Actually, the comparison between Bodenplatte and Motke is quite interesting :
The objective in both case was to make a surpise attack to gain air superiority and compensate numerical inferiority.
Edit : at the start of Bararossa, the german had numerical superiority
The limit in both cases was that they destroyed planes but did not kill the pilots.
This was a strategical mistake for the German, as they exchanged what they did not have (pilots) against what the allied had in high number (planes).
For the Israeli this would be problematic for the attrition war and then the Yom Kippour war (though they finally gained the upper hand) and remember that they lost 10% of their pilots.
Also, a close examination of the air combats during the 6 days war demonstrate that the arab pilots who could fly (Jordanian obviously, but also some Egyptian pilots) were not "sitting ducks" and the real air combat ration was between 2 to 4 for 1 in favour of Israel. A good ratio, but given the initial arab numerical advantage of 3 to 1, winning Air superiority in the Air would have been far more touchy without the successfull airfield strikes.
Of course, Moked was brillantly executed and was rated as critcal to the 6 days war Israeli victory, while Boldenplatte was a failure if only because the battle of the Bulge was over.
On the other hand the comparison between Barbarossa and Moked is less telling, as it is likely that even if the air strikes had not been a success, the German would certainly have won the initial part of the Russian Campaign anyway (a possible comparison would be the campaign of France : it took 2 weeks for the Luftwaffe to destroy the french Air Force, but 3 days to the Wermacht to defeat the french army)
And most of all, it is more funny to compare Moked to Boldenplatte :)