USS Fitzgerald, Sorry girls.

[Fubar512 1,350]

If any one here would know the answer it would be Typhoid and Fubar!

 

Thanks for your clarifications!

It's in the "Rules of the Road" module of the CG Master's exam.  The minimum passing grade for that module is a 90, for obvious reasons. The other modules (the minimum passing grade for them is 70) are deck general, navigation general, and what they now refer to as "plotting".

 

When I took a prep course for my master's ticket back in the dark old days of the 1980s, one of my fellow students, a middle-aged lady who was an attorney by trade, commented that it seemed every bit as hard as passing a bar exam...LOL

Edited June 19, 2017 by Fubar512

[+Erik 1,731]

The latest update I read is the cargo ship was on autopilot with nobody manning the helm. The accident occurred at 01:30 AM an hour earlier than previously stated. The US Navy has yet to clarify their reported time of 02:30 AM. It is understandable that notification was delayed due to the all hands on deck muster required immediately following the impact. The cargo ship being on auto-pilot returned to course after almost coming to a complete stop after impact and only 30 minutes later once a damage assessment had concluded did they make a u-turn to find out what they hit. Upon arriving at the badly damaged USS Fitzgerald at 02:30 AM an hour after the collision did both vessels decide to call this in to the Japanese Coast Guard. The utter chaos that ensued on the Fitzgerald immediately after the compartments were ruptured just above the keel must have been an incredible scene. My hat goes off to the Navy sailors who risked everything to keep the Fitzgerald afloat when all odds were against them. It is also reported that a vessel should never be struck on the starboard side as it is common maritime law that the ship giving way should have been the Fitzgerald because of it's position to the impending traffic. I expect that a very close review of the duty logs and crew of that Mid Watch manning the Fitzgerald wheel house will be closely examined as a special JAG investigation is underway. The loss of life is the most important factor here and to those men and their families my sincerest condolences and grateful appreciation of their service for the United States of America. 

[+Typhoid 231]

That does seem to track with the other info available so far.

 

I've seen both a speed log and course log (AIS source) of the container ship that is consistent with the above.

[+Erik 1,731]

 

The green track is the position reported by the ACX Crystal. Red star is where the incident occurred approximately but you can clearly see the track sharply move right and then again back left to an on course position accounting for the auto pilot.

 

This is very similar to an accident that happened in 2012. Notice the almost exact same strike location on the starboard side. You'd think those Raytheon radar array panels were targets.

 

 

Damage to the USS Porter after colliding with a supertanker in the Persian Gulf in August 2012. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jonathan Sunderman/Released)

 

On August 12, 2012, the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Porter collided with a Mitsui OSK Lines’ supertanker M/T Otowasan near the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.  The collision tore a 3 by 3 meter (9.8 ft — 9.8 ft) hole in the starboard side of the destroyer, forcing it to Jebel Ali, Dubai for repairs. No one was injured however.

 

The ship’s captain, Cmdr. Martin Arriola, was subsequently relieved of command and replaced by Cmdr. Dave Richardson. On 12 October 2012, the Porter rejoined Carrier Strike Group Twelve for its transit through the Suez Canal following extensive repairs to the ship.

 

Below is the audio soundtrack from the bridge. Be prepared for something that will make most sailors blow a gasket. At the end of the track you'll hear one of the crew announce the strike location.

 

https://soundcloud.com/the-virginian-pilot/audio-from-the-guided-missile-destroyer-porters-collision-in-the-strait-of-hormuz

[+CrazyhorseB34 937]

Maybe you are on to something....

 

Zero crap....

 

Zombie ship on auto pilot hits warship on full watch.....

 

The USS Porter affair not same thing.

 

Listen to the audio.... Porters' Skipper obviously was an idiot.

Edited June 21, 2017 by CrazyhorseB34

[+CrazyhorseB34 937]

What Navy Officer Says..."go left...." four times.

 

[+Typhoid 231]

He says "left full rudder"

 

Standard terminology used on USN ships.

 

It does sound like quite the cluster ......

 

And they didn't sound Collision until after the collision too.

 

I suspect we'll eventually hear something similar from the Fitz, although without bothering to call the Captain until after they ran his cabin into the bow of the other ship.

 

I definitely get a "what the Hell were they smoking on the bridge" feeling as more info dribbles out

[+Erik 1,731]

That audio clip sounded like a young crew. Listening to the helm explain himself over and over like he was 12 was astonishing. Maybe he should be driving a dinghy and not a 1.5 billion dollar destroyer. He knew he was in over his head when he cried to slow to 5 knots which if he hadn't done that maybe they'd have cleared the tanker which was probably gauging his position and speed on the destroyers until it slowed abruptly. I would have hoped these kids would have had better training. Lack of experience and sheer terror of his duties was ultimately the captain's responsibility. It's no surprise he lost his command.

 

The Fitzgerald's Captain was bunked up for the night and the accident impacted his sleeping quarters which is why they airlifted him off the boat. So those poor guys not only harpooned themselves on one of the biggest boats in the ocean but almost killed the captain in the process. There's probably a few bad reviews in that crew's immediate future. We should do better that's a fact and if the President doesn't have the top brass of the Navy sitting in his office right now he's absent on the job.

 

Don't get me wrong I'm proud of these kids but if we don't give them the training, knowledge, and experience it's our own damn fault if half our total fleet ends up beached and broken somewhere.

[charlielima 328]

Left rudder ?

US Navy ships don't have a port side or direction anymore ?

CL

Edited June 22, 2017 by charlielima

[+Typhoid 231]

Left rudder ?

US Navy ships don't have a port side or direction anymore ?

CL

 

of course.  but standard rudder orders in the USN bridge crews are for "Left" and "Right"

 

don't ask me why

[charlielima 328]

of course.  but standard rudder orders in the USN bridge crews are for "Left" and "Right"

 

don't ask me why

 

TY. I have zero time on a smallboy's bridge.

I wonder how "crowded" or "messy" the radar screen was with emissions and returns for both ships ?

CL

[JediMaster 451]

That makes sense. While the sides of the ship are port and starboard, and you might give an order for the ship to go hard to port, the rudder is the target of the order here.

 

"Full left rudder" makes more sense than "full port rudder." Saying something like "swing to port, bearing 120 degrees" is one thing as it gives a final result without regard to how you get there (speed of turn).

"Left rudder 15 degrees, come to bearing 120" dictates both final heading and also how quickly you want the turn to occur, and "full left rudder, come to 120" means you want to get there FAST.

 

In other words, port and starboard refer to the ship, not other objects. The port side of your cabin is the side of the cabin that's on the ship's port, not the left side of the cabin as when you enter it. The table inside has a left side, not a port side.

[Fubar512 1,350]

TY. I have zero time on a smallboy's bridge.

I wonder how "crowded" or "messy" the radar screen was with emissions and returns for both ships ?

CL

 

In my experience, not very messy. While one often does see a series of "pacmen" (small dots) appear to randomly propagate across the display from a radar-equipped target, I've never seen it interfere with determining the range or the relative bearing of said target.

 

And, from what I've seen, the Crystal's AIS set was functioning at the time of the collision, so the Fitzgerald would have known its heading, speed, and vessel name, and that it was a "dangerous target" (meaning that it was on a collision course), from the AIS tag that would have appeared on their navigation radar.

 

For those of you who do not know what AIS is, here's a wiki page on it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_identification_system

[+Typhoid 231]

Of course one of the questions to be answered is whether the Fitz watch team was monitoring the AIS.

[Fubar512 1,350]

Of course one of the questions to be answered is whether the Fitz watch team was monitoring the AIS.

Commercial radar sets often integrate AIS onto the display, along with target data tags.  For example, this is a Furuno FAR series display. Note the AIS target data on the right side.

 

Edited June 23, 2017 by Fubar512

[+Erik 1,731]

https://dcs.megaphone.fm/BUR6679441634.mp3?key=276747d6095168c8d13dc8b20bdfcfd8

[+Typhoid 231]

Commercial radar sets often integrate AIS onto the display, along with target data tags. For example, this is a Furuno FAR series display. Note the AIS target data on the right side.

 

Back when I was still gainfully employed, one of my tasks was integrating various maritime info feeds into NORAD including the AIS data. So there is no question that the capability to do that is possible. But whether the Fitz crew was monitoring that info is the question.

 

The more info that is coming out, the more it sounds as if the Fitz bridge watch failed.

[+Erik 1,731]

We know it was one of two causes; faulty equipment on the Fitzgerald or dereliction of duty by the mid-watch. Nobody has reported that prior to the collision there was faulty gear and if there was the Fitzgerald should have posted manned lookouts. The Fitzgerald is nothing but radar gear so failure would mean a complete failure of multiple systems on multiple platforms when no loss of electrical power existed. If I have to use Occam's Razor to examine these two causes it looks more and more like the crew on the Fitzgerald. So I have to agree the bridge watch failed and failed on multiple levels of redundancy. This conclusion is disturbing to say the least.

[Skyviper 1,101]

Stupid questions here:

 

This thread has been very informative and I'm learning a lot.

 

Okay so you're saying the Fitzgerald had a faulty watch. Okay.

 

But didn't the cargo ship have no watch? Weren't they all asleep? I thought someone had to keep watch at all times and being asleep brought hefty fines, etc.

 

Like I said stupid questions. If I missed something I'll gladly re-read it to better educate myself.

[+Erik 1,731]

The abundance of caution entering and exiting choke points like the area of the accident would be to have a manned bridge at all times. However the entire crew of the container ship was probably no more than twenty and at that hour it is possible that only a few crew members were responsible for the entire oversight of the vessel that was on autopilot, a common practice for these types of merchant vessels. It is speculated that the bridge of the Crystal was unmanned or the crew was doing other duties during that shift and wasn't 100% attentive to obstacle avoidance. This common practice may change after this accident. I have not read anywhere that the Fitzgerald heard collision warning horns nor were they contacted by radio communication from the Crystal. It is also unknown if the Fitzgerald even knew of the impending collision and what actions they took if any. It is hard to believe that they knew or knew with enough warning to do anything. In the dark of night it is likely the first warning they had was the sight of the bow of the Crystal coming out of the darkness in almost silence. Both bridges were at fault for collision avoidance but more so the Fitzgerald because it had an active mid-watch that included not only crew on the bridge but crew in the CIC below deck manning the many radar detection devices. 

 

To answer you question directly it is a common practice to leave the navigation to the autopilot on these large oceanic vessels. The ACX Crystal was most likely in this state of operation when the accident occurred.

 

There is a pretty full review of all the AIS data and some common sense speculation here: http://www.vesselofinterest.com/2017/06/mapping-acx-crystals-collision-with-uss.html

 

I still find it hard to imagine that the navigation of the Fitzgerald was so causal especially given the fact that one of their primary roles is early detection and mitigation of missile launches. With the heightened activity in North Korea you would have thought any ship operating in the area would have been on a higher alert than what it appeared to have been. That said maybe a larger review and corrective actions will be taken to avoid these types of situations in the future because as of now they seem almost common place.

[Skyviper 1,101]

Now I better understand the situation. On one hand you have a crew that wasn't aware at all until after the fact. And on the other hand you have a highly trained crew with better equipment that should've known anyway.

[+Typhoid 231]

Yep, you got it.

 

One comment on all the radar on the Fitz. Most of that is air and space search. There is only one surface search radar on the DDG that could (and should have) detected the Crystal. It is the same, standard surface search radar found on most ships.

 

Correction: there are 2 surface search radars plus the gun fire control.

Edited June 25, 2017 by Typhoid

[KJakker 875]

All of this talk of collision at sea has reminded me of two other collisions. The October 2, 1942 collision of RMS Queen Mary with HMS Curacoa, my grandfather was aboard Queen Mary at the time, and the July 25th, 1956 collision of MS Stockholm with SS Andrea Doria.

 

I wonder if one of the contributing factors in the USS Fitzgerald-ACX Crystal collision was a misunderstanding of what the radar was showing the watch officers? It has been years since I read anything about the Andrea Doria but I seem to recall reading that the radar display on Andrea Doria's bridge was set to a short range mode but the officer in charge of navigation thought it was in the long range mode and so believed that he had more maneuvering room than actually existed. All it would take is a similar mistake for the watch on the USS Fitzgerald to think they had sufficient sea room and time to pass in front of the ACX Crystal.       

[Fubar512 1,350]

All of this talk of collision at sea has reminded me of two other collisions. The October 2, 1942 collision of RMS Queen Mary with HMS Curacoa, my grandfather was aboard Queen Mary at the time, and the July 25th, 1956 collision of MS Stockholm with SS Andrea Doria.

 

I wonder if one of the contributing factors in the USS Fitzgerald-ACX Crystal collision was a misunderstanding of what the radar was showing the watch officers? It has been years since I read anything about the Andrea Doria but I seem to recall reading that the radar display on Andrea Doria's bridge was set to a short range mode but the officer in charge of navigation thought it was in the long range mode and so believed that he had more maneuvering room than actually existed. All it would take is a similar mistake for the watch on the USS Fitzgerald to think they had sufficient sea room and time to pass in front of the ACX Crystal.       

 

Radars today display the set range somewhere on the screen.  For example, the image that I posted earlier shows the radar is at a 12-mile setting, so each ring corresponds to 2 nm out from the center. Most of the equipment today is pretty idiot-proof.

 

However, it all means nothing unless one is paying attention.

[charlielima 328]

Radars today display the set range somewhere on the screen.  For example, the image that I posted earlier shows the radar is at a 12-mile setting, so each ring corresponds to 2 nm out from the center. Most of the equipment today is pretty idiot-proof.

 

However, it all means nothing unless one is paying attention.

 

From what i'm seeing today is that the display is digital not analog. That means no need for interpretation or analysis like the good ole digital stuff where one had to be vigilant on their watch.

Yah back in the 80's alot of sensor operators where smoking pot, but they where into their gear or equipment. Today they can't smoke marijuana but they got their lab tops, cell phones, and what now.

Different mind set. Different culture and what ever else you can throw into the pot.

CL

Edited June 26, 2017 by charlielima