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Posted

Well perhaps if the USAF didn´t want to use internal jammers, they didn´t bother to add decoy dispensers. Probably a different approach with a bit more emphasis in the strike package concept compared to the USN in wich they didn´t feel like aircraft would have to be on their own. I don´t remember reading about Navy aircraft tasked specifically with deploying chaff screens in Alpha Strikes.

 

Also, it could also be possible that assembling a certain number of airplanes from carriers is more complicated than doing so from ground bases, so if you could have the aircraft able to perform missions such as smaller scale raids you would want to include that specific task to a number of roles like attackers, flak suppresion, EW, escort, TARCAP, reconnaisance, BDA and Iron Hand, in addition to BARCAP, EAW and several other missions wich would be more desirable to be carried out , if neccesary, by the same carrier wing, with a limited number of aircraft.

 

Last but not least, i have the feeling that US naval aviation was more concerned with tactical scenarios than the USAF, since the Navy already left their part of the nuclear deterrence trident mostly to SSBNs. Another example of it would be the different ways the USN used Sidewinders and improved their variants for dogfighting while USAF kept trying to use Falcons until they finally stuck with AIM-9s, or how did the Navy use aircraft wich, while not intentionally, prove useful in CAS while the USAF still had mostly, early in the war F-100s, wich, despite being in the end a beast in CAS, had its issues, spesiay with low speed stability.

 

Now i´m probably wrong with most of what i said, but that would be what I, with my limited knowledge, can guess at best

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Posted

Just going off my own knowledge, but the Navy was leading much of the F-4's early development. The AF trended toward podded ECM systems, vs. internal systems with the USN.

 

Not sure how close I am, but that is what sticks out.

 

-Jeff

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Posted

Well from a practicability standpoint, and the unpredictability of carrier ops (particularly back then when certain classes of ship were extremely limited in the type and weight of aircraft they could launch and recover), I could see why the Navy/USMC would want to limit the amount of "pods" hanging off an aircraft and internalize as many components as the airframe allowed.

Posted

It may have had to do with pushing from the higher echelons of NAVAIR to get as many internal ECM/expendable CMs as possible, too.  RAdm Gillcrist mentioned that in November 1973, the CNO's Electronic Warfare Program included plans to install all compatible strike, fighter and support aircraft with ALR-45/50 (RHAW), ALQ-126 (Jammer) and ALE-29A/39 (chaff/flare expendable) systems.  This was largely after the air campaign in Vietnam, but it wouldn't surprise me if earlier policy existed pushing for internal expendables installed on Navy tactical aircraft given the SAM and AAA threat over Vietnam.

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