for 6.5g at 14900 lb was heavier than the F-16, designed for 9g at 22,500 lb. Don't confuse the design weight as the actual weight, two totally different things. 

Here's why the YF-16 was heavier. First, it had a much larger structural margin. meaning it was designed for 25% overload capability, because no 150% static test was performed. Second, it was not a refined structural design, either design loads or stress analysis. If there was any doubt about load or stress, it was made a little heavier. Third, manufacturing processes were not refined. It was built as cheaply as possible.

Remarkable, when you consider the added g and design weight, larger wing, horizontal tail, and ventral fins, and longer fuselage of the F-16, in addition to an 8,000 hour service life.

 

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=58&t=25121&p=266379#p266379

 

 

Have to assume ballast or radar included - but even if not more 400 lbs than 4000 lbs!!

Edited June 26, 2014 by MigBuster

[Caesar 305]

Sprey also lied about the ACEVAL/AIMVAL results in that document (F-86 to F-18), stating that the results of the tests (overall) were those of a specific sub-set of the tests and never considering the lopsided kill to loss ratios the F-14 and F-15 crews got in their favor at different points (in the region of 6:1 at times).  I don't trust what he has to say with that test data, having spoken to and read the works of other folks who were directly involved and at different levels.  History also does not back Sprey.  Those same two fighters which he least supported wound up with exceptional kill to loss ratios in the real world vice simulations, and proved to be equally exceptional in the strike role (F-14, F-15E).  The F-16 and F/A-18 became much more deadly AFTER so-called "gold plating" (better radar, AMRAAM missile, ECM, larger weapon compatibility overall) was added.

 

As such, I don't give him much credibility with respect to the F-35.

[MigBuster 2,879]

Sprey also lied about the ACEVAL/AIMVAL results in that document (F-86 to F-18), stating that the results of the tests (overall) were those of a specific sub-set of the tests and never considering the lopsided kill to loss ratios the F-14 and F-15 crews got in their favor at different points (in the region of 6:1 at times).  I don't trust what he has to say with that test data, having spoken to and read the works of other folks who were directly involved and at different levels.  History also does not back Sprey.  Those same two fighters which he least supported wound up with exceptional kill to loss ratios in the real world vice simulations, and proved to be equally exceptional in the strike role (F-14, F-15E).  The F-16 and F/A-18 became much more deadly AFTER so-called "gold plating" (better radar, AMRAAM missile, ECM, larger weapon compatibility overall) was added.

 

As such, I don't give him much credibility with respect to the F-35.

 

 

 

The entire argument for a 1970s F-86 with no radar at all was somewhat ridiculous when you consider the technological improvements just from 1965 to 1972 that Sprey never considers - these improvements were happening already and he is none the wiser. His theories about radar above are so far off - Not saying everything he says is wrong but there is a so much dodgy there (look at the T/W comparison on the F-16 above  ) 

 

 

 

Actually there is a bit about AIMVAL / ACEVAL -

 

 

 

 

THE AIMVAL/ACEVAL CONTROVERSY (THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE

CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM (Marshall L Michell III, 2006)

 

While the F-15 was plagued with engine problems, in 1977 there were more serious questions raised about its operational effectiveness, ironically because of a joint Air Force-Navy exercise that would eventually vastly improve both services air combat capability. While their performance was outstanding, the F-15 and the F-14 had major problems with armament. Their designers had learned a lesson from the early F-4s, which

had been handicapped because they only had missile armament, and both the F-15 and F-14 carried a 20mm cannon. However, the missiles the new fighters carried were only slightly modified variants of Vietnam-era AIM-7s and AIM-9s, and it was clear that to fully utilize their radar and avionics capabilities these fighters they would need better missiles.

 

With only enough development funds for one type of missile, both services agreed the first priority was a new, short-range, heat-seeking missile, the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM), to replace their AIM-9s. To define exactly what characteristics the missile would need the Air Force and Navy commissioned a largescale exercise study, called Air Intercept Missile Evaluation/Air Combat Evaluation, AIMVAL/ACEVAL

 

AIMVAL/ACEVAL took place at Nellis and the test aircraft consisted of a highly instrumented Blue Force of F-14s and F-15s against a Red Force of Northrop F-5Es flown by the Aggressors. Because the AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests were to look for the best characteristics for short-range missiles, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) forced close-in dogfights. The ROE varied depending on the specific test, but generally they were Vietnam War ROE, which required a visual identification (VID) of the target as hostile before firing.

 

In the real world, the American fighters had ways to identify Communist aircraft beyond visual range, notably the previously mentioned Vietnam-era Combat Tree, but because Tree was still classified the system was not part of the exercise. 49 The result of the ROE was that the Blue Force could not use its long-range AIM-7 missiles, thus negating one of the F-15/14s main advantages. Additionally, Red Force always outnumbered the Blue Force fighters and the Blue Force had no ground radar control, while ground based radar guided the Red Force F-5s (which had no radar) to an attacking position.

 

Thus the Rules of Engagement produced the worst possible case for the Blue Forces ROE for a Third World conflict, but a large number of enemy aircraft with excellent radar control, numbers and control that would only be found in a major war in Europe. With the ROE the battles invariably started when the two sides caught sight of each other, and this gave an advantage to the small, hard to see, well flown and more numerous F-5s. The problems with fighting large numbers of small aircraft in closein, turning dogfights was well known in the Air Force fighter force, and was one of the reasons the service insisted the F-15 have a beyond visual range missile. At the end of the exercise, although fighting outnumbered and with the F-5s having all the advantages, the F-15/F-14 Blue Force had a kill ratio of 2:1. This was satisfactory, and besides it was irrelevant the purpose of the test was to try to develop characteristics for a new shortrange missile.

 

 In terms of developing a new missile, from Air Forces and Navys point of view the tests were highly successful and crucial to future air-to-air missile programs. The tests showed that a modified AIM-9, the AIM-9L, had a performance close to the proposed (and very expensive) new ASRAAM, and a newer AIM-9, the AIM-9M, would actually be superior to the ASRAAM. This meant the services could accept improved, inexpensive AIM-9s and shift their limited missile development funds from the ASRAAM to a new, radar-guided, medium-range missile to replace the AIM-7. This new missile was designated the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM After the exercise, the AIMVAL/ACEVAL test results and kill ratios were contained in a large body of complex documents that were classified because they showed the capabilities of the various missiles tested, as well as the capabilities the Air Force and Navy considered most important.

 

There was some small concern that the complex data might be misinterpreted, but that was a minor consideration This was to prove a mistake. AIMVAL/ACEVAL was a highly successful program for what it was intended to achieve, but proved to have some serious unintended consequences as the open spaces for communication and IPN channels that had served the iron majors so well for Red Flag and other programs proved a two-edged sword.

 

In the hard fought air battles, at times the well-trained F-5 Aggressor pilots gave as good as they got. When the Aggressors made their regularly scheduled training visits to TAC fighter bases around the country, the Aggressor pilots recounted their own highly colored versions of AIMVAL/ACEVAL around the bar. The urban legend soon spread that the F-5s had beaten the F-15s in head-to-head air combat. 

 

This story soon arrived in Washington where Colonel Everest Riccioni, retired and working for Northrop, the builder of the F-5, pounced on it. 53At the same time John Boyd, despite his retirement, had maintained his contempt for the F-15 and multi-role F-16 and continued to cultivate a group of officers he had hired in the Pentagon. Boyd learned of the cheap, simple F-5s success in AIMVAL/ACEVAL and saw this as an opportunity to strike back at those who had changed the F-16 into a multi-role fighter. At the same time, Riccioni and Sprey (whom Northrop also had hired as a consultant) saw this as an opportunity to push an advanced version of the F-5, the F-20, on the Air Force.54 For technical reasons, the F-20 had only a pure air-to-air capability, so it fit perfectly with what the Critics still wanted, a simple, high performance air-to-air fighter.55 For the next several years Riccioni, aided by Sprey and Boyd, tried to sell the F-20 which TAC commander Wilbur Creech said had no utility in big league combat -- to the Air Force, then to overseas customers, then to the Air Force National Guard and Reserves, without success.56

 

The multi-role F-16 offered more capability, and Northrops business practices with overseas customers gave the American government pause; when two out of the three of the F-20 prototypes crashed, the program ended.57 However, the Critics continued to use the results of AIMVAL/ACEVAL to hector the F-15 program and Air Force weapons selection in general.

 

 

(note this paper is not always perfect in its arguments)

Edited June 27, 2014 by MigBuster

[MigBuster 2,879]

The Case for More Effective, Less expensive weapon systems: what "Quality versus quality" issue?

 

Pierre M Sprey (1982)

 

Isn't that the year the MiG-23MLD is coming in with R-60 (AA-8) and R-73 (AA-11)? - good job you've got our backs!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Some of this analysis might not be far off regarding early MiG-23s - not that I suppose he cares because he is only putting it forward to push his agenda through - otherwise he might have mentioned why it was still a threat.

Edited June 27, 2014 by MigBuster

[MigBuster 2,879]

Some points in the first paragraph but really have to question the rest of it

 

Sprey does not divulge how he intends to maintain surprise when enemy radar picks him up a few hundred miles out - obviously Stealth is out of the question because stealth skin is too heavy it seems    

 

 

 

 

Center for Defense Information 

World Security Institute 

February 2011 

 

 

“Evaluating Weapons: Sorting the Good from the Bad” 

 

by Pierre M. Sprey 

 

 

Similarly, real air-to-air combat is separated by a chasm from the technologist’s dangerously beguiling dream of beyond-visual-range (BVR) combat: push a button, launch a missile at a blip on the scope at 25 miles, then watch the blip disappear without ever having laid eyes on the target. That concept of combat, oblivious to the inconvenient details of real air-to-air fights , leads to huge, cumbersome fighters loaded down with tons and tons of heavy stealth skins, massive radars and missiles, and failure-ridden electronics of unmanageable complexity. The most recent fighter built in pursuit of the BVR combat delusion, the F-22, has a $355 million sticker price and costs $47,000 per hour to fly, making it impossible to fly the hours necessary to train pilots adequately (people first!) and impossible to buy enough fighters to influence any seriously contested air war. 

 

As opposed to the BVR dream, actual air combat almost invariably starts with two or more attackers “bouncing” and surprising an unaware flight of fighters at their normal cruise speed (no more than mach .7 to .9 for all existing fighters). The surprise factor looms large: in every war of the past century, 75 percent to 90 percent of all pilots shot down in air-to-air combat were unaware. Attackers must close to within roughly a quarter mile or less to get positive eyeball identification of friend or foe (no current electronic identification is secure) 

 

To win this kind of fight places a premium on gifted pilots, above all else. In distant second place are the airplane characteristics that will help those pilots to win, as follows: 

 

achieving surprise by visual and electronic undetectability, e.g. tiny size, no radar emissions and higher cruise speed than the enemy’s (which ensures that he can’t sneak up from behind); 

 

 ability to launch lots of friendly fighters into enemy skies every day (achieved through low sticker price, low maintenance leading to many sorties per day and long cruise endurance) and ability to generate lots of air combat training hours (ditto) to produce plenty of gifted pilots; 

 

 superior agility i.e., better turn, better acceleration and quicker control response to gain firing position and defeat enemy firing passes (less weight, more thrust and more wing area each increase agility); 

 

 carrying weapons that deliver reliable kills quickly (cannons first, simple infrared missiles second, radar missiles are off the table since they are neither quick nor reliable). 

[Caesar 305]

I feel bad saying this, but it seems like Sprey has been living under a rock since Vietnam.  Those arguments which were foolhardy at his time carry little weight forty to fifty years later.  He seems to take into account none of the advances made in missile, electro-optical, infrared and radar sensing and identification technology, or the threat of integrated air defense systems.  As you say, MB, what happens when you're detected over 100 miles away by an SA-10/20's radar?

 

For that matter, the F-35 is being built with an electro-optical sensor in the nose akin to the F-14.  Even during ACEVAL/AIMVAL, when the system was still a prototype, the then-TVSU was producing an average 8NM head-on visual identification against the tiny F-5.  That system became the TCS that we all know and love, and I'm willing to bet that the -35's own EO pod will do better, having the benefit of more than 30 years of technological development (and if memory serves, does more than EO alone).

 

But here's the thing...that pod, you see, it adds weight and complexity to the F-35, so I'm not sure if it's really worth it...

[MigBuster 2,879]

For that matter, the F-35 is being built with an electro-optical sensor in the nose akin to the F-14.  Even during ACEVAL/AIMVAL, when the system was still a prototype, the then-TVSU was producing an average 8NM head-on visual identification against the tiny F-5.  That system became the TCS that we all know and love, and I'm willing to bet that the -35's own EO pod will do better, having the benefit of more than 30 years of technological development (and if memory serves, does more than EO alone).

 

But here's the thing...that pod, you see, it adds weight and complexity to the F-35, so I'm not sure if it's really worth it...

 

 

ha - any weight that's not associated with what PS wants on his jets is very bad as we know.

 

EOTS (AN/AAQ-40) is pretty much a combined Sniper TGP and IRST from what I know - I cant see it being bad considering how good some of the older systems were .

 

 

 

 

But the ultimate frustration for the Air Force was often the Critics simply did not tell the truth. The most prominent but by no means only example of this was when the Critics said that the AIM-7 was not useful in BVR combat because the Air Force did not have a system that could identify a radar target as an enemy aircraft. In fact, such long range identification systems had been available since World War II, and an Air Force system, called Combat Tree, had been used successfully in Vietnam from 1971-1973.

Additionally, a newer and even more effective long-range identification system, called Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR) had been developed for the F-15 to use with the AMRAAM.

 

Sprey had worked on fighters in DoD since the mid-60s and certainly knew that Combat Tree and its follow on systems existed, but to make his point against the AIM-7 he ignored it, as did Spinney, another DoD employee very familiar with weapons systems.73 Because Combat Tree and the NCTR systems were classified, the Air Force could not publicly counter the Critics false contention that Air Force fighters with radar missiles had no way to identify targets at long range. One is left to wonder if the Critics deliberately made this false argument knowing that, because of classification, the Air Force would not refute it.

 

(THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE

CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM (Marshall L Michell III, 2006)

Edited June 27, 2014 by MigBuster

[MigBuster 2,879]

Some points I found discussing some of Spreys comments in the video.

 

   The F-15 Is Loaded Up With A Bunch Of Junk... A Bunch Of Electronic Stuff That Has No Relevance To Combat

 

..........Then there is the undeniable combat record of the Eagle, yet Mr. Sprey seems to think that the F-15 is a loser even after four decades of incredible success, not to mention the fact that it has never been bested in air-to-air combat and retains a kill ration of 105.5 to 0. This denial of clear historical reality is a startling indication that Mr. Sprey may be living in the 1970s when it comes to air-combat doctrine, or maybe he simply does not want to admit that his stripped down, all super-maneuverable light-weight visual fighters or nothing initiative was not the right path for America's air combat forces after all.

 

The fact is that the F-16, the same aircraft that Mr. Sprey is said to have had such a great input into during its genesis, has gained thousands of pounds in avionics, targeting pods, fuel tanks and other "frivolous junk" continuously since its introduction into service and some see this as a testament to how inaccurate his light-weight fighter prophesies of the 1970s were.

 

Mr. Sprey's views are questionable considering that the F-15 remains more deadly than ever even after forty years of continuous service in the USAF, not to mention that its even more complicated and heavy brother, the F-15E Strike Eagle, is the most all-around useful machine that the USAF has in its inventory. Additionally, the F-15 Strike Eagle derivatives are still thought of as one of the top-of-the-line fighter aircraft available on the world market today.

 

Bottom-line, the idea that Mr. Sprey still thinks the F-15 is a dog when every metric and battle has proven him otherwise is more indicative of a character flaw than an argumentative one.

 

 

'The Marines Have This Mindless Passion Now, Recently, For Vertical Takeoff Airplanes'

 

Is Pierre Sprey really Doc Brown who traded in his Delorean for a time traveling F-16 that runs on banana peels and flux capacitors?

 

FACT: The USMC introduced the AV-8A Harrier in 1971 and it has been a mainstay of their air arm ever since.

 

Much of the Marine's combined arms combat doctrine is built around a STOVL capable fixed-wing attack platform. So the Marine's STOVL requirement is not something that is going to go away anytime soon, nor should it, regardless of the F-35 debate.

 

 

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/pierre-spreys-anti-f-35-diatribe-is-half-brilliant-and-1592445665

Edited June 27, 2014 by MigBuster

[+ST0RM 145]

Well, it appears that the F-35 grounding has been lifted, despite having no known cause for the 23 June engine fire.

 

This is political, pure and simple. Lift the ban just in time for it's international debut to save face/order with it's overseas customers.

 

Something tells me that as soon as they return from Farnsborough, the grounding will be reimposed.

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/us-airshow-britain-lockheed-fighter-idUSKBN0FK0O520140715

[MigBuster 2,879]

Hmm - they might not be going

 

 

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/07/no-f-35s-coming-to-farnborough-safety-first-says-secdef-hagel/

 

FARNBOROUGH AIR SHOW: That whoosh sound you just heard was the air rushing out of all the Pentagon officials, Lockheed Martin employees and the myriads who still hoped the F-35Bs would fly here.

Rear Adm. John Kirby issued this statement at 7 p.m BST during a Pentagon press conference, less than 12 hours after news broke about the fleet’s grounding being lifted:

“This is a limited flight clearance that includes an engine inspection regimen and a restricted flight envelope which will remain in effect until the root cause of the June 23 engine mishap is identified and corrected.

“That said, I can confirm that the Department of Defense — in concert with our partners in the U.K. — has decided not to send Marine Corps and UK F-35B aircraft across the Atlantic to participate in the Farnborough air show.

“This decision was reached after consultation with operational commanders and air worthiness authorities, despite the decision by air worthiness authorities to clear the aircraft to return to flight.

 

 

Never mind - there is always next year 

Or even the next 50 years after that...............

Edited July 15, 2014 by MigBuster

[+ST0RM 145]

Wow, someone actually halted it.

 

I'm very happy to be wrong here.