Had TSR2 Survived.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine GCB GBE CBIM FRAeS
Sir Patrick Hine’s reputation stretches
far beyond the Royal Air Force where he
shone as fighter pilot, commander and
staff officer. His ability to inspire others
by example was unparalleled in his
generation and he is acknowledged as a
military thinker of considerable clarity.
Since his retirement, after command of
all British Forces in the Gulf War, he has
become Military Advisor to British
Aerospace plc and is a much respected
figure in international aviation circles.
He is well suited to consider the likely
effects ‘Had TSR2 Survived’.
I was at the Staff College when the cancellation of TSR2 was
announced in 1965, and at the end of that year I was posted as
Personal Air Secretary to the Minister of Defence for the RAF – Lord
Shackleton. As Sir Frank Cooper has told us, the general view in the
MoD at the time, including that of the then CAS, was that cancellation
had been inevitable – on the grounds of unaffordability and with rising
costs that were out of control.
But my remit today is to offer you a view of how things would
look now if TSR2 had survived, then and subsequently. To do so I
must make at least one assumption at the outset. And that is that,
while the TSR2 project proceeded, the earlier cancellation of the
P1154 stood. It is very important that I put that peg in the ground. In
passing, I should say that I believe it was right to cancel the P1154.
The highly effective off-base operating capability developed by the
RAF on the Harrier could not have been achieved on the P1154 with
its plenum-chamber burning reheat system which would have caused
very severe ground erosion problems. In short, we would have been
trying to run before we could walk, and that could have had a most
adverse, if not fatal, impact on VSTOL in the RAF.
Here then is my scenario.
First, the RAF would, I believe, have got about a decade earlier the
kind of capability it eventually enjoyed with the Tornado GR1. The
avionics may not have been quite so well advanced, nor would the
TSR2 have been so manoeuvrable, but it would have had longer legs,
and in this respect have met the range capability called for in the
FOAS Staff Target. But TSR2 would not, of course, have been
stealthy. The bottom line is that TSR2 showed all the signs of being a
better aircraft than its nearest competitor, the F-111, but there remains
a big question mark over cost and therefore ultimate affordability and
cost-effectiveness.
Next, let us have a look at force structure.
The TSR2 would have replaced the Canberra but, because of high
costs, not on a 1 for 1 basis. Probably no more than 100 aircraft would
have been procured. The RAF’s strike/attack/recce force would thus
have become smaller, unless a second aircraft had been procured, for
which money would almost certainly not have been available.
You will recall that by 1965 the days of the V-bomber force were
numbered as a result of the Polaris decision of 1963 and which the
new Labour Government had endorsed. The Air Staff would probably
have argued for more TSR2s to replace some of the V-bombers – but
only once the programme was secure – and they may not have been
successful.
The TSR2 would have been used for nuclear strike/deeper recce,
OCA and interdiction, but not, except in extremes, for OAS
(BAI+CAS). It was not tailored for those missions and it would not
have been cost-effective in the OAS role. Therefore, another aircraft
would have been needed to replace the Hunters in the UK, Germany,
Gulf and Far East.
Would this second aircraft have been the Harrier or Jaguar, or
something else, perhaps a multi-role fighter like the STOL F-16? I
suspect it would have been the Harrier (HSA needed an order), and
that the Jaguar would not have been procured – it was always the
wrong (or certainly over-elaborate) aircraft for an advanced jet trainer
(the original intention) and with its relatively high wing loading, was
not optimised for CAS. In any event, the UK became involved in
Jaguar as part of a collaborative package agreed with the French,
where our real interest lay in the AFVG which was killed of by de
Gaulle in 1967.
The Lightning was planned to be run-on in the AD/Interceptor role
into the late 1970s and, if TSR2 had survived, I very much doubt that
the RAF could have afforded before then a new fighter as well as
TSR2 and Harrier.
By the mid-‘70s the need for a highly agile fighter like the F-15 or
a multi-role FGA aircraft like F-16 or F-18 had been widely
recognised throughout NATO. There was also the requirement to
replace the F-104 and, in France, the Mirage III; thus an opportunity
existed for a collaborative programme in Europe, as an alternative to
procurement of an American fighter. Industry here in the UK would
have pushed hard for a European programme for an agile fighter – as
would the RAF. But that option was effectively ruled out following
the cancellation of TSR2 and AFVG, and with the Tornado
programme launched instead, because industrial, economic and
political arguments de facto forced the RAF down the Tornado ADV
path. In passing, I would comment that the Tornado was never a real
MRCA, and the ADV certainly was not an air superiority fighter. It
was a long endurance interceptor and has given good service in that
role.
So, if TSR2 had survived, it is likely that the UK or Europe would
have developed an EFA-type fighter ten years earlier than was the
case. The lessons learnt on the Jaguar and Tornado collaborative
programmes would then instead have been learnt on the EFA
programme, but nonetheless a good product would probably have
resulted. Moreover, it is less likely perhaps that the French would have
gone their own way on the new agile fighter, as they did in the late
‘80s with Rafale.
Under this plot, there would almost certainly not have been a
Buccaneer in service with the RAF, unless money had been available
to fill out the force structure. I doubt it: I believe the RAF would have
had only TSR2 and Harrier in the offensive roles.
In the longer term, therefore, the RAF’s combat aircraft front line
would have been: TSR2, Harrier and the Lightning replacement.
As it was, in 1982 we had the Lightning, Phantom, Harrier, Jaguar
and Buccaneer in service. We also still had some Canberras operating
in the recce role – and still do. We thus had six types instead of three,
moreover, without TSR2, the V-bombers had to be run on for longer
than necessary – awaiting the entry into service of the Tornado GR1.
Overall, therefore, in logic there should have been considerable
savings in the logistics support area if proper fleet rationalisation
around TSR2 had been effected.
The big unknown, of course, is how costly TSR2 would have been,
both in capital and life-cycle cost terms; and what impact that would
have had on the affordability of Harrier to replace Hunter and a new
fighter to replace the Lightning. Also, of course, on the size of the
RAF’s front line. A TSR2, Hunter, Lightning fleet into the 1980s
would have been feasible but is not one that would have appealed to
me.
Another question that comes to mind is, ‘Who would have
designed and produced the new agile fighter to replace the Lighting?’
With BAC as prime contractor on the TSR2 and HSA on the Harrier,
it could have gone either way, or it could have been an issue that
brought forward the formation of the nationalised BAe. We shall
never know but there are people here today who will have a view. My
own is that the design lead would have gone to Warton given their
experience by then on supersonic aircraft.
For me the seeds of destruction of the TSR2 programme were
sown back in 1959/60 when inadequate attention was paid to
cost/performance trade-offs before endorsement of the operational
requirement on which the contract was finally based. That costs then
rose so dramatically, particularly at a time when industry was being
forced to rationalise across different cultures, is not too surprising, and
by 1964 when the first prototype flew, the die was probably cast and
the balance of arguments that the MoD and HMG had to address at
that time inexorably led to a cancellation decision. In this respect, I
agree with Sir Frank Cooper.
But that was a great shame, for an affordable TSR2 to the right
specification would have given the RAF the world’s most capable
TSR aircraft and one with at least some potential in the export market
(whereas TSR2 had virtually none when it was cancelled).
For the reasons I have given, the RAF’s front-line inventory would
(or should) have been more coherent than it is today and the Service
would probably have had an air superiority fighter at least ten years
earlier.
I doubt that, structurally, industry would have looked much
different than it does today, except perhaps the process of consolidation in Europe might have been accelerated. Frankly, I doubt
it: the real driving force there has been the pace of rationalisation in
the US since the ending of the Cold War and the formation (or
prospective formation) of mega-giants like Lockheed Martin, Boeing
McDonnell Douglas and Raytheon/Hughes.
Had TSR2 Survived. Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine GCB GBE CBIM FRAeS Sir Patrick Hine’s reputation stretches far beyond the Royal Air Force where he shone as fighter pilot, commander and staff officer. His ability to inspire others by example was unparalleled in his generation and he is acknowledged as a military thinker of considerable clarity. Since his retirement, after command of all British Forces in the Gulf War, he has become Military Advisor to British Aerospace plc and is a much respected figure in international aviation circles. He is well suited to consider the likely effects ‘Had TSR2 Survived’. I was at the Staff College when the cancellation of TSR2 was announced in 1965, and at the end of that year I was posted as Personal Air Secretary to the Minister of Defence for the RAF – Lord Shackleton. As Sir Frank Cooper has told us, the general view in the MoD at the time, including that of the then CAS, was that cancellation had been inevitable – on the grounds of unaffordability and with rising costs that were out of control. But my remit today is to offer you a view of how things would look now if TSR2 had survived, then and subsequently. To do so I must make at least one assumption at the outset. And that is that, while the TSR2 project proceeded, the earlier cancellation of the P1154 stood. It is very important that I put that peg in the ground. In passing, I should say that I believe it was right to cancel the P1154. The highly effective off-base operating capability developed by the RAF on the Harrier could not have been achieved on the P1154 with its plenum-chamber burning reheat system which would have caused very severe ground erosion problems. In short, we would have been trying to run before we could walk, and that could have had a most adverse, if not fatal, impact on VSTOL in the RAF. Here then is my scenario. First, the RAF would, I believe, have got about a decade earlier the kind of capability it eventually enjoyed with the Tornado GR1. The avionics may not have been quite so well advanced, nor would the TSR2 have been so manoeuvrable, but it would have had longer legs, and in this respect have met the range capability called for in the FOAS Staff Target. But TSR2 would not, of course, have been stealthy. The bottom line is that TSR2 showed all the signs of being a better aircraft than its nearest competitor, the F-111, but there remains a big question mark over cost and therefore ultimate affordability and cost-effectiveness. Next, let us have a look at force structure. The TSR2 would have replaced the Canberra but, because of high costs, not on a 1 for 1 basis. Probably no more than 100 aircraft would have been procured. The RAF’s strike/attack/recce force would thus have become smaller, unless a second aircraft had been procured, for which money would almost certainly not have been available. You will recall that by 1965 the days of the V-bomber force were numbered as a result of the Polaris decision of 1963 and which the new Labour Government had endorsed. The Air Staff would probably have argued for more TSR2s to replace some of the V-bombers – but only once the programme was secure – and they may not have been successful. The TSR2 would have been used for nuclear strike/deeper recce, OCA and interdiction, but not, except in extremes, for OAS (BAI+CAS). It was not tailored for those missions and it would not have been cost-effective in the OAS role. Therefore, another aircraft would have been needed to replace the Hunters in the UK, Germany, Gulf and Far East. Would this second aircraft have been the Harrier or Jaguar, or something else, perhaps a multi-role fighter like the STOL F-16? I suspect it would have been the Harrier (HSA needed an order), and that the Jaguar would not have been procured – it was always the wrong (or certainly over-elaborate) aircraft for an advanced jet trainer (the original intention) and with its relatively high wing loading, was not optimised for CAS. In any event, the UK became involved in Jaguar as part of a collaborative package agreed with the French, where our real interest lay in the AFVG which was killed of by de Gaulle in 1967. The Lightning was planned to be run-on in the AD/Interceptor role into the late 1970s and, if TSR2 had survived, I very much doubt that the RAF could have afforded before then a new fighter as well as TSR2 and Harrier. By the mid-‘70s the need for a highly agile fighter like the F-15 or a multi-role FGA aircraft like F-16 or F-18 had been widely recognised throughout NATO. There was also the requirement to replace the F-104 and, in France, the Mirage III; thus an opportunity existed for a collaborative programme in Europe, as an alternative to procurement of an American fighter. Industry here in the UK would have pushed hard for a European programme for an agile fighter – as would the RAF. But that option was effectively ruled out following the cancellation of TSR2 and AFVG, and with the Tornado programme launched instead, because industrial, economic and political arguments de facto forced the RAF down the Tornado ADV path. In passing, I would comment that the Tornado was never a real MRCA, and the ADV certainly was not an air superiority fighter. It was a long endurance interceptor and has given good service in that role. So, if TSR2 had survived, it is likely that the UK or Europe would have developed an EFA-type fighter ten years earlier than was the case. The lessons learnt on the Jaguar and Tornado collaborative programmes would then instead have been learnt on the EFA programme, but nonetheless a good product would probably have resulted. Moreover, it is less likely perhaps that the French would have gone their own way on the new agile fighter, as they did in the late ‘80s with Rafale. Under this plot, there would almost certainly not have been a Buccaneer in service with the RAF, unless money had been available to fill out the force structure. I doubt it: I believe the RAF would have had only TSR2 and Harrier in the offensive roles. In the longer term, therefore, the RAF’s combat aircraft front line would have been: TSR2, Harrier and the Lightning replacement. As it was, in 1982 we had the Lightning, Phantom, Harrier, Jaguar and Buccaneer in service. We also still had some Canberras operating in the recce role – and still do. We thus had six types instead of three, moreover, without TSR2, the V-bombers had to be run on for longer than necessary – awaiting the entry into service of the Tornado GR1. Overall, therefore, in logic there should have been considerable savings in the logistics support area if proper fleet rationalisation around TSR2 had been effected. The big unknown, of course, is how costly TSR2 would have been, both in capital and life-cycle cost terms; and what impact that would have had on the affordability of Harrier to replace Hunter and a new fighter to replace the Lightning. Also, of course, on the size of the RAF’s front line. A TSR2, Hunter, Lightning fleet into the 1980s would have been feasible but is not one that would have appealed to me. Another question that comes to mind is, ‘Who would have designed and produced the new agile fighter to replace the Lighting?’ With BAC as prime contractor on the TSR2 and HSA on the Harrier, it could have gone either way, or it could have been an issue that brought forward the formation of the nationalised BAe. We shall never know but there are people here today who will have a view. My own is that the design lead would have gone to Warton given their experience by then on supersonic aircraft. For me the seeds of destruction of the TSR2 programme were sown back in 1959/60 when inadequate attention was paid to cost/performance trade-offs before endorsement of the operational requirement on which the contract was finally based. That costs then rose so dramatically, particularly at a time when industry was being forced to rationalise across different cultures, is not too surprising, and by 1964 when the first prototype flew, the die was probably cast and the balance of arguments that the MoD and HMG had to address at that time inexorably led to a cancellation decision. In this respect, I agree with Sir Frank Cooper. But that was a great shame, for an affordable TSR2 to the right specification would have given the RAF the world’s most capable TSR aircraft and one with at least some potential in the export market (whereas TSR2 had virtually none when it was cancelled). For the reasons I have given, the RAF’s front-line inventory would (or should) have been more coherent than it is today and the Service would probably have had an air superiority fighter at least ten years earlier. I doubt that, structurally, industry would have looked much different than it does today, except perhaps the process of consolidation in Europe might have been accelerated. Frankly, I doubt it: the real driving force there has been the pace of rationalisation in the US since the ending of the Cold War and the formation (or prospective formation) of mega-giants like Lockheed Martin, Boeing McDonnell Douglas and Raytheon/Hughes.
I have a tractor beam off the front right of the pit reaching out past the gunsight unfortunately
