Sea Harrier Over The Falklands

[harryleith 12]

I just finished reading Sea Harrier Over The Falklands by Nigel "Sharkey" Ward last night and I must say it was a serious eye opener. His tone is somewhat superior and occasionally a bit defensive, but I guess that comes from the sort of confidence and self-belief you want in a great fighter pilot.

 

His book raised a lot of issues. For example, I was horrified to know that Harriers in 801 Squadron flew the entire war without countermeasures. According to the book, they received two kits late in the war - both of which were unserviceable. They instead crammed chaff into the air brake, so they could release it that way, or stuffed it under bomb mountings so releasing the ordnance gave them a burst of chaff. This is far from the high-tech world you imagine of modern air combat, and is frankly just a cut above opening the canopy and throwing the damn things out!

 

They also didn't have any tracer ammunition to observe fall of shot, because the RAF didn't believe in it, so MOD procurement couldn't see why the FAA would need it...

 

Probably the biggest theme in the book is the different experiences of 800 and 801 Squadrons with their Blue Fox radar and Navhars. Because most of the 801 pilots had been involved in the Initial Flight Trials Unit, they had lots of experience getting the best out of these systems and swore by them. Alternatively, 800 Squadron who were newer to the equipment seemingly couldn't get them to work effectively and given this unit was on the flagship, this failure was the experience the Admiral had of the equipment. Sharkey believes pulling a CAP off 120 miles to do a visual scan of an area they could have searched by radar lead to the loss of the Sheffield. The Argentinians got through the hole in the cap and launched their attack.

 

His maths about the effort versus effectiveness of the Vulcan bomber raids was also startling. I hadn't thought of it that way, but using 11 tankers to put one aircraft over a target to drop 21 bombs just doesn't work out to be cost effective.

 

I'm sure this book will stand a re-read after I have had some time to digest it.

[+Piecemeal 450]

It certainly shows the level of bigotry and ingorance at command level from Woodward on Hermes, especially when you consider that his background was in subs. Before the campaign Woodward was also very dismissive as to the value of carriers in modern warfare.

 

In the end I think Ward was spot on in his analysis at management level and of grandiose but impractical operations like "Black Buck"

Edited March 5, 2012 by Piecemeal

[macelena 1,070]

Well, the radar threat was not as high as in other contemporary conflicts, and many aircraft in the era lacked proper ECM. However, should the scenario have been different, it would have been disastrous. Imagine Mig-23s, Mirage F1s / 50s, or Phantoms, much faster than the Shar and with radar BVR capability. Or even imagine that the Argentine MirageIIIEAs could carry R530s all the way to the area, or facing the Syrian air defense network over Lebanon. Without any doubt, the Shar with AIM-9Ls owned the skies over the Falklands but when you are about to rely on carriers only, those carrier wings better be well suited. The same applied to our AV-8S.

Edited March 5, 2012 by macelena

[Planejunky 0]

To ballance that book by Cdr Ward, I would highly recommend Sqn Ldr Jerry Pook's book "RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands", and David Morgan's "Hostile Skies".

[MigBuster 2,884]

I just finished reading Sea Harrier Over The Falklands by Nigel "Sharkey" Ward last night

 

A brilliant read - hes a great character!

 

Well, the radar threat was not as high as in other contemporary conflicts, and many aircraft in the era lacked proper ECM. However, should the scenario have been different, it would have been disastrous. Imagine Mig-23s, Mirage F1s / 50s, or Phantoms, much faster than the Shar and with radar BVR capability. Or even imagine that the Argentine MirageIIIEAs could carry R530s all the way to the area, or facing the Syrian air defense network over Lebanon. Without any doubt, the Shar with AIM-9Ls owned the skies over the Falklands but when you are about to rely on carriers only, those carrier wings better be well suited. The same applied to our AV-8S.

 

 

In 82 the SHARs had no hope of intercepting the Super Etendards launching Excorcets from the mainland anyway - lucky they only had 5 of the air launched missiles or the fleet would have had to retire - thats one reason F-4Ks were needed with an airbourne AEW and lookdown capability.

[crl848 9]

To ballance that book by Cdr Ward, I would highly recommend Sqn Ldr Jerry Pook's book "RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands", and David Morgan's "Hostile Skies".

 

Yeah, Pook's book is equally moany about the Navy as Ward is about the RAF, if not more so. And both of them hate the Admiral! Morgan provides balance to the force by not moaning as much IIRC.

 

Ward is quite critical of Pook and the RAF in general's attitude to carrier flying in this article:

 

http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2011/05/flying-from-our-new-carriers-%E2%80%93-the-rn-or-the-raf-ethos/

Edited March 5, 2012 by crl848

[+Gepard 11,318]

If the argentinians would have made the runway of Port Stanley only 300 meters longer the whole british adventure could have become a bad end. But so it end in favor for UK.

 

The big plus point of free press is, that after a while of propaganda during war times and after the war the truth comes to the light. Sometimes truth is painfull, but healthy.

[+Typhoid 231]

These different books is simply the same thing that happens after every conflict. All the principles write their book about how it was that THEY won the war despite all of the incompetent interference from all those other guys. On the other side of the conflict will be all of the exposes of how they would have won if only the author had been listened to.

 

And it happens every year in the US Congress too during DoD budget debate as the service chiefs testify on their budget requests.............

 

In my humble opinion, the most accurate account will be the soonest after the conflict before all of the arm-chair quarterbacks (also knows as "analysts") get involved. Absolute accuracy, however, cannot be found. ever.

 

So the in the final analysis - be sure to win the war and then you can write about how great you were.

[crl848 9]

There was a great documentary on Channel 4 last night about the Black Bucc raids, based on the excellent Vulcan 607 book. Predictably they imply that the RAF won the war etc., but it is an above average example of this kind of programme. It was good to see the actual aircrew telling their stories and even the re-enactments are not bad and filmed in the real cockpits. Sharkey Ward didn't like it, check out his blog.

 

Here's the link to the C4 website:

 

http://www.channel4.com/programmes/falklands-most-daring-raid/4od

[MigBuster 2,884]

There was a great documentary on Channel 4 last night about the Black Bucc raids, based on the excellent Vulcan 607 book. Predictably they imply that the RAF won the war etc., but it is an above average example of this kind of programme. It was good to see the actual aircrew telling their stories and even the re-enactments are not bad and filmed in the real cockpits. Sharkey Ward didn't like it, check out his blog.

 

Here's the link to the C4 website:

 

 

A nice film - but it doesn't even mention there was more than 1 raid - think about 5 in total and 2 of them were anti radar strikes - on the second raid they forgot to arm the bombs according to Sharkey.

[Lexx_Luthor 57]

harry::

His maths about the effort versus effectiveness of the Vulcan bomber raids was also startling. I hadn't thought of it that way, but using 11 tankers to put one aircraft over a target to drop 21 bombs just doesn't work out to be cost effective.

Interesting. For an important enough target the costs can be justified, as I suppose the case here in the Falklands.

 

I play strikefighters and mod it for classical Strategic Air Command vs PVO and the background requirement for lots of expensive refueling is going to be one of the "equalizing" methods for the background. In my game there's going to be tons of refueling for bombers and escort fighters, ECM support, recon, SAM suppresion, etc... as well -- a simple one-strike won't force a surrender of a dug in determined opponent but air ownership over time might, or might not.

 

Imagine if 8th AAF and RAF had to do several one or more refuels on their missions to Germany and back, bombers and escorts included.

[crl848 9]

Sharkey Ward's arguments about the cost of Black Buck versus attacks by Sea Harriers (he made them in the book in 1992 and he's still making them today, see his blog) do not address the strategic point, which is that the Argies were prompted to withdraw their fighters from the islands partly because of the potential threat of the Vulcans to the mainland.

[MigBuster 2,884]

Sharkey Ward's arguments about the cost of Black Buck versus attacks by Sea Harriers (he made them in the book in 1992 and he's still making them today, see his blog) do not address the strategic point, which is that the Argies were prompted to withdraw their fighters from the islands partly because of the potential threat of the Vulcans to the mainland.

 

Not sure that was ever admitted by the Argentinians - certainly they never bothered making Port Stanley runway long enough to allow jet ops - no Jet fighters were ever based on the Islands that I know of during their brief stay.

[crl848 9]

Sharkey Ward's main goal is to show that the RAF cannot provide proper fleet defence and attack capabilities as they claim, and are trying to rewrite history regarding the Falklands as a propaganda point. Thus his argument centres around the cost of Black Buck versus the same missions if performed by SHAR. Here's a link to one of his recent pronouncements on this subject.

 

http://www.sharkeysworld.com/search/label/12.%20%2030%20Years%20On.

 

I think that although he's absolutely right about the direct effects of Black Buck (minimal damage to PS runway etc.), and about the wider inability of the RAF to absorb the RN's aviation needs, it's a bit disingenuous to ignore the potential strategic benefits of Black Buck, which some sources certainly say did influence the Argies to keep back Mirage IIIs for air defence over the mainland (note that basing Mirages at PS is not the point, it's operating over the islands that is).

 

Ward's essay above does not mention this potential strategic benefit, and nor from memory did the first edition of his 1992 book. On the other hand I see that the ever reliable wikipedia quotes his second edition as attempting to rebut the arguments (see notes 47 & 8 here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands_War#cite_note-46).

[MigBuster 2,884]

 

I think that although he's absolutely right about the direct effects of Black Buck (minimal damage to PS runway etc.), and about the wider inability of the RAF to absorb the RN's aviation needs, it's a bit disingenuous to ignore the potential strategic benefits of Black Buck, which some sources certainly say did influence the Argies to keep back Mirage IIIs for air defence over the mainland (note that basing Mirages at PS is not the point, it's operating over the islands that is).

 

Ward's essay above does not mention this potential strategic benefit, and nor from memory did the first edition of his 1992 book. On the other hand I see that the ever reliable wikipedia quotes his second edition as attempting to rebut the arguments (see notes 47 & 8 here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands_War#cite_note-46).

 

 

His analysis of the raids make good/funny reading - and he probably has some valid points - fuel usage - and the SHAR could deliver bombs more accurately - only needed to put 2 on the runway and it would have beaten the Vulcan! - still cant imagine that a single Iron bomb (or 2) would keep the runway out of action for long (and it didn't by the looks of things).

 

Although there is the Strategic argument to justify the Black Buck raids - even if Mirages operated CAPs over the Islands I fail to see how that would have been a disaster. It would have made things more challenging certainly - but the Mirage IIIs did CAP on the first few days and were hopelessly outmatched - poor missiles, no countermeasures, and poor tactics (fighting/welded wing).

 

Wiki (from the official FAA Magazine no less ) mentions that Mirage 3s were still used as decoys during strikes by the Argentine FAA so they were not all withdrawn after the raids if thats the case.

Edited March 22, 2012 by MigBuster

[Toryu 156]

Although there is the Strategic argument to justify the Black Buck raids - even if Mirages operated CAPs over the Islands I fail to see how that would have been a disaster. It would have made things more challenging certainly - but the Mirage IIIs did CAP on the first few days and were hopelessly outmatched - poor missiles, no countermeasures, and poor tactics (fighting/welded wing).

 

...an most importantly: no gas to play.

The Mirages only had the gasbags they brought from their bases - no inflight refuelling-capability whatsoever.

 

Discussing the option of lenthening the runway at PS is moot in my opinion, as supplying that airfield with parts, fuel and ammo would not have been an easy task at all.

Whether the Argentinians would have based Mirages at PS - given their paranoia about Chile launching an attack - is another flashing questionmark.

They would propably have based A-4s at PS.

[+Gepard 11,318]

The argentinian Mirages operated on their outer range. They had had no chance to use their afterburners, so they were inferior to the Sea Harriers.

With Skyhawks on PS the reconquest of the Falklands would have been much more challenging for the british forces.

[SUICIDAL 401]

Nigel, an excellent pilot.

I have your book, is interesting.

 

Argentina could not extend the existing runway

While it took the material to do so.

It was decided it would be very difficult to maintain the aircraft,

Under constant bombardment and without the lack of adequate

Parts.

 

 

The bombing of the Vulcans on 1 May

They were very intimidating. Their bombs fell on tent

Newly assembled. Which killed several Air Force mechanic. and some soldiers.

Clearly his main target was the airstrip

Of Puerto Argentino.

It was called the engineers of the army, to mask and create false holes on the track, with flour and mud.

To make them believe that the track satellites

Was disable. That way would cease to send the vulcans....

 

 

 

 

 

 

This photo was taken on May 1, from the airport building after the bombing of Vulcan.

In boxes of wood, brick, is where they slept the first night, but where not return due

to the proximity of fuel tanks, which reaches to be protective fence on the right edge of the photograph. Too close.

 

 

 

 

Photo taken on May 1 after the bombing. Sample water tanks and tractor with the PTO to ensure supply.

The track is on the left, out of the picture, and behind the building of the airport is the hole in

the first of the bombs. On the right the background is the main hangar.

 

 

 

 

 

The main problem of the Mirage

It was out of fuel, had only 2 minutes

To fly Above the Islands.

 

The flight school that had

Mirage pilots.

It was the French, A flight over cautious and always ensure Avion.

Without a lot of Forces G.

 

The best chance of fighting against the Harriers

It was the fight in height. but

The harriers, refused to go and fight in height.

Argentines often flying in circles at high altitude.

Waiting for the harriers rise.

This did not happen

 

A technique that is often attempted, was to attract the

harriers to the Continent. Using fun flights

By The Learjet A-35....

 

 

For example something that was totally different.

was the IAI-Dagger M-5.

The pilots had flight school

Israelite, Carry the plane and the Human body to the limit.

Engagement in any situation and try to be as

More Animal possible in the Combat.

They fought in all situations.

Edited March 26, 2012 by SUICIDAL

[crl848 9]

Interesting stuff on the different training from France and Israel, thanks. And on the direct impact of the Vulcan raids.