heck - you're no fun!

[+Typhoid 231]

"Ok everyone take a deep breath."

 

 

aw shucks......

 

 

 

can I answer the fighter question?

Edited November 7, 2007 by Typhoid

[eraser_tr 29]

x2

 

Like we were actually angry with each other? Hell I'm just practicing my pointless uphill battle arguing skills for being in the middle of it for a week in Atlanta!

 

And I wanted to see the reaction to the crazy liberal playing the same card the right loves to.

[+Typhoid 231]

x2

 

Like we were actually angry with each other? Hell I'm just practicing my pointless uphill battle arguing skills for being in the middle of it for a week in Atlanta!

 

And I wanted to see the reaction to the crazy liberal playing the same card the right loves to.

 

which one would that be?

 

nevermind - I'm going to shut up here unless and until USAFMTL says it ok to re-engage. Otherwise I'll respect his decision to lock the thread.

[SayethWhaaaa 245]

S'okay tonight boys, even though you guys do argue like you're married! Just make sure in future that it's a good clean fight, no eye gouging, hair pulling or crying in order to sucker punch. Horsebites and Chinese burns are acceptable, but only in the singular, not repeated applications. Name calling will be allowed, however keep it clean. "Poohead" and "bumface", yay, "[expletive deleted]" and/or "[expletive deleted]" are unacceptable. When the ref tells you to break it up, if not done so immediately, there will be several warning shots fired above the kneecaps. This may also determine the winner after extra time should the need exist.

 

Make it a good one gents

[column5 63]

x2

 

Like we were actually angry with each other? Hell I'm just practicing my pointless uphill battle arguing skills for being in the middle of it for a week in Atlanta!

 

And I wanted to see the reaction to the crazy liberal playing the same card the right loves to.

 

LOL, now you want to hide and say you "wanted to see the reaction." No one buys your crap, you were dead serious and dense as hell in the locked thread.

[+Dave 2,322]

can I answer the fighter question?

 

Sure that is what was peaking my interest to begin with.

[+Typhoid 231]

Sure that is what was peaking my interest to begin with.

 

OK, kinda busy at this particular moment but I will assign some "homework" for all who are interested before I come back and explain that one.

 

first off-

 

go re-read the timeline from the 9/11 Commission report with a chart (map to you (puke) civilians) in front of you and compute flight times, fuel, etc.

 

also recall that there were about a thousand aircraft in the air at that time and;

 

NORAD was entirely dependent upon the FAA being able to;

- identify everyone

- know where the hijacked aircraft were

-tell NORAD where the hijacked aircraft were

 

there is a tendency for people after the fact to assume everyone knew everything at the time that is clear only after the fact. In fact, no one EVER knows the complete, accurate picture of an engagement during the battle, and on that morning what we in NORAD heard from the FAA was;

-grossly innacurate

-to late

-incomplete

(ref the 9/11 Commision report)

 

AFTER the curious do that - frame a specific question and when I get through with the meeting I in later today, I'll try to frame an appropriate response

 

oh, and eraser - I'm not buying what your selling.

[column5 63]

[+Typhoid 231]

continuing.....

 

All of the following is from the 9/11 Commission Report which is available in bookstores and on-line. It provides a consolidated timeline of when information was passed to NEADS to what the fighter responses were. It is clear that information to NORAD was both far too late and inaccurate to be able to provide a defense. Notice of the first aircraft was only minutes from impact and in the case of the last three aircraft, information was received either at the same time or AFTER the aircraft had already crashed or hit their target. I hope this makes clear the questions asked. Typhoid.

 

"That nine minutes’ notice before impact was the

most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings."

 

"The first indication that the

NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came

in a phone call from NewYork Center to NEADS at 9:03.The notice came at

about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower."

 

"The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis

fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding

pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan.They arrived at 9:25 and

established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city. Because the Otis fighters had

expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to

military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned

about refueling. NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley

Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup.The Langley

fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09.137 NORAD had no indication

that any other plane had been hijacked."

 

"In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time

it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking

for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward

the west.Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither

it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers

to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for

36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C."

 

"Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-

130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify

and follow the suspicious aircraft.The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified

it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after

impact, reported to the control tower:“looks like that aircraft crashed into the

Pentagon sir.”"

 

"NORAD heard nothing about the

search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed

reports about a plane that no longer existed:American 11."

 

(my note - NEADS crew commander to the sector commander.)

"Okay, uh,American Airlines is

still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington.

Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now.And I’m gonna

take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find

him."

 

"After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the

order at 9:23:“Okay . . . scramble Langley.Head them towards the Washington

area. . . . f they’re there then we’ll run on them. . . .These guys are smart.”

That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24.

Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to

keep the Otis fighters over NewYork.The heading of the Langley fighters was

adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander

explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between

the reported southbound American 11 and the nation’s capital.

 

At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison,NEADS contacted

the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the

conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS:“We’re looking—

we also lost American 77.”The time was 9:34.151This was the first notice

to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If

NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have

received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although

the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for

military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery

about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington:“Latest report.Aircraft

VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest.

Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.” This startling news

prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control

of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:“Okay,we’re going

to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House.” He then discovered,

to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward

the Baltimore area as instructed,but east over the ocean.“I don’t care how many

windows you break,” he said.“Damn it. . . . Okay.Push them back.”152

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First,

unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target

or the target’s location. Second, a “generic” flight plan—prepared to get the

aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Langley

fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles.Third,

the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan

instruction to go “090 for 60” superseded the original scramble order.153

After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles

from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington,D.C.

Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but “it kind

of faded” over Washington.The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck

by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away"

 

"NEADS first received a call about

United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07.Unaware that

the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s last

known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on

radar because it was already in the ground."

[Viggen 644]

Typhoid, didn't the Otis Eagles head for 090 at first? I heard once that they did. Were Otis and Langley the only fighters scrambled as well?

[tank03 1]

Re: Typhoids post

 

Seems reasonable and believable. I'm quite sure that if there was ANYTHING the folks in uniform could have done, they would have, but there was simply no opportunity as everything was too late/inaccurate.

[+Typhoid 231]

Typhoid, didn't the Otis Eagles head for 090 at first? I heard once that they did. Were Otis and Langley the only fighters scrambled as well?

 

yes. On the initial scramble they had no target. We were completely dependent on the FAA providing a target out of the several thousand airborne over the NE. The FAA had no idea where the 1st hijacked airliner was and could provide no vector or target. Accordingly, the fighters were scrambled to a military airspace holding area waiting for a target.

 

again, from the 9/11 Commission report (recall that the 1st aircraft which these fighters were scrambled for hit the tower at 0846);

 

"F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base.But NEADS

did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing

the fighters pressed for more information:“I don’t know where I’m scrambling

these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.” Because the hijackers had

turned off the plane’s transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes

searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return.American 11 struck

the NorthTower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50,while NEADS personnel were still

trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World

Trade Center.

Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target,

they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island

coast.To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the

fighters were brought down to military airspace to “hold as needed.”From 9:09

to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern."

 

notes-

recall from the earlier post that the first notification to NEADS of the second hijack was at the same minute as the aircraft hit the 2nd tower. So the fighters were then vectored to CAP over Manhattan after the second aircraft had hit its target. In Cheyenne Mountain, the first indication anyone there had of the second hijack was the live video from CNN of the second hit.

 

after the Pentagon was hit, a general scramble order put everything available into the air over North America. That consisted initially of only the alert fighters under NORAD control which was initially 16 over all of CONUS, 2 over all of Canada, and 2 over all of Alaska. Additional fighters were quickly available in Alaska and Canada as we were monitoring a Russian LRA exercise that involved Bears and Blackjacks flying to North American launch points and launching cruise missiles back over the pole towards Russian weapons ranges in a pre-announced exercise. Those aircraft were quickly added to the CAP posture and the Russians very, very quickly cancelled all of their flights after a conference call between the 37th Air Army Commander and the NORAD Commander.

 

within a few hours, we had everything available on CAP and ground alert - about 300 armed CAP. Essentially wings (all services) would call in with "X available" and they would be given alert or CAP assignments with the tasking orders following. The Navy chopped several carriers and cruisers to NORAD TACON so for a time NORAD was operating the 2nd largest Navy, supplied by the 1st largest Navy, which was coordinated by a Canadian Naval Officer on the staff (with some help from a certain retired USN type working as a defense contractor). NORAD also closed the airspace with execution of a standing war emergency plan known as Security Control of Airspace and Navigation Aids (SCATANA) and the Canadian equivelant (ESCAT). This closure of the US airspace was (after the General gave the order) carried out by a Canadian officer (ATC specialist) assigned to the NORAD staff.

 

we maintained an airborne CAP posture around the clock with fighters, tankers and AEW aircraft for several months. I was recalled to the mountain to support the AEW/Tanker desk on the battle staff support team and was on duty the night we took control of NATO AWACS provided to support the US after implementation of provision 5 of the NATO Treaty.

 

a rough time for all of us. We remain on a wartime defense posture.