In late 1972 President Richard Nixon was facing the prospect of having the funding cut for Vietnam by congress, so took one last gamble before they could reconvene to get North and South Vietnam to terms and pull the US out of the war with its POW's. This gamble would involve for the first time large B-52 raids on actual strategic targets in North Vietnam including Hanoi and Haiphong. Now having better relations with the Soviets and Chinese the gloves were off and he duly instructed Strategic Air command ( SAC) to sort it out……. unfortunately it didn’t quite roll down the chain far enough.
What ended up as a relatively short eleven-day campaign, started out and was planned for three days and those first days are really the focus of this article due to some rather strange tactics.
All B-52 sorties were launched either from the Pacific island of Guam at Anderson AFB or U-Tapao RTAFB (Thailand), with Guam having a very long flight time to target requiring A-A refueling for the B-52Ds. The B-52s were to take off from Guam and fly right over a Soviet spy trawler sitting in international waters of the end of the runway.
As the B-52 raid got closer to North Vietnam they would test all their ECM gear handily notifying the SAM operators of the frequencies being used in advance.
As they neared the target the F-4 Chaff bombers would fly in front of the raid and drop chaff to provide a protective chaff corridor that the B-52s would fly through giving extra protection. However it seems that not only did the chaff present a big arrow pointing to the intended target on the Vietnamese radar scopes it then promptly blew away in the very high winds providing next to no real protection.
On top of that as planned for the first three nights the B-52 waves (three waves per night) were to follow the same route as F-105s had done since 1967 and fly over the targets in level flight (to a determined point) at the same altitudes, speed, heading and times…………with a nice long pause between each wave.
General Melchett: Field Marshal Haig has formulated a brilliant new tactical plan to ensure final victory in the field.
Captain Blackadder: Ah. Would this brilliant plan involve us climbing out of our trenches, and walking very slowly towards the enemy?
Captain Darling: How could you possibly know that Blackadder? It's classified information!
Captain Blackadder: It's the same plan that we used last time..........and the seventeen times before that.
General Melchett: Exactly! And that is what is so brilliant about it! It will catch the watchful Hun totally off guard! Doing precisely what we've done eighteen times before is exactly the last thing they'll expect us to do this time! There is, however, one small problem.
Captain Blackadder: That everyone always gets slaughtered in the first ten seconds.
General Melchett: That's right. And Field Marshal Haig is worried this may be depressing the men a tad. So, he's looking for a way to cheer them up.
Captain Blackadder: Well, his resignation and suicide seems the obvious choice.
General Melchett: Hmm, interesting thought. Make a note of it, Darling.
(from Blackadder Goes Forth BBC)
Unsurprisingly the B-52 crews, although very pleased to be finally doing something to end the war knew the tactics were dumb with comments including “like Ducks in a shooting Gallery” and “I knew it would be a turkeyshoot….....for those on the ground”.
The idea of flying in level flight was to maintain Jamming integrity for the B-52 cells, also because the antenna need to be pointing down to provide the jamming coverage, thus if you turn no more protection. On the first nights some of the B-52 pilots did indeed try to outmanoeuvre upcoming SAM's not completely trusting the Jamming [and a B-52 can certainly turn at 30,000ft]. This lead to some threats of court martial for any pilot that did jeopardize cell integrity by turning (for certain waves).
The threat of Court Martial reported by all sources doesn’t seem to account for the contradictory fact that the pilots were ordered to perform a Post Target Turn after dropping the payload. This meant they would turn directly over the worse concentration of SAM sites over Hanoi with no jamming protection and into the Jet Stream winds keeping them in the lethal SAM radius a lot longer.
This Post Target Turn was not only unnecessary but was essentially a big cause of some of the losses.
B-52s at Anderson AFB Guam December 1972 (USAF)
Night One 18/19 December
As an example of a raid the first night strike consisted of three waves of 129 B-52s (three waves of 48, 30 and 51). This is a breakdown of Wave One only.
The Vietnamese defenders
The Vietnamese were not expecting or geared up for a strategic bombing campaign of this scale, they had sent personnel and sites down to South North Vietnam and now had to recall them and everyone else on leave. The main problem was they were short of assembled SA-2B missiles. Each site (Battalion) only held six on launchers and six more on trucks in reserve. Once a truck had loaded one on the launcher it had to go to a depot and collect another, however you now had queues of trucks waiting for missiles – they could only assemble 40 per day. Luckily the pause between waves helped them somewhat. [The only way the USAF could have helped the Vietnamese more by this point was to drop fully assembled SA-2s on parachutes!! ]
Even though on night one they had managed to down three B-52s (two others damaged), by Night two they had noticed the obvious use of the same tactics but were not able to capitalize on them straight away. They would launch the SA-2s unguided and when the B-52s did the Post Target Turn they would lock on and the SAM would guide in.
This was not as easy as it sounds and needed practice, so they didn’t manage to down any B-52s on night two (only damaging two). From the US point of view, it seems no loss had vindicated SACs tactics, however when the Vietnamese got their tactics worked out on night three six B-52s were shot down (one other damaged) in only two waves (Second wave was cancelled by the head of SAC General Meyer after the losses in the first - but the third Wave was pushed ahead to "save face").
Some US sources seem to indicate they thought the Vietnamese had different SAMs (SA-3) but they only actually had SA-2Bs – the US were just clearly underestimating them if that was the case.
B-52 window damaged from SA-2 fragments (USAF)
Where did this cunning plan come from?
SAC was running the show from their HQ and were very much for centralized planning - unfortunately they were detached from reality and were too arrogant to know it. WW II & Korea fighter Ace General John C Meyer was in charge and had been accused of being hesitant to make decisions by the lower Generals. [Well most would be hesitant if their expertise lay in fighters]:
Richard Baughn flew as a fighter pilot in World War II and then went on to command a SAC bomber unit as a brigadier General, and recalled feeling out of place in SAC due to the mindsets driven by different cultures. “You just feel like a third shoe, a third foot” and he believed that “if a SAC guy came to a TAC base, he would probably feel the same way.” From a common base in pilot and navigator training, the major commands imprinted different approaches to their unique missions and aircraft. In the words of Baughn, “Bomber pilots and fighter pilots are two different types. Always have been. They think differently and act differently.”
It was these same lower Generals who were responsible for the planning of Linebacker II - in particular General Peter Sianis. With his WW II and Korean War experience of Strategic bombing and no experience of a modern IADS he was definitely the person you wanted in charge of this [NOT].
According to Colonel Frederick J. Miranda, SAC’s logistics representative on the planning staff, General Sianis saw the map prepared by staff officers that showed routes of flight for the operation, with “several different routes leading to Hanoi.” Miranda related what next occurred:
General Sianis walked out of his inner office, took a look at the map, and said, “That’s not the way we do it!” Then he removed the colored tape showing the Andersen B-52 routing from the map and rerouted that bomber stream to a route over South Vietnam into Laos and forming up with the U-Tapao bomber stream. He also changed the post-target exit routing to one requiring all aircraft to make a right turn after dropping bombs and stated, “One way in and one way out!” He then instructed his staff to go make those changes and come back with the briefing. I will never forget how the map looked after General Sianis made changes. The colored tape was hanging loosely and the general made a comment, “You guys probably have a lot of tape, don’t you?” This was a significant last-minute change resulting in replanning, additional poststrike refueling, and the now infamous “post-target turn.” He essentially took the planning function away from the majors and lieutenant colonels and straitjacketed them with the “one way in, one way out” directive. No one questioned the SAC DCS/Operations.
The Post Target Turn is something required when delivering Nuclear bombs to avoid the blast, its inclusion at a time when Nuclear bombing was low level single ship is not really explained or justified anywhere.
B-52G-125-BW (59-2582) awaiting at Anderson AFB Guam to take off on 18 December 1972 (USAF)
The Electronic Warfare experts at SAC were confident that by maintaining cell integrity the B-52s would be fully protected against the SAMs, a cell was supposed to be three B-52s but sometimes a cell would include only two bombers and sometimes the cells would have degraded or failed ECM equipment due to the no abort maximum effort policy.
Although SAC at the time thought the unmodified Jammers on the newer B-52Gs were the cause of some of the losses (and stopped Gs flying over Hanoi) it wasn’t the full story because they were also using the wrong type of jamming. North Vietnam was using an SA-2B SAM that was modified by the Soviets [supplied in 1971] to prevent Beacon jamming after analyzing an QRC-160-8 (ALQ-87) ECM pod found in the jungle. In the late 1960s this type of jamming had rendered the SA-2 all but useless by jamming its uplink command guidance.
Now fair enough, how were the SAC EW experts to know this?……………..well they could have read reports from the US Seventh Air Force on the matter who had been aware this SAM was in use and had been reporting on it for the past year. Or they could also have tested the B-52 jammers against the modified SA-2B they had captured and was sitting in Eglin AFB! In fact it wasn’t until during Linebacker II and after the losses of the first 4 days they started testing that they confirmed that the Post Target Turn removed all jamming and the beacon jamming was not effective.
B-52Ds preparing to take off for another Linebacker II mission (USAF)
Although no plan is said to survive contact with the enemy it doesn’t help when you have centralized planning and control by people that simply do not know what they are doing from the start. SAC eventually handed the planning down the 8th Air Force and with many other tactical changes things never got anywhere near as bad as Night three had been - by nights 10/11 the resistance from Hanoi had become almost irrelevant to the point they could freely fly over it.
Overall Linebacker II ended up achieving Nixons objectives and the gamble paid off for him with the peace treaty being signed in January 1973. However for the B-52 flyers as always it was a very different war and by 1973 some had clearly had enough of Meyers management policies: [note B-52 Arc Light & Bullet Shot operations continued until August 1973]
On January 3, those crewmembers not flying assembled in the Arc Light Center briefing room, where they first watched Meyer pin the Air Force Cross on Colonel McCarthy, who had flown two missions during the operation. Meyer then addressed the Airmen in the audience, and his message was blunt. The general elaborated on the need for cell integrity in the missions over North Vietnam, remarking that tight formations provided the greatest chance to thwart the SAM threat by using the combined jamming capability of three bombers to defeat the data-links guiding the missiles. He then stated that aircraft commanders were not to maneuver during the bomb run and repeated the court-martial threat that they had previously received at the start of Linebacker II. At that moment, the briefing room became totally silent—all whispered conversations stopped, the normal coughing that typically comes from any audience halted, and no one moved. Then, suddenly, roughly half the Airmen in attendance stood up and walked out, “like a herd of cattle,” John Allen remembered. Many of those were chagrined that McCarthy had flown only two missions, plus that he had done so from the jump-seat of G model aircraft, though qualified only in D models. Allen described what came next:
Of the roughly 200 that remained, 75 to 80 people just went crazy. They picked up whatever was nearby and threw it at the stage—flight computers, briefing books, Coke cans, folding chairs, you name it. It was like if you had ever been
to a burlesque house, where they’d throw tomatoes and apples at a bad act, it was just like that. It couldn’t have lasted more than 13 seconds, the assault, but [Meyer] got hit a bunch of times. I saw a Coke can bounce right off his head. I
was just frozen in my tracks—I couldn’t do anything—it was mob action. He went down on a knee, and a bevy of colonels picked him up and helped him off stage. Meanwhile, the guys jumped up on stage and physically chased him down to the
flight line. There were a bunch of guys running after him, including the guys that were “gone” and the others of us that just wanted to see what would happen. He was in his staff car, heading toward his airplane, a shiny silver and white VC-135. They chased him down to where they now have the B-52 [Arc Light Memorial] up on a pedestal. They ran down and they threw chunks of gravel that were next to the road, just pelting his staff car and the power cart [used to start engines],and continued to pelt him as he went up the ramp. Then off he went and we never heard anything more from CINC [commander in chief] SAC.
Crews in briefing at Anderson AFB December 1972 (USAF)
Sources and Further Reading
To Fly and Fight: The experience of American airmen in Southeast Asia (Andrews WF, 2011) , George Mason University
The 11 Days of Christmas (Michel III ML, 2002) Encounter Books
Linebacker II: A View from the Rock (McCarthy JR & Rayfield RE, 1976), Office of Air Force History Maxwell AFB
War From Above The Clouds (Head WP, 2002) Air Force Press Maxwell AFB
Patterns and Predictability: The Soviet evaluation of operation Linebacker II (Drenkowski D & Grau LW )
Fifty Shades of Friction: Combat Climate, B-52 Crews, and the Vietnam War (Clodfelter M, 2016) National Defense University Press
F-105 Wild Weasel vs SA-2 “Guideline” SAM Vietnam 1963-73 (Davies.P, 2011) Osprey Publishing
The Red SAM: The SA-2 guideline Anti-Aircraft Missile (Zaloga SJ, 2007) Osprey Publishing
B-52 Stratofortress units in combat 1955 to 1973 (Lake, J 2004) Osprey Publishing
Quote from Blackadder Goes Forth (BBC, 1989)
Title photo B-52D-65-BO s/n 55-110 weapons loading (USAF)
Never in the field of Human conflict have so many hampered, limited and controlled so few as in the air campaign in North Vietnam. (Churchill + HW Baldwin)
Note - These articles are a compacted summary of a rather large topic and cannot include every detail.
The Muppet Show that was Lyndon B Johnson, Robert McNamara, and friends demonstrating how they didn’t have a clue when running Rolling Thunder from the White House was certainly almost criminal if not treasonous. However, the lack of understanding didn’t stop there because the SAC dominated US Air Force was also trying to run things from afar leading to some very strange policy decisions for those in the field.
Air to Air Training in Vietnam
To fight and use guns A-A you need to be trained in the first place, if you wish to become experienced that is.
If you remember the pilot comments from Part 1 you may have noticed the ones from the USAF seemed to include comments regarding poor training and back seat drivers…….
Not wanting to fight a long war with the same group of pilots the USAF set up a policy that would rotate the available pilots. USAF policy was thus to fly a tour which was 1 year in South Vietnam, or 100 missions over North Vietnam. Unfortunately, the war went on longer than expected and basically, the USAF had problems getting enough pilots to fill the roles. One great way [or not] around this was to lower standards and send through pilots that may have been washed out pre-war. Part of policy was to produce “universal pilots” that could in theory fly any aircraft, so yes transport pilots who perhaps never had the aptitude to fly fighters now transitioning to fighters and being sent to Vietnam. The Replacement Training Units (RTUs) produced pilots poorly trained in A-A because of the USAFs corporate beliefs that ACM among inexperienced pilots would lead to accidents. USAF culture at the time was obsessed with flying safety. [Dying in combat due to lack of basic training was not on the Health & Safety spreadsheet perhaps!] Another problem was the time it took to train A-A didn’t quite fit in with the time they wanted to spend training a pilot before sending them into combat (fixed at 6 months at one point). By 1967, 200 pilots a month were entering training, however the quality had deteriorated to a point where they were having problems completing the landing/take off part let alone the rest! To add to the mess the USAF had too many Navigators and not enough Pilots. So, what did they do? That’s right they started sticking 2 pilots in each F-4 as policy. The ‘genius’ idea being that the pilot in the back would learn the systems then move to the front seat. In reality it seems the pilot in the back was a waste of a pilot that was not trained properly or interested in learning the radar systems. This and other factors lead to the two-man crew being anything but an effective team in combat!!
F-4s and F-105s around a KC-135 (USAF)
US Navy Training
Unlike the USAF the USN couldn’t lower the bar /standards to get more pilots because they had to be able to land on a carrier, and it was decided early whether they were fighter or heavy. Because of this USN pilot tours were typically longer than USAF ones (over 100 missions up North) and pilots would fly 2 combat cruises every 14 months by policy from 1967 to ensure there was some rest period.
Unlike the USAF, the Navy used highly trained, and dedicated RIOs (Radar Intercept Officers) in the back seat, that funnily enough worked a lot better.
F-4Bs from VF-111 Sundowners (US Navy)
How Rolling Thunder changed air to air training (or not)
Decided the poor performance during Rolling Thunder was more related to technical issues, and actually reduced air-to-air training after 1968 if you could believe something so ridiculous [the 2 pilot F-4 policy was at least rescinded!].
Although it was recognised by most it needed to change urgently, the internal politics and policies meant that was not happening. Real change only happened after 1972 with the change in high level staff and attitudes leading to the creation of programs like Red Flag.
F-4C-23-MC 1966 (USAF)
After the dismal F-4 air-to-air results the USN decided its F-4 pilots had not been adequately trained properly. Being ‘fleet defense’, training was based on using missiles and they had even abolished the Fleet Air Gunnery Unit in that time. Thus, air-to-air combat skills had deteriorated. [note: this didn’t apply to the well-trained F-8 crews of course that had far better results]
This lead in 1969 to the creation of the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun) to get the Navy F-4 crews back to speed. The Navy also improved the technical side - they didn’t have ‘Combat Tree’, but had significantly better AIM-9 versions such as the D/G/H.
F-4J from VF-114 (US Navy)
How did the different attitudes to training work out for the USAF?
During Linebacker 1 & 2 the US Navy kill ratio against MiGs was 6-1 and the USAFs was 2-1 however the kill ratios don’t include all the factors e.g. USAF F-4D/Es had Combat Tree, flew different Route Packs etc.
So, to illustrate how inept USAF training really was at the end of US involvement in the war.
In August / Sept 1972 a group of USN F-8 pilots spent a few weeks at Udorn RTAFB flying A-A training (or DACT) against USAF F-4 crews of the premier USAF MiG killing wing.
The well-trained F-8 pilots [who had been used to dueling with USN F-4 Top Gun pilots] embarrassed the USAF F-4 crews, and were appalled at the tactics, training and lack of skill from a supposed A-A unit.
An F-8 pilot said,” The contest between the F-4 and F-8s was so uneven at first we were ashamed by the disparity. The sight that remains in my mind is a chilling one for any number of MiG pilots must have identical views. The pitiful sight of four super fighters [USAF F-4s] in front of you all tucked in finger four, pulling a level turn. An atoll fired anywhere in parameters would be the proverbial mosquito in a nudist colony and wouldn’t know where to begin.” (Clashes by ex USAF F-4 veteran Michel III)
The USN F-8 pilots felt the USAF crews needed basic instruction, not just training missions!
Also consider that some of the USAF pilots were instructors or graduates of the USAF Fighter Weapons School, that was still preaching obsolete useless tactics and was resistant to change. This only confirmed what the USAF pilots already knew (they were so far behind). The USN report when sent to PACAF was dismissed by some as inter-service bias it seems.
This next account sums things up perfectly:
In 1974 the Air Force reassigned me from an overseas assignment in England to Nellis. When I arrived, I had over 1,200 hours in the F–4, including 365 combat hours. I had never flown a dissimilar air combat sortie(DACT). I had never carried a training AIM–9 and had not even seen one since my combat tour four years earlier. I had never used a gun camera. The only tactical formation I had flown was Fluid Four/Fighting Wing. I had never intercepted a target at low altitude. In other words, I was a typical F–4 pilot with a combat tour. (CR Anderegg - who went on to fly the vastly superior F-15 along with some actual A-A training!)
F-4Bs of VF-114 (US Navy)
The not so mysterious case of the VPAF Aces
The first batch of VPAF (Vietnamese Peoples Air Force) pilots were sent in 1956 to China and were being trained on MiG-17s by 1960 in both China but primarily in the Soviet Union. The MiG-17 had no missiles initially and thus air combat employing guns had to be taught, so training included things like dogfighting.
Drop outs were high with only around 20% of the pilots passing by the mid-1960s (the rest becoming ground technicians). This was lower than other Soviet ally nation pilots who typically had a better baseline education and had often already flown aircraft. [some of the Vietnamese had literally never seen an aircraft before]
Over North Vietnam the MiGs became part of an Integrated Air Defence system (IADS) and had to fit around the AAA and later SAM defenses flying in restricted areas and altitudes and often tied to the GCI (Ground Control Intercept) stations. The VPAF were also consistently changing tactics that the pilots had to adapt to. However, the MiG pilots mostly had only one primary role and that was air-to- air combat.
Being outnumbered but often having better situational awareness they often fought ambush “hit and run” tactics in small numbers. [this was smart!]
What we can deduce is:
They didn’t fly a 100-mission tour then go home, they had to fight until death. Fighting for their home land probably meant motivation and dedication were not an issue. [Unlike the US, the VPAF were fighting a ‘total war’] If they were shot down and survived then they were still on home turf. With the experience and training some of these pilots were no doubt very skilled flyers. So, for example out of 18 VPAF MiG-21 pilots given official Ace status, 16 of them were shot down and some of them were shot down 3 times!
MiG-21MF Fishbed with AA-1s and AA-2s (Wikipedia)
Let’s do the myth and mystery of Colonel Tomb
Prior to better information the ‘13 kill ace, Colonel Tomb’ was apparently shot down and killed on 10 May 1972 in a famous (and very close) 1 v 1 MiG-17F v F-4J dogfight against US Navy Top Gun Graduates Randy Cunningham/Willie Driscoll.
Willie Driscoll in a 2018 podcast describes how capable he thought the pilot was. [but still also thinks he had 13 kills to his name].
Showtime 100 downs a MiG-17 (dogfighthistory.be)
In 2007 A document called On Watch was declassified and released by Freedom of Information by the National Security Agency (NSA). In the section “Comrade Toon Flies the unfriendly skies”, it seems that NSA SIGINT analysts were able to unlock the MiG pilots callsign system and had identified an ace who flew out of Phuc Yen called “Toon”. Head of the Seventh Air Force General Momyer wanted him out of the skies and it is said became obsessed with getting rid of him. It states:
“The SIGINT detachment alerted Momyer’s HQ whenever Toon was scheduled to fly a mission, and Momyer would send his planes aloft to hunt down the Red Baron of North Vietnam.”
It seems that Toon was quite adept at avoiding these aircraft and one dark night [no date] after taking off from Vinh (South NVN) in a MiG-21 and avoiding the US fighters he intercepted a flight of B-52s and fired 2 missiles. One failed but the other lodged into the wing of a B-52 and didn’t detonate. Despite this the B-52s, following standard procedure ditched their ordnance and so he had a mission kill anyway.
It states they were never able to catch him (or perhaps it meant "them" ?).
Trying to match this up...........In 1971 MiG-21 Ace Dinh Ton appears to be the only Ace [6 claims / 4 match up] involved in intercepting B-52s from South NVN. On the 4th October he took off from Dong Hoi (near Vinh), but was unable to fire on the B-52s because of the Escorting F-4s.
On the 20th November Hoang Bieu took off from Vinh [MiG-21] as a diversion and another pilot (Vu Dinh Rang) was able to fire two R-3S Atolls [from his MiG-21] at a B-52 and one of the missiles hit and damaged the bomber. This was the first successful intercept of a B-52 according to the VPAF [ USAFs "War Above The Clouds" does mention a Missile fired from a MiG at B-52s on the 20th November during Commando Hunt VII - causing the mission to be called off ]
So, although it looks like there really was an ace called Toon I do wonder if they were able to see everything and not still tracking different pilots.
If [big if] the real Toon was Dinh Ton, then he was eventually shot down on 11 Sept 1972 in a MiG-21U by a VMFA-333 F-4J (Lasseter/Cummings) Both Ton and the backseat IP ejected safely.
No VPAF pilot claimed more than 9 kills, the 13 number most likely came from VPAF MiGs photographed and sent to the media at the time including May 1968 a photo of MiG-21PFV (4326) with 13 red stars (kills) on its nose and MiG-17 (3020). In reality the 13 kills were the sum of those claimed by several different flyers of that Jet.
MiG-17 Fresco (warbirdsresourcegroup.org)
So, who did Driscoll / Cunningham shoot down then on the 10th May?
Four MiG-17s were scrambled to intercept the raid on the Hai Duong Railway yard that Showtime 100 (Cunningham/Driscoll) was covering.
Pilots Do Hang, Tran Van Kiem, Nguyen Van Tho were 923rd regiment MiG-17 pilots hit by missiles on that date but nothing conclusive describing a prolonged 1v1 fight. (Hang and Kiem were both killed)
There were J-6s (Chinese MiG-19s) also in combat that day (925th regiment) but over different areas. Only Le Duc Oanh was shot down on the 10th being hit by a missile and ejected (later died of injuries) but not described as a prolonged 1v1 dogfight. Le Van Tuong was the other fatality when he overran the runway and turned over.
No MiG-19/J-6s claims were made by the US on the 10th despite one being shot down - they were probably (understandably) misidentified as MiG-17s it seems by US pilots in the heat of combat.
Shenyang J-6 / MiG-19S Farmer (vnmilitaria.com)
When it comes to A-A guns over Vietnam let us not forget
The F-8 Crusader
Unlike the USN F-4 pilots the F-8 community was well trained in traditional BFM/ACM from the start and could make use of the 4 cannon in its nose providing they didn’t fire them under high G loading that caused them to Jam! (Leading one pilot to describe the guns as very unreliable under High G loading). This training served them well and by the end of Rolling Thunder the stats would suggest they did well compared to the F-4 units, which of course was replacing the F-8s at that time.
Out of the 19 A-A kill claims, 3 were with the gun.
The F-105 Thunderchief
In somewhat of a paradox the USAF F-105 had the most encounters over Vietnam with MiGs and racked up about 26 MiG-17 kills (out of 140 gun engagements) with its M61A1 Gatling Gun.
Some F-105 pilots had complained of poor A-A training in Red Baron. Jack Broughton described a different community with many old heads from Korea who knew their A-A anyway (considered themselves fighter jocks) and trainees were taught when they came to theatre.
Some probable reasons for the gun kills include:
The F-105 often didn’t carry AIM-9Bs due to available pylons or sometimes lack of availability. The AIM-9B was inferior to the AIM-9D used by the F-8. The M61A1 was far more reliable than the F-8s (MK-12) guns, only failing in about 12 percent of firing passes Being ‘All Aspect’ the gun was easier to employ over the restrictive AIM-9B envelope.
F-105D - king of the Brrrt (Global Aviation Resource)
Guns on modern fighters (the F-35A)
The last US A-A (manned) gun kill was in Feb 1991 when an A-10A shot down an Iraqi Mi-8 Helicopter. There is also a 1992 video of a FAV F-16A gunning down an OV-10E in a Venezuelan coup. But who cares really because guns have been used in all the low-key wars since then. In fact, jets including the F-14/16/15/18/Harrier have all used guns to strafe enemy personnel and equipment on a very regular basis. So, as we see just in 1963 with the F-4E, the requirement for a gun for Air to Ground is just as strong now as it was then.
Let’s look at why the USAF may have put an internal gun on the F-35A, according to a 2007 paper by Colonel Charles Moore who was so adamant the F-35A needed a gun that he writes:
Regardless of the opinions of the USMC, USN or (F-35) Joint Program Office, the USAF must not become dismayed or discouraged by the difficulties in achieving the capabilities it has determined it required. Within the air to air and air to ground environments, the gun has proven to be a reliable and irreplaceable weapon. Even if Lockheed [Martin] declares it will not be able to fully meet the requirements and specifications the USAF desires, disallowing requirement relief sends a strong message that the capabilities offered by the gun are not negotiable.
Important these are “Arguments For” only (there are probably very valid arguments against) and quite a few things can change in 11 years!
His arguments include:
On A-A use
A-A missiles do not have a 100% PK, especially against advanced adversaries. Its limited missile supply could be exhausted quickly if faced by a significant number of low tech adversaries. The F-35 may not be able to egress from all adversaries based on its slower speeds and may need to stay and fight. When defending other assets, it may need to stand and fight regardless. Gun employment is less reliant on on-board systems working such as radar. All the modern tech in the world cannot protect an aircraft from the oldest weapon in A-A combat [when in range]. The Gun is simple, efficient, effective and always available. On Gun Pods
It is seldom known when you will need a gun system so carrying it only when needed is not practical. Risk of RCS (Radar Cross Section) increase. Risk of having performance issues like the previous gun pods e.g. GAU 5 (Pave Claw) or SUU16/23 Additional logistics required. On A-G use
Despite being poor in power compared to PGMs and IAMs, the gun will remain after those have been expended and can be used if called upon. This happened many time in Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Can be used where PGM/IAMs are too powerful and can be prohibited or ill-advised such as urban situations. Can be used on moving targets. Gun considered the only true multi role weapon to be carried. Can be used to supress (rather than kill) and provide just a warning. Sometimes offers a quicker reaction time because of less setup over other ordnance. Less dependent on targeting sensors so can be used in event of failures with those.
F-35A Lightning II - gun is port side (USAF)
Clashes (M.L.Michel III, 1997) Naval Institute Press
Thud Ridge (J.M.Broughton, 1969) Crecy Publishing
F-105 Thunderchief MiG Killers of the Vietnam War (P.Davies, 2014) Osprey Publishing
F-8 Crusader Units of the Vietnam War (P. Mersky, 1998) Osprey Publishing
MiG-21 Units of the Vietnam War (I.Toperczer, 2001) Osprey Publishing
MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam War (I.Toperczer, 2001) Osprey Publishing
MiG-21 Aces of the Vietnam War (I.Toperczer, 2017) Osprey Publishing
MiG-17 and MiG-19 Aces of the Vietnam War (I.Toperczer, 2017) Osprey Publishing
USAF McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (P.Davies, 2013) Osprey Publishing
USN McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (P.Davies, 2016) Osprey Publishing
US Navy F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1972 -73 (B.Elward & P.Davies, 2002) Osprey Publishing
US Navy F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1965 -70 (B.Elward & P.Davies, 2001) Osprey Publishing
USAF F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1972 -73 (P.Davies, 2005) Osprey Publishing
USAF F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1965 -68 (P.Davies, 2004) Osprey Publishing
The Revolt of the Majors: How the Air Force changed after Vietnam (M.L.Michell III)
RED BARON Project Volume I - III (1969) Weapon Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG)
The Need for a Permanent Gun System on the F-35 JSF (Colonel C.Moore, 2007) Air Force Fellows Air University, Maxwell AF Base
SIERRA HOTEL (C. R.ANDEREGG, 2001) Air Force History and Museums Program
Research Study of radar reliability and its impact on life-cycle costs for the APQ-113. 114, -120 and -144 radars (1973). Technical report by General Electric under contract to the USAF.
McDonnell F-4E Phantom II (Baugher J, 2002) online
ON WATCH Profiles from the National Security Agencys past 40 years (1984) National Security Agency
War from above the clouds (Head WP, 2002) Air University Press Maxwell AFB
Information on F-4E radar range from Forum entry by ex F-4 flyer Walt BJ (Bjorneby, Walter)
Willie Driscoll interview from Podcast Episode 009 “Vietnam Ace” (V.Aiello, 2018 ) http://fighterpilotpodcast.com/
Title photo credit USAF
View File RAF Phantom FG.2 (No.38 Group)
McDonnell Douglas Phantom FG.2 for STRIKE FIGHTERS 1
This is a simple mod of the stock Phantom F-4B to give a 'what if' J79 powered Phantom FG.2 tactical fighter with markings for No.6, No.41 and No.54 squadrons of No.38 Group of RAF Strike Command as they might have appeared in the late 1960's but I've also included some two-colour B-type markings for you to play around with.
In theory, this should work in any 'first generation' game that has the standard F-4B LOD's. As SFG and WOV does not have the RAF Letter codes I've made some of my own in yellow and white and included them here to help avoid bare fins although there's plenty going on in fin land.
The successful first flight of the McDonnell XF4H-1 (Phantom II) on May 27th, 1958 certainly piqued the interest of both the RAF and the Royal Navy and by 1959 both were granted official 'observer status' on the project. The realisation that only two of the Royal Navy's five aircraft carriers could operate an aircraft of the XF4H-1's size (and that only after extensive modernisation) soon cooled the interest of the Senior Service but the RAF could see a promising aircraft of obvious potential across many roles and not just in their search for a Hunter replacement. By 1960 McDonnell were scheming various tactical fighter versions of the F4H-1 Phantom II with J79 engines including a minimum change version of the baseline USN F-4B to replace the Hunter and Javelin in RAF service and supplement the Lightning.
The RAF had already bore the brunt of the 1957 Defence White Paper and had then suffered the ignominy of losing the UK's nuclear deterent in the planned switch from V-Force to Polaris. Following this heavy perceived loss of status the Air Staff were so determined to get the TSR.2 that in March 1961 they volunteered to forsake the supersonic V/STOL P.1154 strike fighter and STOL AW.681 tactical transport and replace both with off the shelf purchases of American aircraft. Both projects were declared as "too technically challenging to succeed in the current fiscal situation" but the early cashing-in of both projects did ultimately save the TSR.2 which went on to survive the 1964 Budget Review and enter RAF service at the end of the 1960's.
Meanwhile, back in August 1961 the UK Government became the first export customer for McDonnell's XF4H-1 with an order for 350 aircraft consisting of 150 interceptor-fighters for RAF Fighter Command and 200 tactical fighters for RAF Germany and No.38 Group. Designated by McDonnell as the F-4K and by the RAF as Phantom F.1 and Phantom FGA.2 the first F-4K rolled off the St. Louis production line in February 1963 with a ceremonial first flight on April 1st, 1963 to coincide with the RAF's 45th birthday celebrations. These early RAF Phantoms retained the AAA-4 infrared search and tracking sensor fitted to a prominent bulge underneath the radome housing the powerful AN/APQ-72 radar and were powered by two General Electric J79-GE-8A engines each rated at 10,000lbs dry thrust and 17,000 lbs thrust with afterburner.
The Phantom FG.2 entered service with No.41 squadron at Coningsby in January 1966 and eventually equipped no less than ten RAF squadrons at home and abroad.
1. From the AIRCRAFT folder drag and drop the PhantomFG2 folder into your Aircraft folder.
2. From the DECALS folder drag and drop the PhantomFG2 into your Decals folder.
Thanks to TK for a great little game/sim.
And thanks to everyone in the wider Third Wire community.
Version 2 - 01/04/18
Version 1 - 26/02/09
Submitter Spinners Submitted 02/20/2009 Category Fictional Aircraft, Experimental and UAV's