Question: Cold War fighters: Internal Jammers

[GalmOne 1]

So I've read that planes like the F-14, F-15, Su-27 and MiG-29C/S all had internal jamming systems. But just how effective are these jammers?

 

Of course, one would have to look at which radar system vs which jamming system, but say the most powerful radar here (AWG-9 of the Tomcat or APG-63 of the Eagle) was to burn through the best internal jamming system of any fighter of the period lasting until 1991. Would an F-14/15 have to fly WVR just to burn through?

 

Also, did the F-16 ever have an internal jammer with any country at this time? I mean, it was a good plane, why did the USAF not invest for an internal jammer? A book I have called "Jet Fighters: Inside Out" by Jim Winchester shows a schematic of an F-16C (probably a blk 50/52) with a "rear ECM antenna fairing" located in the very aft end of the fin pedestal. Normally, foreign users of the F-16 have extended pedestals for ECM or chutes, though the schematic in the book as the short pedestal. Below I have a picture of that page (look at the part labeled 140). Wiki also states that the MSIP for the F-16A blk 15 had "internal ECM" but of course, Wiki is not reliable.

 

Edited August 30, 2011 by GalmOne

[+streakeagle 867]

ECM effectiveness is for the most part classified. This works out great for games since they can adjust ECM effectiveness to improve gameplay.

The F-16 did not have extra space for ECM, it was designed to be small and cheap, so it has to either rely on pods, remove something useful to get internal ECM, and/or add bulges to squeeze in more stuff.

Noise jamming is tough to counter, but requires powerful systems to be useful. EA-6s and EF-111s were the only fighter sized aircraft able to really do this to any useful effect. Of course, the source of such jamming becomes an HOJ magnet, so they need to stand off a bit and have a barrier CAP protecting them.

Deceptive jamming is far more practical, but requires knowledge of threat systems to get it right. The early jammers carried by U-2s were effective against the US theory of missile guidance, but didn't do much other than possibly help Soviet SAMs home in on them.

 

I would love to see real world test results on the effectiveness of various jammers, flares, and chaff on all the different radars and missiles.

 

I was a submarine sonar tech, and we had equivalent systems for jamming/decoying sonars and torpedoes. Despite having extensive training and Top Secret clearances, I still have no idea just how effective those systems would have been in actual combat. I don't think there has ever been all-out air combat that would force the US and Soviet Union to compromise their state-of-the-art technology by actually using it to the full extent. Vietnam would have great data on older systems vs SA-2. Israeli conflicts is the only place where you might get good data, and even then, it would be good for their own systems, not evaluating front line US and USSR/Russian systems.

 

An absolutely important question... with no really useful answer possible.

[Derk 265]

The Belgian F16's have Carapace, an internal ECM system mounted in the tailbase (where others put the dragchute)

 

Houdoe,

 

Derk

[+daddyairplanes 10,127]

most USAF tactical fighters as general design philosophy do not use internal jammers but bolt on pods instead. i believe this has only changed with the Mud Hen(F-15E). the US Navy and various other world airforces took different lessons away from VietNam and the Arab-Isreali '73 rematch and mounted internally as space and tech allowed.

[Caesar 305]

Ditto to what StreakEagle said. You can get bits and pieces on the unclassified side on jamming; historic information on how effective it may have been in this circumstance or that, that x system was designed to work in a electronically jammed environment, basic information on the physics behind ECM, etc., but actual effectiveness, TTP's, studies, etc. are pretty much limited to the classified side.

[Faust_ 1]

The F-16 did not have extra space for ECM

 

in fact, the F-16C has a specific empty space to carry a internal jammer in the base of the tailfin, which was widened to carry the jammer, and the UHF antenna "faired" in the A model was replaced with a external blade UHF antenna, in fact, that is one of the most easy recognition feature between a late A-model and one early C-model.

 

the USAF finally didn't put a internal jammer into the C-model because of cost matters, but the new built C-models for export, (block 50+ onward) carry internal jammers.

 

much of the non-specialized publications, or most common in older ones, they mistake (no wrongly) the concept between ECM equipment and ESM equipment, so is frequent to classify a RWR-antennae as a ECM-antennae

 

PS: that "ECM-antenna fairing" indicated in the schematics, is in fact, the rear RWR receiver antenna.

Edited August 30, 2011 by Faust_

[Faust_ 1]

and the specific question of the thread...

 

the effectiveness of internal (and external) jammers is a topics of utilization, most of the "internal" jammers is in fact, versions of external podded jammers.

 

and in fact, the podded external jammers were really derivatives of early internal jammers.

 

but those early internal jammers (along with others countermeasures like chaff and decoys) were put in (big) bombers to confuse primarily early warning and surveillance radars and then fire control radars of AAA batteries...

 

with the advent of the SAMs, the need to spoof them was a new task of jammers in bombers and strike aircrafts.

 

the ECM/ESM features were for much time a aid to allow bombers and strike aircraft to "get through" the enemy air defenses ( which were formed of EW radars, Fire control radard and airborne interception radar of interceptors aircraft).

 

those air defenses were far less complicated in the front lines, the natural space of tactical aircrafts, so the need of protection that allow them to "get through" weren't so acute.

 

the evolution of the air warfare, that brings more and better air defenses in the front lines, and the increment of usage of tactical aircraft into well defended enemy space, demanded the utilization of jammers and countermeasures to assure mission sucess and survival.

 

the last evolution of the air warfare show the generalization of the BVR combat capabilities in fighters, so the jammers now is a "must" in any mission, no a "option" as it was in the past.

[+WhiteBoySamurai 1,094]

the last evolution of the air warfare show the generalization of the BVR combat capabilities in fighters, so the jammers now is a "must" in any mission, no a "option" as it was in the past.

 

This is a very good point. The only time ECM is not an absolute necessity in modern warfare is if the enemy has absolutely no fighters and no radar-guided SAMs.

Even then, I think of ECM like a prophylactic: I'd rather have one and not need it than need one and not have it.

 

Speaking of the Viper, though, I was reasonably sure that (at least some) USAF F-16C Blk50/52 had an internal AN/ALQ-178, as do the ones that went to Turkey. Perhaps I am mistaken, but why would the US provide only foreign nations with such a system while leaving the USAF's own planes stuck using fat, draggy pods that take up a drop tank slot?

[Lexx_Luthor 57]

Interesting Faust thanks.

 

I got Alfred Price's The History of U. S. Electronic Warfare, Vol. 2: The Renaissance Years, 1946 to 1964 , focusing on SAC vs PVO, but with other things like that moon reflection project. Amazing stuff. Anyways, the early boxes were built, or conceptualized, to fit into B-50s B-47s and larger planes, and the AF called out for, and Industry tried to build, nightmare complex systems .... kinda reminds me of the B-36 auto gunner stations (except the tail gun) that never got worked out. If there were a shooting war, a long one, with crew losses like 8th AAF in 1943, I tend to think lots of this stuff would have been worked out, faster, and with less complexity....but with more emergency funding of course.

 

I read a book once, maybe about astronauts or something, I don't recall. But, fighter test pilots hated flying electronic warfare tests until about 1965, after which EW testing became the hot career move, or something like that. When names start getting erased off the board, things start getting done. RAF Bomber Command wrote way too many names off their night bomber crews, so they got that electronic war thing figured out -- big time. I'm working a SF strategic campaign, over the pole thing, and this a hot war possibly dragging for two decades covering all the "nifty" classic airplanes yet in a tragic and Haldeman~esque story of loss, I assume a corresponding real EW situation would have developed wildly different than what happened in the real thing cold war -- like RAF and Luftwaffe did, develop effective, useful, responses quickly (along with some duds of course).

[GalmOne 1]

Thanks for the answers everyone. I was snooping around tonnes of Jane's books on electronic warfare but to no avail. No figures or numbers are really available and I'm not surprised. Hey, Lexx, does your campaign include the Avro Arrow interceptor? Hah, I'm kidding. I wish it had been fielded though.

 

This is a very good point. The only time ECM is not an absolute necessity in modern warfare is if the enemy has absolutely no fighters and no radar-guided SAMs.

Even then, I think of ECM like a prophylactic: I'd rather have one and not need it than need one and not have it.

 

Speaking of the Viper, though, I was reasonably sure that (at least some) USAF F-16C Blk50/52 had an internal AN/ALQ-178, as do the ones that went to Turkey. Perhaps I am mistaken, but why would the US provide only foreign nations with such a system while leaving the USAF's own planes stuck using fat, draggy pods that take up a drop tank slot?

 

But back on topic. For one thing, the F-16 was never the main staple fighter of the USAF. The F-15 was, so focusing on making it better or building more of it made sense. Also, ECM pods seem to cover more aspects of the aircraft than an internal jammer, particularly in the downward aspect where SAMs could get you. Since the F-15 was the primary air-to-air fighter, it made sense that the cheaper, smaller and mostly "secondary" fighter - the F-16 - be made into the multirole fighter/fighter-bomber. Additionally, there are dedicated jamming aircraft like the EA-6 or EF-111; both of which can be deployed in numbers with F-15's to secure air superiority while the F-16's can sweep in later and do mud-moving or WVR fighting with what's left of the enemy. At least, that's what I would assume. Remember, by this time, Air Command changed into something totally different and more organized than what it was in Vietnam. They worked more as a team than as fighters and bombers being on separate ones.

 

By the way Faust, what you said about the F-16C's having that internal space for a jammer but never actually getting one is pretty lame. I mean, might as well have just put in a similar internal jammer that the F-15 used, but I guess it's not that easy. In terms of BVR combat (pre-AMRAAM), how would something like an F-16C sneak up on something like, say, an F-15? I'm quite sure the only way for the little fighter to win in such an exercise is to fight WVR. But with no internal jammer of its own, could it win? I ask this because if an F-16 can somehow beat an F-15, it should have no problem fighting something like an Su-27 (also equipped with an internal - albeit rear-facing - jammer). Also, I remembered reading one time that an F-16 managed to lock up and "shoot down" an F-22 in a simulated combat exercise, but was "shot down" itself.

Edited August 30, 2011 by GalmOne

[busdriver 35]

But back on topic. For one thing, the F-16 was never the main staple fighter of the USAF. The F-15 was, so focusing on making it better or building more of it made sense. Also, ECM pods seem to cover more aspects of the aircraft than an internal jammer, particularly in the downward aspect where SAMs could get you. Since the F-15 was the primary air-to-air fighter, it made sense that the cheaper, smaller and mostly "secondary" fighter - the F-16 - be made into the multirole fighter/fighter-bomber. Additionally, there are dedicated jamming aircraft like the EA-6 or EF-111; both of which can be deployed in numbers with F-15's to secure air superiority while the F-16's can sweep in later and do mud-moving or WVR fighting with what's left of the enemy. At least, that's what I would assume. Remember, by this time, Air Command changed into something totally different and more organized than what it was in Vietnam. They worked more as a team than as fighters and bombers being on separate ones.

 

LOL...as a guy that flew A model Vipers in the 80s I have a different POV than your assertion the F-16 was a secondary fighter. I was also what was called an Electronic Combat Pilot (poor man's EWO) in my sqdn. There was nothing in our mind set or training about waiting for the Eagles to clear the skies of bad guys for us. Oh, indeed that would be the preferred option. But we planned/trained to be self sufficient.

 

In terms of BVR combat (pre-AMRAAM), how would something like an F-16C sneak up on something like, say, an F-15? I'm quite sure the only way for the little fighter to win in such an exercise is to fight WVR. But with no internal jammer of its own, could it win?

Sneak up? I had a co-worker that was a ANG F-4D driver that snuck up on a flight of two Eagles. I did sneak up on a pair at low altitude in Germany during REFORGER, but I was in an unarmed RF-4C. I never snuck up on an Eagle during DACT. But we knew how to exploit a "feature" in their radar to arrive at the merge alive. It was energy depleting, it was risky (die pre-merge or arrive without a tally...poor SA).

[GalmOne 1]

LOL...as a guy that flew A model Vipers in the 80s I have a different POV than your assertion the F-16 was a secondary fighter. I was also what was called an Electronic Combat Pilot (poor man's EWO) in my sqdn. There was nothing in our mind set or training about waiting for the Eagles to clear the skies of bad guys for us. Oh, indeed that would be the preferred option. But we planned/trained to be self sufficient.

 

 

Sneak up? I had a co-worker that was a ANG F-4D driver that snuck up on a flight of two Eagles. I did sneak up on a pair at low altitude in Germany during REFORGER, but I was in an unarmed RF-4C. I never snuck up on an Eagle during DACT. But we knew how to exploit a "feature" in their radar to arrive at the merge alive. It was energy depleting, it was risky (die pre-merge or arrive without a tally...poor SA).

 

Oh man, I didn't mean to offend. That was just what I've come to think.

 

I hope I can get an answer when I ask: what is this special "feature" that you exploited? Is there anything unique about the Viper that makes this "move" easier for the F-16 than other planes (like the Phantom II you mentioned)?

Edited August 30, 2011 by GalmOne

[Faust_ 1]

By the way Faust, what you said about the F-16C's having that internal space for a jammer but never actually getting one is pretty lame. I mean, might as well have just put in a similar internal jammer that the F-15 used, but I guess it's not that easy. In terms of BVR combat (pre-AMRAAM), how would something like an F-16C sneak up on something like, say, an F-15? I'm quite sure the only way for the little fighter to win in such an exercise is to fight WVR. But with no internal jammer of its own, could it win? I ask this because if an F-16 can somehow beat an F-15, it should have no problem fighting something like an Su-27 (also equipped with an internal - albeit rear-facing - jammer). Also, I remembered reading one time that an F-16 managed to lock up and "shoot down" an F-22 in a simulated combat exercise, but was "shot down" itself.

 

well, that's reality:

 

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions_article5.html

 

"Externally, the F-16C is almost identical to the F-16A. The only significant external difference is the introduction on the F-16C of an enlarged triangular base or "island" on the rear fuselage leading up to the vertical fin, with a small blade antenna protruding upward from it. This extra space was originally intended to house the Westinghouse/ITT AN/ALQ-165 ASPJ (Airborne Self-Protection Jammer) that is used on Navy aircraft. The USAFs ASPJ program became mired in controversy in 1989-90, followed by the USAF's withdrawal from the project in January 1990. As a result, the ASPJ was never fitted in USAF F-16s."

 

remember that the USAF F-16s use the external podded ALQ-131 full mating with the ALR-56M and the ALE-40/42 to electronic protection , a similar funtionality that, for example, the F-15E with his full integrated all-internal TEWS, so, in case of any menace (enemy fighters with BVR capability or SAMs) they hang-up theirs pods, even the F-16CJ (F-16C block50/52) that is the premier SEAD platform in the USAF.

 

but a close support mission of friendly troops on ground, without any perceived menace, they simply fly without any ECM pod (as A-10 does in the same scenarios like iraq and afganistan) making it a little less expensive such missions.

 

also remember one thing: the USAF have other type of planes for demanding missions (F-15C, F-15E, before the F-117s and now the F-22, soon the F-35, B-1, B-52, B-2) and don't forget the navy planes (EA-6, F-18s) but other countries, like Poland, Chile, Turkey, the UAE and so on, the F-16 is one or the best plane that they had, so put in intenal jammers (and other enhancement like CFT or internal targeting system) in their F-16s is worth it.

 

 

and don't forget another fact, a lot planes out there have no internal or ever external ECM pods, especially those that may be confronted with the US, even in the cold war, just a bunch of soviet MiG-29s were equipped with the gardenya internal ECM pod, and the Su-27 uses the external sorbtsiya ECM pod

 

have a good day to everyone!

[busdriver 35]

Oh man, I didn't mean to offend. That was just what I've come to think.

Absolutely positively...no worries...I was not offended. Eagle guys said much worse.

I hope I can get an answer when I ask: what is this special "feature" that you exploited? Is there anything unique about the Viper that makes this "move" easier for the F-16 than other planes (like the Phantom II you mentioned)?

As to the first part...I suspect it has been corrected. I would hope it has been fixed. To get an idea, albeit as a simmer, this might help . In regards to why it was easier for the F-16, IMO it's the wide range of speeds for corner velocity (think maneuverablity and nose authority). The F-18 excels in this regard also. I felt quite comfortable at the merge vs an F-15 (if I wasn't hauling two external tanks). For me the F-18 was a more difficult opponent...when you get really slow the Hornet has better nose authority (bastiges). The Eagle excels BVR no doubt about it.

 

Way back during my time in the ROK, many anticipated scenarios had the Eagles from Kadena showing up for "two weeks" (killing all the NKAF) then going back to Kadena. That left USAF F-4s (2 sqdns dual tasked A-A & A-G), A-10s (1 sqdn), F-16s (2 sqdns), OV-10s (1 sqdn) and a bunch of ROKAF F-5s and F-4s to conduct the air-land battle. Plus there were 2 F-4 sqdns down at Clark in the PI as reinforcements.

[busdriver 35]

GalmOne here's a better discussion from 2002. Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time' It mentions the tactic at the time was 20 years old...go figure. So maybe it has not been fixed.

[MigBuster 2,884]

GalmOne here's a better discussion from 2002. Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time' It mentions the tactic at the time was 20 years old...go figure. So maybe it has not been fixed.

 

 

This was probably down to limitations of radar tech (mechanically steered) and processing power - there is nothing but chatter to state tricks like these have been tried against the F-22 AESA APG-71 in exercises by aggressors and do not work any more - nothing concrete.

 

Did those F-15Cs still have the older APG-63 non AESA sets?

 

Problem is they never reveal other factors in exercises that may totally influence the outcome!!

[GalmOne 1]

Thanks, busdriver, I remember reading that LOMAC thread as well as that second article. During the Cold War, I'm sure the F-15C's clutter notch would have still been exploitable. Perhaps this has been minimized by the APG-63(V)1, but that's all post-1991. I suppose if you use a jammer pod like the APQ-184 or something, you can significantly reduce the chances of getting locked-onto. The only problem then is the added weight and drag as mentioned earlier. The question now is, if you carry a jammer like that (on the F-16C since every other fighter has its own internal jammer), how badly will it impact your maneuverability when the fight gets WVR?

 

 

This was probably down to limitations of radar tech (mechanically steered) and processing power - there is nothing but chatter to state tricks like these have been tried against the F-22 AESA APG-71 in exercises by aggressors and do not work any more - nothing concrete.

 

Did those F-15Cs still have the older APG-63 non AESA sets?

 

Problem is they never reveal other factors in exercises that may totally influence the outcome!!

 

 

Yes, MigBuster, the F-15C's in the mentioned exercise were equipped with APG-63 or APG-70 Doppler shift mechanically-scanned array radar sets. At his time VERY few F-15C's had the APG-63(V)2 AESA set which was just installed on a single F-15C one year earlier. There's no way you could trick an AESA-equipped fighter with this kind of maneuver.

Edited August 30, 2011 by GalmOne

[MigBuster 2,884]

In regards to why it was easier for the F-16, IMO.......

 

Discussion ties in with this:

 

As the F–16 weapons school labored to get started, another squadron at Nellis,

the 422d Test Squadron, was conducting a test that was a fighter pilot’s dream.

The main purpose of the test was to investigate ways to reduce the radar cross

section of the F–16. Radar cross section, or RCS, is the amount of radar energy

an airplane reflects to a tracking radar. The more it reflects, the larger its RCS.

An airplane with a large RCS can be tracked from farther away, and more accurately,

than one with a smaller RCS. The test would compare different techniques

for reducing the F–16’s RCS against a variety of radar systems. This meant that

the F–16 pilots would fly against the pulse radar of the F–4 and the pulse doppler

radar on the F–15, over some 200 test missions. For the Eagle, Phantom, and

Viper pilots in the 422d, it was heaven. It was a license to fly unlimited A/A

against one another in every conceivable scenario: two Eagles against two Vipers,

four against two, four against four, two F–16s against four F–4s, and so on. Every

mission was flown on ACMI to document performance, or lack of it. The F–16s

always had to fight against an equal or greater number of adversaries; they were

never allowed to outnumber the opponents.

Although the test parameters were set, the pilots, like the AIMVAL-ACEVAL

pilots, had considerable latitude in selecting and devising tactics. The considerations

boiled down to a few key facts. The F–4s and F–15s could shoot their

radar-guided Sparrows well beyond visual range. The F–16 had neither a radar

missile, nor a radar as powerful as the others did. Therefore, the F–4 and F–15

could not only see the Vipers first, they could also shoot at them first. Also, the

new Sparrows, the AIM–7F, on the F–15 were proving to be very accurate and

reliable in shots against drones. In effect, “the F–15 was playing a whole new ball

game, and they got to write the rules.”9

Without doubt, the pilots who would fly in the test were some of the best in

the Air Force. The 422d commander, Lt. Col. Joe Merrick, had commanded the

Multinational Operational Test and Evaluation of the F–16 at Hill Air Force Base

before taking over leadership of the 422d, and he immediately surrounded himself

with the best pilots he could find. Most, if not all, were combat veterans, and

all were weapons school graduates.10

The F–16 pilots immediately started to look for ways to survive to the merge.

They drew on the lessons learned a few years earlier by the AIMVAL-ACEVAL Air

Force pilots who had found themselves in the same situation. They studied the

F–15 radar and the Sparrow missile and found some small vulnerabilities, which

they exploited. It took perfect timing and pilotage, but if they could confuse the

Eagle and Phantom pilots and get one or two Vipers to the merge, they could fight

on F–16 terms. Of course, the Eagle and Phantom pilots immediately developed

techniques that countered the tactics of the F–16s, and another cycle of countering

the counter to the counter began. The stakes were high. Everyone knew that the

Soviets were equipping their fighters with missiles similar to the Sparrow and

Sidewinder. The days of U.S. pilots having the only effective radar missile in the

battle were long gone, and the F–16 pilots had no radar missile at all. Blithely flying

straight into the merge from twenty miles away was a sure recipe for disaster.

The competition was intense. One day a pilot brought a rubber chicken, the

kind used in slapstick comedy, to the squadron, and he and his buddies stuck into

the silly, limp carcass a host of small plastic models of A/A missiles. The next

day they hung the bird over the entrance door to the flight room of the guys who

had lost the fight. The day after that it reappeared over the door of that day’s

losers. No one wanted it, and the pilots studied hard, flew hard, and schemed hard

to avoid seeing it show up at their door. From this atmosphere of intense competition

in Merrick’s squadron emerged a new tactical term: all-aspect missile

defense (AAMD). As pilots of each of the fighter models learned ways to survive—

and kill—in the all-aspect missile environment of the Sparrows and

Sidewinders, they spread the word throughout the weapons school. Students then

took the new tactics back to their home units. Within five years, all Air Force

fighter squadrons were using AAMD as part of their daily training routine. As

they honed their skills to employ their own “face shooters,” they also learned how

to survive ones fired at them.11

Work done in the 422d Test Squadron was not totally original. Those who were

there are the first to say that AAMD developed over several years and carried the

fingerprints of dozens of great fighter pilots.12 Aggressors had been defending

themselves against all-aspect missiles for years, and the AIMVAL-ACEVAL

pilots brought the tactics to an even higher level. Yet several factors converged in

the early 1980s that made AAMD vital to the newest generation of fighter pilots.

First, the missiles were becoming more credible every day as the WSEP results

revealed superb missile accuracy and reliability. Second, the new HUDs and fire

control computers showed exact launch parameters, helping pilots know exactly

where they were within the missile’s capability to hit the target. Additionally, the

Soviets were fielding a new generation of missiles as good as—some thought

better than—the Americans, giving the development of an effective AAMD added

urgency. Finally, dissimilar air combat training, testing, and evaluation had

matured to the point that every pilot had the opportunity to fight often against different

aircraft. A feeling started to grow within the Air Force fighter community

that if an F–16 pilot could beat an F–15, or an F–15 could beat a Navy Tomcat,

then when the next war came, the enemy would be dead meat.

By 1984 the most striking change in the battle arena was how much technological

changes had expanded the air-to-air battle space. Ten years earlier, F–4

pilots had struggled mightily to get radar contacts and tried to take the first shot

with a questionable radar missile. The main focus for the Phantom drivers, however,

was to get to position from which they could visually engage and kill the

bulk of the targets. In the mid-1980s, the F–15 could see fighter-size targets over

fifty miles away and start to jockey for the first shot. Even the small radar on the

Viper could see targets beyond twenty miles. The new jets were maneuvering at

vastly extended ranges based on the information from their radars.13 “The tactics

development from all that shucking and jiving made everybody learn.”14

[MigBuster 2,884]

The question now is, if you carry a jammer like that (on the F-16C since every other fighter has its own internal jammer), how badly will it impact your maneuverability when the fight gets WVR?

 

 

Assuming its on the centreline it still has to impose a drag and weight penalty - but that still might be negligible against exercise opponents like the F-15A/F-14A

[GalmOne 1]

Assuming its on the centreline it still has to impose a drag and weight penalty - but that still might be negligible against exercise opponents like the F-15A/F-14A

 

Well that's what I'm assuming. It's WAY smaller, lighter and slender than a DT, so I guess that makes sense. Also, where did you get that excerpt on AAMD from? I want to see the RCS reductions/merge-finding results for the Vipers. It looks to be a good read.

[Caesar 305]

Not to be the one to pull the OPSEC flag here, but the majority of modern aircraft's RCS modelling, reductions and intel are classified. Might not be the best place to start posting on that topic.

Edited August 30, 2011 by Caesar

[MigBuster 2,884]

Not to be the one to pull the OPSEC flag here, but the majority of modern aircraft's RCS modelling, reductions and intel are classified. Might not be the best place to start posting on that topic.

 

 

The only person who can post such information not in the public domain is Busdriver - but pretty sure he wont be, so I dont think you have too much to worry about.

[Caesar 305]

The only person who can post such information not in the public domain is Busdriver - but pretty sure he wont be, so I dont think you have too much to worry about.

 

[MigBuster 2,884]

Well that's what I'm assuming. It's WAY smaller, lighter and slender than a DT, so I guess that makes sense. Also, where did you get that excerpt on AAMD from? I want to see the RCS reductions/merge-finding results for the Vipers. It looks to be a good read.

 

 

No crikey it has no classified info in it.

 

Its called Sierra Hotel (Flying Air Force Fighters in the decade after vietnam) by a ex Pilot C. R. Anderegg

 

I particularly like this bit:

 

Throughout the book I have attributed credit where it is due. However, many

statements in the book are my own. For example, in the last chapter I write that

the F–16 is a better day, visual dogfighter than the F–15. F–15 pilots who read

that statement will howl with anger. Sorry, Eagle pilots, but I flew the F–15 for

over ten years, and that’s the way I see it. (Fighter pilots are not happy unless they

are stirring the pot.)

 

 

 

 

And Ceasar will like this bit:

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied are solely

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force

History and Museums Program, the United States Air Force, the Department of

Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Edited August 30, 2011 by MigBuster

[Caesar 305]

Don't have a problem with what you're quoting, MB, and it sounds like a good read, and I know that general discussions on characteristics about ECM are fine (own a few books with that subject discussed myself). The thing I was/am concerned about is that once you get into the technical aspects (how it works operationally, reductions to RCS tied to an airframe, etc), you get onto the high side very quickly. I guess you could just call me a bit paranoid is all.